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A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) [Paperback]

Yoram Barzel (Author)
3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)

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Book Description

December 3, 2001 0521000645 978-0521000642
This book models the emergence and evolution of the rule-of-law state. The protector or ruler is assumed to be self-seeking. Individuals will install a protector only after they create institutions to control him. Organized protection engenders legal institutions that enforce rights. A "state of nature" then gradually turns into a rule-of-law state. Individuals employ both the state and other third parties for enforcement. The fraction of agreements that the state enforces determines its scope. Rule-of-law states encourage market transactions and standards that facilitate trade. The larger the domain of the state's ultimate enforcer, the greater the advantage of scale economies to contracting. This force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires.

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A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) + The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia


Editorial Reviews

Book Description

This book models the emergence and evolution of the rule-of-law state. The protector or ruler is assumed to be self-seeking. Individuals will install a protector only after they create institutions to control him. Organized protection engenders legal institutions that enforce rights. A "state of nature" then gradually turns into a rule-of-law state. Individuals employ both the state and other third parties for enforcement. The fraction of agreements that the state enforces determines its scope. Rule-of-law states encourage market transactions and standards that facilitate trade. The larger the domain of the state's ultimate enforcer, the greater the advantage of scale economies to contracting. This force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires.

Product Details

  • Paperback: 304 pages
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press (December 3, 2001)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0521000645
  • ISBN-13: 978-0521000642
  • Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 0.8 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 14.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,142,525 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars transactions costs and property rights, September 17, 2008
This review is from: A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (Paperback)
I'm using Barzel's book , along with a number of other books and professional journal articles, to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the current back-door privatization of a massiv e portion of New Zealand's South Isalnd High Country. I suspect only economists with a strong interest in property rights theory analyzed from the perspective of modern institutional economics will like this book. It's not for the average reader who isn't willing to do some hard slogging to understand key theoretical ideas. But there are few who can match Barzel's understanding of the development of "enforcement" or "governance" institutions that both facilitate - and limit - the potential gains for specialization and exchange that neoclassical economics takes for granted.
Dr John Fountain
Senior lecturer in economics
University of Cantebrury, New Zealand
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4 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars Theory-based fantasy, March 27, 2006
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This review is from: A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) (Paperback)
If you like the fantasy models of economists who know virtually nothing of non-capitalist economies or pre-state societies, this book is for you. If you are interested in actual information (empirical data) on what the earliest states were like, how their economies worked, and how they might have developed, then try some of these works instead:

--- Earle, Timothy (2002) Bronze Age Economics: The Beginnings of Political Economies. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
--- Feinman, Gary M. and Joyce Marcus (editors) (1998) Archaic States. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM.
--- Hansen, Mogens Herman (editor) (2000) A Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures. The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, Copenhagen.
--- Johnson, Allen W. and Timothy K. Earle (2000) The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State. 2nd ed. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
--- Smith, Adam T. (2003) The Political Landscape: Constellations of Authority in Early Complex Polities. University of California Press, Berkeley.
--- Smith, Michael E. (2004) The Archaeology of Ancient State Economies. Annual Review of Anthropology 33:73-102.
--- Trigger, Bruce G. (2003) Understanding Early Civilizations: A Comparative Study. Cambridge University Press, New York.
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Inside This Book (learn more)
First Sentence:
The model developed here attempts to capture the emergence of social interactions. Read the first page
Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
different enforcers, specialized protectors, legal delineation, dictatorial takeover, common protector, single protector, idiosyncratic assets, adjudication services, specialized protection, vote allocation, anonymous exchange, ultimate enforcer, economic owner, delineate rights, generic assets, dictatorial states, costless information, protection specialist, residual claimant, contract trade, territorial continuity
Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
United States, Middle Ages, Magna Carta, World War, Hong Kong, British Empire, Soviet Union, English Parliament, Julius Caesar, King John
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This book cites 38 books:
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