Customer Reviews

Thinking in Time (the Uses of History for Decision Makers)

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1 star:		(1)

 

 

As an avid reader of history, I've long struggled with putting my learning to use in day-to-day situations, whether that be in evaluating critical business decisions or in helping me better observe and understand the world around me. On the one hand, there is the familiar aphorism attributed to George Santayana that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. But, on the other hand, each situation is truly unique, and the use of historical analogies is clearly fraught with pitfalls. "Thinking in Time" addresses this conundrum and provides a sound basis for using historical knowledge intelligently and responsibly.

To overcome the temptation of using history incorrectly, the authors put forward a specific process for decision makers in crisis situations, and they use case studies to highlight successes and failures in the use of history as guide to decision making. The case studies are all drawn from domestic and foreign policy scenarios, but the lessons are applicable to any organization (private sector, non-profit, etc.).

The authors' decision making methodology may seem a bit didactic or formulaic at first, but it is meant to be used with the greatest flexibility. The heart of the process is to establish a system of critical inquiry and resist the temptation to jump to the "options phase" of decision making immediately. Rather, the authors argue, focus clearly on the situation at hand and confirm the intended objective. This can be started by listing what is known, what is unclear and what is presumed about the situation. Next, analogies will come to mind or will likely be invoked for advocacy (intentionally or otherwise), so quickly highlight all the "likenesses" and "differences" between the present situation and the historical analogies. This should further clarify the present situation and the intended objectives

The authors suggest other tools that, while useful, are a bit more cumbersome than separating the known from the unclear from the presumed in any given situation, which I know do religiously at work. Some of the other techniques covered include laying out a timeline of the event, including major concurrent events along with the details; asking journalistic questions (where, how, why, what, etc.) for each major event along the timeline; setting odds for given "if - then" scenarios; explicitly laying out what kind of information (new "knowns") would change your various "presumeds"; and for various options asking "For the objective of X, Y is the best option because...."

In closing, "Thinking in Time" is one of the ten most influential books I've ever read. If you are in a leadership position in business, government or even the local lodge, this book can make you a more effective leader. The only thing I regret about reading "Thinking in Time" is that I didn't do it sooner.

Suburb work - Neustadt and May do us a great service in that they provide a process and framework, not only for governmental decision-makers, but for anyone struggling with complex decision making. The authors, Harvard professors both, use comparative case study methodology to develop their thesis - that being "Seeing Time as a Stream." They also remind us that continuity is not everything and that "Human experience also includes discontinuity, sudden, sharp, and hard to foresee, if foreseeable at all." A suggestion: Read Chapter 13 first - then proceed to the detailed studies that make up the majority of the text. This is a necessary study for those who would either govern or lead in modern society.

This book is an essential point of reference for understanding the analogies and other devices that decision makers use to evaluate information.

The bottom line is both straight-forward and scary: policymakers see everything in terms of their own (usually limited and largely domestic) historical experiences, and they interpret what they are given by intelligence professionals in the context of their own personal perspectives.

This has several implications, and I regard this book as one of perhaps five that are long-term essential building blocks for the new craft of analytic tradecraft being devised by the CIA's Kent Center and Jack Davis:

1) Intelligence is remedial education for policymakers. There is no getting around this. While the authors are much more diplomatic than I could ever be, the raw fact is that most policy makers are very loosely-educated and generally do not have a high-quality international affairs education or substantive experience dealing with foreign affairs or even national affairs. They are local lawyers, businessmen, "friends of the President," etcetera.

2) Objective, internationalist intelligence will always be in conflict with subjective, domestic politics unless--and this is the other new theme just now emerging, years after the author's published their work--there is a public intelligence community and the citizen-voters are receiving sufficiently compelling intelligence they can use to demand and vote for early and thoughtful action instead of in extremis reaction.

3) The book breaks new ground in establishing the importance of history, not only for drawing intelligence conclusions (understanding ethnic conflict, for example, is best done in the context of 200+ years of prior history), but for translating, converting, interpreting foreign events, threats, and opportunities in domestic historical terms that can be more easily absorbed by very busy policymakers.

I do not mean to suggest that the authors are condescending. Far from it. They take a very difficult and complex matter, that of speaking truth to power about foreign issues, and offer it up in a very sensible and understandable form.

The best of the students using this book for coursework will understand that it is a "keeper," of lasting value as a future reference, worth returning to from year to year for a refresher on the value of history in both understanding and communicating.

For years, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May taught a course in Decision Making at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. It must have been one heck of a course.

The subtitle of this book is "The Uses of History for Decision-Makers." That could actually be broadened a bit to something like "The Uses of Precedents and Analogies for Decision-Makers."

Remember when we were debating going to war in Iraq? How many times did you hear the precedent of Viet Nam invoked?

And, if you're old enough, remember Viet Nam? How many times did you hear about Munich?

How many times in business have you heard a colleague invoke a historical precedent to justify a particular course of action?

We use historical precedents and analogies all the time. Most of the time we use them as if history repeats itself. It doesn't.

Mark Twain's aphorism captures best what really happens. "History does not repeat, but it does rhyme." This book will give you tools that you can use to sort out what's the same (the rhymes) and what's different and then use your analysis to make better decisions.

The authors introduce you to methods that will help you sort things out in all kinds of different situations. They teach you about separating "facts" into known, unknown, and presumed. They discuss analyzing precedents that you're about to base a decision on in terms of likes and differences from the current situation.

By itself, no individual idea or tool is unique. None of this is rocket science. But the authors give you a systematic application of common sense and proven techniques. That system gives you power.

There are lots of little "sidebar" points as well. For example, there's the Goldberg Rule.

That rule tells you not to ask, "What's the problem?" Instead ask, "What's the story?" I picked up that technique from this book when I first read it years ago and I've used it ever since in my consulting work and research. Try it. You'll like it.

There's also Dr. Alexander's question, which: "What fresh facts, if at hand, by when, would cause you to change your presumption?" Instead of presumption, you can insert direction, or recommendation. This simple question forces decision-makers in a group to look at underlying assumptions and to look at when those assumptions need to be changed. It, too, is simple and powerful.

The techniques in this book will definitely help you sharpen your decision-making skills. But there's an added benefit for you if you're a history buff. You'll enjoy the anecdotes and analysis of historical events, such as The Bay of Pigs, where one of the authors was an advisor.

There are a lot of books on decision-making. This is the only one I'm aware of that deals clearly and systematically with the use of precedent and historical analogy.

The authors teach a highly influential course, "Reasoning from History" at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. The book has great case studies of real decisions based, sometimes well, sometimes badly, on historical precedent. A wonderful book.

This book presents a terrific tool to anyone who would choose to lead in politics. In it, Neustadt presents a systematic way for dissecting situations in terms of past history (starting with figuring out what is known, unknown, or assumed in any particular crisis). The book presents several situations in which Presidents either did or did not accurately read past precedents in history. Neustadt's cogent analysis provides terrific insights into situations like Kennedy's successful use of history to avoid disaster in the Cuban Missile Crisis. One of the chapters I found most interesting was Neustadt's discussion on how President Carter misread the "honeymoon" period presidents actually receive with Congress.

This book was our second in a voluntary squadron book club led by our commander in hopes of developing us into effective leaders as we move through the ranks.

I would like to give this book 4.5 stars; however, am limited to 4 or 5.

The authors are both noted scholars and advisors. The late (2001) Richard Neustadt taught at Columbia where he wrote the very influential "Presidential Power." Prior to this, he served as advisor to Pres. Truman, and afterward, he advised Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Clinton. The late (2009) Ernest May taught at Harvard for 55 years and authored many historical analyses of WWI and WWII.

This book does not serve as a history book, but as a book on how to use history. The premise of the book is that certain tools can be inserted into analytical processes to increase (even in small increments) the effectiveness or success of a decision. The authors propose several mini techniques to facilitate their purpose. These methods are the fruit of several years worth of classes taught by the authors at Harvard. The authors use their insight into events surrounding presidential decisions and crises and look at the use of history in their decisions. Firsthand accounts, biographies and official documents provide further views into the decision processes the authors consulted. Then the authors show where the decision makers could have used history more effectively to come to better conclusions. The Bay of Pigs, The Americanization of the Vietnam War, the Cambodian capture of SS Mayaguez, SALT II treaty, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even the reparation of Social Security by Reagan. In these, little political bias shines through.

The authors differentiate between effective use and common use of history. They propose that the majority that uses history in decision making use it incorrectly. Problems arise in inappropriate analogies and a tendency to move too quickly to act. These must be overcome and replaced with the simple-to-use and easy to remember techniques.

The authors being Harvard professors may turn some off to this text; however, the verbiage is not pretentious or overly scholarly. The concepts of the book are proposed in a straight-forward manner and repeated with a patience that seemed to underscore the importance with which the authors see this topic.

Why subtract 1/2 star? At times, it seemed the authors belabored points. They repeated themselves often and their techniques become slightly convoluted in the last quarter of the book. Also, the authors placed the conclusion (summary) a chapter too early. After the conclusion, the authors wrote about the importance of thinking of time as a stream or continuum. This is a concept that is important but seems out of place with the rest of the text.

The concept that those who do not study history are doomed to repeat it. That includes looking at the methods used in reaching decisions, and this book serves well as a means of gathering insight into decision making history. This book is highly recommended to those in leadership positions.

This is a very good book. The only complaints I could make is that trying to make it relevant to an American means that an Australian finds it very difficult to follow the examples.

This is a great guide for a government staffer. If what you do is help a senior executive decision maker there are a number of cases and examples of how history can be used properly to aid decision making.

Neustadt and May taught a classic course at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government and this is the text that resulted.

I find it extremely useful in my own work. Worth reading for anyone who helps a senior leader make decisions and take action.

Richard Neustadt and Ernest May's book is a classic that belongs on the shelf of every policymaker, businessman and financier. It will teach you how to think more clearly and precisely about current events, and lays a great foundation for further study of current affairs.