Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Bravo!, July 12, 2009
The argument of Braver's book is that one of the threads that connects the major philosophers in the continental tradition is a commitment to anti-realism. This claim is not as obvious as one might think, due to the simple fact that these authors rarely employ the vocabulary associated with realism/anti-realism debates.
To remedy this situation, Braver first constructs a set of theses that are associated with realism. The word "theses" in the plural is significant because realism does not only entail the thesis that there is a mind-independent world. For example, he argues that an adherence to a bivalent theory of truth is also a logical consequence of realism - and I find his arguments convincing, especially since he supports them with texts from the analytic tradition.
Then Braver launches into his history of anti-realism in the continental tradition, starting with Kant. Kant develops a system of philosophy that opposes some of the major theses associated with realism - but he is not able to challenge all of them, rendering his philosophy inconsistent. According to Braver, the philosophers who follow - Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida - attempt to do a better job than Kant in eradicating all the theses associated with realism (none of them succeed completely, but that is the task of future philosophers, and the anti-realist positions that they develop become more consistent over time).
Braver's succeeds in demonstrating that each philosopher is arguing against realism, even if they don't use conventional vocabulary. He quotes their works frequently, and then explains how that quote opposes a certain thesis of realism. For example, this strategy helped me understand what Heidegger means by Being - I've read several secondary works on Heidegger which have given me a functional understanding of the concept, but Braver enabled me to grasp it fully.
The genius of recasting these philosophers' works in terms of realism or anti-realism is that the theses associated with realism are relatively simple. The concepts of a mind-independent world or truth as correspondence are intuitive. Therefore, connecting notoriously difficult terms as "spirit," "will to power," "being," and "metaphysics of presence" to realism renders them less mysterious.
Another goal of this book is a rapprochement of the analytic and continental traditions. I would argue that this goal is secondary, since the primary goal is to situate diverse continental thinkers within a certain debate - but this has been a debate occurring in analytic circles also. At first, I thought Braver was going to argue that, "Look, once we develop commensurate vocabularies, we'll discover that we've been saying the same things all along!" He gives this impression at certain times, especially when he connects later Heidegger to later Wittgenstein (and the similarities are eerie).
However, in the conclusion, he argues that the two traditions fundamentally split because of the way in which they appropriated Kant. I've heard this argument elsewhere, and Braver's version make sense. In the end, he emphasizes both the similarities and the differences between the two traditions, an aspect of the book that I appreciated.
Overall, this book earns the highest praise from me. It is not without its flaws. Nevertheless, I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the continental tradition of philosophy, although I would recommend a prior understanding of these philosophers (especially Kant and Heidegger). You don't necessarily have to be interested in the realism/anti-realism debate beforehand. Suppose you just want to understand the later Heidegger - this book, by casting his vocabulary in terms of realism and anti-realism, will help you figure it out.
P.S. I have noticed that frequently philosophers who work to produce a synthesis between the analytical and continental fields often identify major continental philosophers as realists (for example, CG Prado for Foucualt and Christopher Norris for Derrida). I wonder if this results from a desire to make them more palatable for analytic philosophers (which is not to say that the aforementioned authors don't provide convincing reasons for their interpretations, they do). Therefore, Braver's book is unique for this genre.
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4 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Big Book of Brilliance, January 22, 2009
I received this book as a gift from a friend. I was prepared to read a dry work that would, frankly, help me fall asleep. Wow! I cannot tell you how wrong I was. The material is fascinating, and I found Mr. Braver's insights mind-altering. I recommend this book for anyone who is interested in this subject and who enjoys the written word. I cannot wait to read Mr. Braver's next work.
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