The prevailing interpretation of Kant's First Critique in Anglo-American philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as basically a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge (or experience), or the a priori conditions for that possibility (the representations of space and time and the categories). Instead, Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge-the very possibility of the possibility of empirical knowledge in the first place.Greenberg advances four central theses:(1) the Critique is primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects, of a priori, not empirical knowledge, and Kant's theory of that possibility is defensible; (2) Kant's transcendental ontology must be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a priori knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment, in Kant's discussion of the Table of Judgements, should be seen according to his transcendental logic as having content, not as being just logical forms of judgment making; (4) Kant's distinction between and connection of ordering relations (Verhaltnisse) and reference relations (Beziehungen) have to be kept in mind to avoid misunderstanding the Critique. At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these dominant interpretations, but by being more true to Kant's own intent it holds promise for making better sense out of what have been seen as the First Critique's discordant themes.
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
Review
Centering on the notion of things simpler (as opposed to either things in themselves or objects of experience as such), Greenberg has developed a highly original reading of Kant's arguments regarding the a priori conditions of knowledge. As a challenge to the main lines of approach to those arguments today, it cannot be ignored. --Richard E. Aquila, University of Tennessee
Robert Greenberg offers an intricate, highly original reading of Kant's first Critique on what constitutes the possibility of a priori knowledge. One of the book's main features, ambitious in scope, is the author's extensive polemic against mainstream Anglophone approaches to Kant's position on a priori knowledge. --Irmgard Scherer, Review of Metaphysics --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
Robert Greenberg offers an intricate, highly original reading of Kant's first Critique on what constitutes the possibility of a priori knowledge. One of the book's main features, ambitious in scope, is the author's extensive polemic against mainstream Anglophone approaches to Kant's position on a priori knowledge. --Irmgard Scherer, Review of Metaphysics --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
About the Author
Robert Greenberg is associate professor of philosophy at Brandeis University. His articles have appeared in the History of Philosophy Quarterly and the Journal of Philosophy.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
On Greenberg's Kant,
By Flounder (Substitution Instance) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Kant's Theory of a Priori Knowledge (Hardcover)
This is a valuable book that should be read along with Strawson, Allison, Bennett, Guyer, and Aquila. I highly recommend it, especially for those with interests in Kant's views on apriori knowledge.Greenberg offers a controversial reading in distinction to the mainline and ubiquitous Strawsonian view--that the possibility of experience is not Kant's central concern in the first Critique. He also argues that K's transcendental metaphysics should be evaluated independently of the conditions of the possibility of (apriori) knowledge. Greenberg discusses an interesting interpretation of K's Table of Judgments, as well as the logic of reference. Part 1: External Realism and K's Theory of Representation Greenberg's prose is clear and direct, which helps make the Master's arguments more clear. I also recommend: Langton, Kantian Humility (Oxford UP); McDowell, Mind and World; Smith, Reading McDowell; Stroud, Understanding Human Knowledge (Oxford UP/Paper); and Strawson, Entity and Identity (Oxford UP/in print).
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transcendental deduction, representational mind, priori knowledge that comes, knowledge whose possibility, apriorist view, transcendental affirmation, laws that belong, transcendental epistemology, twofold standpoint, things simpliciter, one apperception, transcendental ontology, transcendental content, original synthetic unity, empirical unity, priori representations, empirical intuition, double affection, customary view, schematized category, dental unity, external realism, given cognitions, dental logic, empirical synthesis Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Metaphysical Deduction, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Second Analogy, Cambridge University Press, Paul Guyer, New York, New Haven, Yale University Press, Kant's Transcendental Psychology, Analytic of Concepts, Van Cleve, Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp Smith, Analytic of Principles, The Necessity of Kant's Idealism, The Bounds of Sense, Kant's Categories Reconsidered, Model of Kant's Theory of Representation, Oxford University Press, Indiana University Press, Three Issues, Step One of the B-Deduction, Kant's External Realism, Dieter Henrich, Kant's Analytic Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
transcendental deduction, representational mind, priori knowledge that comes, knowledge whose possibility, apriorist view, transcendental affirmation, laws that belong, transcendental epistemology, twofold standpoint, things simpliciter, one apperception, transcendental ontology, transcendental content, original synthetic unity, empirical unity, priori representations, empirical intuition, double affection, customary view, schematized category, dental unity, external realism, given cognitions, dental logic, empirical synthesis Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Metaphysical Deduction, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Second Analogy, Cambridge University Press, Paul Guyer, New York, New Haven, Yale University Press, Kant's Transcendental Psychology, Analytic of Concepts, Van Cleve, Critique of Pure Reason, Kemp Smith, Analytic of Principles, The Necessity of Kant's Idealism, The Bounds of Sense, Kant's Categories Reconsidered, Model of Kant's Theory of Representation, Oxford University Press, Indiana University Press, Three Issues, Step One of the B-Deduction, Kant's External Realism, Dieter Henrich, Kant's Analytic Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
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