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To overcome the temptation of using history incorrectly, the authors put forward a specific process for decision makers in crisis situations, and they use case studies to highlight successes and failures in the use of history as guide to decision making. The case studies are all drawn from domestic and foreign policy scenarios, but the lessons are applicable to any organization (private sector, non-profit, etc.).
The authors' decision making methodology may seem a bit didactic or formulaic at first, but it is meant to be used with the greatest flexibility. The heart of the process is to establish a system of critical inquiry and resist the temptation to jump to the "options phase" of decision making immediately. Rather, the authors argue, focus clearly on the situation at hand and confirm the intended objective. This can be started by listing what is known, what is unclear and what is presumed about the situation. Next, analogies will come to mind or will likely be invoked for advocacy (intentionally or otherwise), so quickly highlight all the "likenesses" and "differences" between the present situation and the historical analogies. This should further clarify the present situation and the intended objectives
The authors suggest other tools that, while useful, are a bit more cumbersome than separating the known from the unclear from the presumed in any given situation, which I know do religiously at work. Some of the other techniques covered include laying out a timeline of the event, including major concurrent events along with the details; asking journalistic questions (where, how, why, what, etc.) for each major event along the timeline; setting odds for given "if - then" scenarios; explicitly laying out what kind of information (new "knowns") would change your various "presumeds"; and for various options asking "For the objective of X, Y is the best option because...."
In closing, "Thinking in Time" is one of the ten most influential books I've ever read. If you are in a leadership position in business, government or even the local lodge, this book can make you a more effective leader. The only thing I regret about reading "Thinking in Time" is that I didn't do it sooner.
This book is an essential point of reference for understanding the analogies and other devices that decision makers use to evaluate information.
The bottom line is both straight-forward and scary: policymakers see everything in terms of their own (usually limited and largely domestic) historical experiences, and they interpret what they are given by intelligence professionals in the context of their own personal perspectives.
This has several implications, and I regard this book as one of perhaps five that are long-term essential building blocks for the new craft of analytic tradecraft being devised by the CIA's Kent Center and Jack Davis:
1) Intelligence is remedial education for policymakers. There is no getting around this. While the authors are much more diplomatic than I could ever be, the raw fact is that most policy makers are very loosely-educated and generally do not have a high-quality international affairs education or substantive experience dealing with foreign affairs or even national affairs. They are local lawyers, businessmen, "friends of the President," etcetera.
2) Objective, internationalist intelligence will always be in conflict with subjective, domestic politics unless--and this is the other new theme just now emerging, years after the author's published their work--there is a public intelligence community and the citizen-voters are receiving sufficiently compelling intelligence they can use to demand and vote for early and thoughtful action instead of in extremis reaction.
3) The book breaks new ground in establishing the importance of history, not only for drawing intelligence conclusions (understanding ethnic conflict, for example, is best done in the context of 200+ years of prior history), but for translating, converting, interpreting foreign events, threats, and opportunities in domestic historical terms that can be more easily absorbed by very busy policymakers.
I do not mean to suggest that the authors are condescending. Far from it. They take a very difficult and complex matter, that of speaking truth to power about foreign issues, and offer it up in a very sensible and understandable form.
The best of the students using this book for coursework will understand that it is a "keeper," of lasting value as a future reference, worth returning to from year to year for a refresher on the value of history in both understanding and communicating.