Customer Reviews

The Third Day at Gettysburg & Beyond (Military Campaigns of the Civil War Series)

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The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond edited by Gary Gallagher is a nice relatively short volume of historiographical works on the last day at Gettysburg and it's immediate aftermath.
The book is not without its problems. In his chapter "Lee's Army Has Not Lost its Prestige" Gallagher asserts that the defeat at Gettysburg was not a crushing defeat for the Confederacy and the defeat at Vicksburg was a much larger defeat for the CSA and its people. While this conclusion is interesting, it's completely at odds with Gallagher's later assertion in his book The Confederate War, that Lee's army was of paramount importance to the people of the CSA. His conclusion that the populace was not as concerned about Gettysburg based upon analysis of letters and diaries needs more study. However, his conclusion that Gen. Lee originally did not regard the defeat at Gettysburg as a crushing blow is well grounded as is his conclusion that Lee's soldiers were not crushed by the defeat which they attributed to the Union army simply having the advantage of better ground and "not fighting a fair fight." Their confidence was certainly not crushed and they believed they did inflict a blow to the Union army in the previous three days fighting.
William Garrett Piston's chapter "Cross Purposes" on Gen. Longstreet and his orders for the final days fighting which ended up causing Lee to order the ill fated, and misnamed, Pickett's charge is also quite interesting. Piston fails to convince however that it was in fact Longstreet not following Lee's orders that caused the disaster. However he does acknowledge ultimate blame falls on Lee for not following through with Longstreet's plan once in motion, he didn't have to order the ill fated charge.
However, after these two chapters the book starts to take a turn and not for the better. Carol Reardon's chapter on Pickett's Charge focuses on the historiographical conflicts waged after the war concerning the responsibility for the failure of the charge. While this is interesting, it really doesn't have much to do with the actual aftermath of the conflict or the charge itself. It only includes a small discussion of which account of the charge and the responsibility for its ultimate failure, is correct.
Perhaps the most interesting chapters are the last two in the book. Robert L. Bee includes the wartime correspondance of Sgt. Ben Hirst's account of the fighting and its aftermath, as well as mentioning his accounts of other battles. Hirst's letters detail the horror of war in a very intense way that brings the action to life for the reader.
A. William Greene conclusively demonstrates that the charges against Gen. Meade of not pursuing Lee after the battle are completely baseless. Bad weather as well as the fact the Confederate army was not as defeated and lacking supplies as Lincoln and many historians after the battle would have one believe, demonstrate had Meade gone after the Confederate army his own army, lacking sleep, food and shoes, would likely have been repulsed on the banks of a swollen Potomac by an angry, well supplied, Confederate Army with many of its soldiers looking for another fight. These charges also ignore that Meade's actual orders were to protect Washington and Baltimore, and force him away from the Federal capital and out of Maryland, not attempt a crushing defeat of Lee which would have taken him and Lee much closer to Washington. Given Lincoln's paranoia about protecting the Federal capital, had Meade spoiled for a fight nearer Washington, Lincoln likely would have criticized him for putting the capital in jeopardy. The consequences of such a battle for the Union had Lee's army been successful would have been desasterous.
Overall, this is a decent historiography that loses its way in the middle with Reardon's chapter and Robert K. Krick's chapter on two Virginia Confederate soldiers. Had those chapters been replaced by ones more germane to the fighting the last day at Gettysburg, this would have been a better book.

Part of the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series and the third of three books on Gettysburg, Gallagher presents a series of essays on the 3d and 4th days of the Battle of Gettysburg and the immediate aftermath. A key point is that these are essays - the volume does not present a history of the battle. Instead, each essay reviews a particular moment or theme.

A strong point of an essay series is that the authors can lay differing interpretations of key events or points without the necessity of retelling the entire story of the battle. For instance, Gallagher's own essay discusses the difficulties Meade faced in launching a pursuit of the Confederates and what he actually managed to accomplish. Little has been written on this since Coddington's The Gettysburg Campaign.

Other essays focus on skirmishing by the 14th Connecticutt prior to Pickett's Charge, the importance of Gettysburg to the overall Confederate war effort and some other topics. The essays are uniformly well-written and interesting, if not always completely convincing.

I'd recommend that anyone interested in Gettysburg beyond the most basic level read this volume as well as the previous two.

This book follows the standard format of all Gary Gallagher Military Campaigns of the Civil War books. It contains six essays about various aspects pertaining to the last day at Gettysburg and the immediate aftermath of the battle. Overall the book is solid in that it discusses some of the latest scholarship and academic findings about Gettysburg, and covers a wide range of topics. I enjoy this in depth analysis of battles, while others may find this type of history book slighly dry.

Gary Gallagher's essay about the impact the loss at Gettysburg had on the Confederate Army and civilian population is very interesting, and probably the best essay from the book. I did not realize that Vicksburg was considered a much greater loss for most Confederates. Not until Lincoln's address does the magnitude of what happened really sink into the hearts and minds of both sides.

Both, Piston's essay about the relationship between Lee and Longstreet during the battle, and Reardon's essay about Pickett's charge, are well researched and written. Robert Krick's essay about the shared history between Generals Armistead and Garnett is a bit long and somewhat boring. Robert Bee's essay conveys a very personal view of the Battle through the letters of one of the participants. I find these types of eye witness accounts fascinating. Finally, Greene argues that Meade was not overly cautious in his pursuit of Lee. Greene presents some decent arguments, but I was not convinced that Meade did not prolong the war through his slow advance towards the defeated Confederate Army. Of course, all this changes once Grant is put in command over Meade.

I recommend this book for anyone who is very interested in the Battle of Gettysburg. If you are looking for fresh, relevant, and current material about the third day of the battle, then you will enjoy this book. For those who have read other books in the campaign series and liked them, you will most likely enjoy this one also.

Gallagher does a good job of putting together collections of essays on civil war topics. I bought this one mainly because I tend to agree with Gallagher's opinion that Gettysburg is only in hindsight the main turning point or high water mark of the war. The battle was undoubtedly a horrible defeat for Lee, but if it was such a death blow, why way Lee able to send his best corps to Georgia a month later and keep it there for over eight months? There were no major battles in Virginia for almost a year after Gettysburg. I see Bragg's failure at Chattanooga to be a much bigger turning point. The war was all downhill for the South after Chattanooga.

I've read the other two books, Day One and Day Two. Unique concept that has different authors reflect on the battle plans each day. Very well rounded forum and that lays the ground work for dissecting the actors and events of the Gettysburg battle. Often different analysis that is thought provoking. Studies of the commanders and their battle plans during the Civil War will always be controvercial. The book shows this from all sides. The 'trilogy', day one,tow, and three, is a excellent source of 'battle plan theory' of the Battle at Gettysburg

This book is the the final volume of essays on each of the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg (July 1 --3, 1863) edited by Professor Gary Gallagher. It includes six essays five of which center upon the final assault on the center of the Union position on Cemetery Ridge on July 3, commonly known as "Pickett's Charge." Although I found the essays illuminating, they do not address the legendary charge itself but deal instead with somewhat collateral issues. Four of these five essays deal predominantly with the Southern assault rather than with the Union defense. The final essay in the volume explores in detail the Confederate retreat following the battle and the Union pursuit.

The book opens with an essay by Professor Gallagher, "Lee's Army has not Lost any of its Prestige". This essay challenges the view that Gettysburg was recognized as a disaster for the Confederacy in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Professor Gallagher argues that the morale of the Southern Army remained high and that the Southern press and people were not of one mind in their reaction to the Battle. There is valuable material in this essay, but even in Professor Gallagher's recounting the evidence of Southern reaction is equivocal. Although the material is interesting, I found it of secondary value in trying to understand the events of July 3.

William Garrett Piston's essay "Longstreet, Lee, and Confederate Attack Plans for July 3 at Gettysburg" is an outstanding study of the Lee-Longstreet controversy as it applied to the formulation of plans for the third day of the Battle. Piston reviews in detail the various plans of General Lee and General Longstreet for the third day of the Battle. He argues persuasively that Longstreet was dilatory and did not follow Lee's orders to attack early in the day on July 3. (Most of Longstreet's critics focus with much less justification on Longstreet's alleged slowness on July 2.) The essay explores the options available to the Army of Northern Virginia on the morning of the third day of the battle. The Southern position was very difficult, in hindsight, and the performance of both Lee and Longsteet was wanting. This is easily the best essay in the volume in terms of understanding the events of July 3.

Carol Reardon's essay "The Convergence of History and Myth in the Southern Past" is one of an increasing number of scholarly efforts to distinguish between history as an actual event and history as memory -- the uses and mythologies which people construct about the past. She discusses how Pickett's charge assumed the status of a legend and she focuses on the war after the Battle in the South. This war over the charge involved attempts to exonerate Robert E. Lee for the failure of the assault, and it also involved disputes between Virginians and North Carolinians over which Southern troops deserved the glory (and which the blame) for the assault. Professor Reardon subsequently addressed the subject of this essay in her book "Pickett's Charge in History and Memory."

Robert Krick's essay "Armistead and Garnett: the parallel lives of two Virginia soldiers" offers biographical insights into the two of General Pickett's brigade commanders who died at Gettysburg. I learned a great deal about Armistead and Garnett from this essay, but it was of limited usefulness in helping me understand Pickett's charge.

Anthropologist Robert Bee's essay "Fredricksburg on the Other Leg" examines the letters of a Union combatant, Sergeant Ben Hirst, of the 14th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, who participated on the Union side of the line during Pickett's charge. This is a good essay in how a common soldier saw and responded to the Confederate assault.

The final essay in the volume "From Gettysburg to Falling Waters" by A Wilson Greene examines two issues: a) General Meade's decision not to counterattack on July 3 and July 4 following the repulse of Pickett's charge; b) the retreat from Gettysburg and General Meade's alleged failure to pursue with sufficient agressiveness before the Southern Army crossed the Potomac to Virginia on July 14. The essay includes a careful factual exposition followed by Greene's analysis. Greene argues that Meade acted properly in deciding against a counterattack. The matter of the retreat is more complex. President Lincoln's views, highly critical of Meade, have colored much of the controversy and tarnished Meade's reputation. Greene finds that Meade on the whole performed ably and thoughtfully in his pursuit of the retreating Army of Northern Virginia. He concludes, however, that the Union Army had opportunities for a more agressive approach which a more daring and imaginative commander could well have exploited to good effect. It is doubtful that Lee's army could have been destroyed by more agressive pursuit.

This is a thougtful volume of essays that will interest readers familiar with the basic facts and issues of the Gettysburg campaign.

Similar in format to his books covering Day #1 and Day #2 issues, Gary Gallagher has assembled several writer/historians to offer or explain popular concerns of the Day #3 events. Authors offer their views on various subjects such as Confederate morale, Meade's decision to not pursue Lee, Pickett's Charge as a myth and more. Sadly, I did find Robert Krick's essay on Armistead and Garnett to be quite boring and not as useful for the Day #3 events as intended. He liked to cover their military careers while very little was covered about their Gettysburg involvment. I like Krick's work, but felt this essay could have worked in another book.

This book is intended for those who probably already have a good knowledge of the Day #3 events and may have had questions as to popular ideas and concepts of that day. True to the quality of his other books, Gary Gallagher has assembled a very good book with intention to cover these subjects which better explains them. This book is a must read for anyone studying Gettysburg and especially for those who are looking further into the third day fighting. This book won't cover the entire battle as others I would recommend for that. Instead, it focuses on the key issues. 5 STARS!!!!!

Gary Gallagher has assembled an interesting series of essays relating to The High Watermark at Gettysburg and subsequent views of the battle.

The essays vary from excellent to mediocre, as they often are wont to in collections. This is not a long book, but a series of a half-dozen long magazine type pieces on various topics.

Most interesting are writings about the mythology and battles over the memory of Virginia's seminal role in Pickett's Charge. The author gives a very good account of how Virginia writers monopolized the commentary on this most famous of American infantry advances in the decades following the Civil War until it became perceived as an all-Virginia show. This produced resentments and compensating analyses in magazine articles from North Carolina veterans and those from other states eventually in an effort to restore some balance to the memory of that fight and rightfully claim their state's share of the southern glory.

Longstreet's culpability in the delay surrounding the attack on July 3rd and the issue of whether or not Lee gave him preemptory orders the night before is explored as well as the creation of Longstreet as a whipping boy to magnify Lee's memory in the late 1800's. Partly due to payback for Longstreet becoming a Republican and accepting patronage from President Grant, and partly due to the need to shield Lee from what could be shown as a gross error in ordering Pickett's attack, Longstreet was the target of a sustained and vitriolic citique of his role at Gettysburg and in the war. This issue is handled well and presents an interesting monograph on how historic remembrance and war writing can easily turn propagandistic.

Less satisfying is the portrait of a Connecticut soldier who helped turn back Longstreet's advance (actually facing North Carolinian troops beyond the turn in the Angle). The diary entries and the soldier's remembrances of the battle are fascinating. Less so is that author's analysis and attempt to analyze the soldier's psyche and divine his actions or lack thereof by deconstructing his writing.

I also enjoyed a straight-history essay on the pre-Gettysburg careers of Generals Armistead and Garnett. This presented a good picture of pre-war army service as well as fleshing out the careers and background of two of the major participants in Pickett's Charge. (Ironically, Garnett fathered -- and acknowledged -- a son with an Indian woman, but had no problem fighting for a South that viewed humanity through the lens of racial class)

The Army of the Potomac's pursuit of Lee to the Potomac River and Lee's escape in the fortnight after the battle is also examined. The author does a good job of exploring the question of whether or not Meade should have counterattacked on July 3rd, examining the apparent slow pace of the pursuit, Halleck's attempt at exhortation and the not-fought "Battle of Falling Waters" in attempting to bring more clarity to age old questions.

All in all this is an interesting book that should please the Gettysburg fan.