Customer Reviews

Thought Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society: The New Science Of Memes (The Kluwer international series in engineering & computer science)

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I read Thought Contagion as my first exposure to a book dedicated to the subject of memes and memetics and one of my earliest reads dealing with cultural evolution devoid of the Social Darwinism delusions prevalent earlier in this century. It captivated me to read further on this subject. While certainly drier and more academic reading than either Blackmore or Brodie, you shouldn't have any trouble staying focussed through it if overexposure to pop-media hasn't reduced your attention span a lot. If you actually get annoyed by hype, you may even enjoy this book more than the other two (see my other Amazon reviews of "The Meme Machine" and "Virus of the Mind" both recommended).

While Lynch does not have the behavioral sciences background of Blackmore, he makes up for it in thoroughness. He has as clear a grasp of the basic understandings of memetics as any. His examples prove very useful to orient us in this understanding. Some of them have come under scrutiny by others in the memetics field with more background in biological and behavioral sciences. But they still serve as good didactic devices to the uninitiated, for which purpose they seem intended. This book only represents the introduction to Lynch's ideas in this subject. He has gone on to provide much stimulus to other serious thinkers in the field through his contributions in the online Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transfer (JOM-EMIT -- you will also find some Blackmore contributions there as well as many others).

If you like this book, then certainly Susan Blackmore's "The Meme Machine" deserves some consideration, a little more hyped, but with some deeper background in the behavioral sciences. If you don't like this presentation at all but still want to get a good introduction to the ideas of memetics, then Richard Brodie's "Virus of the Mind" may interest you better, attention grabbing and dealing more with psychological survival and self-realization in the context of our evolutionary cultural environment. If you remain skeptical about the idea of memes, but find yourself intrigued by the broader ideas of cultural evolution, then you may enjoy E. O. Wilson's "Consilience" for a renowned evolutionary biologist's approach to culture, or Gary Taylor's "Cultural Selection" for the cultural ideas of a renowned Shakespearean scholar immersed in evolutionary thinking.

Enjoy reading "Thought Contagion." It will get you thinking. It sure did for me.

The idea of beliefs helping to spread themselves is introduced well here, as a partial explanation of "thought contagion." It is a compelling view, at least superficially, but not a deeply satisfying explanation for the spread of human belief.

This seems to be the best introduction to the concept. The limitations of this book are more limitations of the meme concept than of Lynch's exposition. Lynch makes clear, in a way that others often do not, what memetic science is expected to accomplish and what it is not expected to accomplish.

Lynch briefly mentions the medical metaphor of "contagion," which like Richard Brodie's "Mind Virus," has clear and unambiguous negative connotations that serve distinct rhetorical purposes. Perhaps the best known example is the comparison of religious faith to a viral infection popularized originally by Richard Dawkins ("The Selfish Gene").

The main problem with this is that it leaves us to wonder what the host might have been composed of prior to the "infection !" What does an "uninfected" mind look like ? We know what an uninfected finger looks like, and it is very different from an infected one. In spite of this, we find the compulsory paragraph by Lynch that these are "neutral" terms. Perhaps in their intention, but not in the effect they have on discussion and thinking, even among memeticists themselves. And the choice of _which_ beliefs are part of the host and which are infestations is probably arbitrary. All beliefs are infestations in some sense in the neutral view.

Since scientific thinking came historically after medieval religion in the West, for example, it was scientific memes that were the original infestation on religious faith memes, not the reverse. And clearly the two are still in conflict in some ways, seen in bold relief in Kansas.

The basic idea behind all this is not just a rhetorical combat of ideas however. It is much more notable and interesting than that. The idea is that beliefs influence behavior, in a way that can cause us to further spread and accept those very beliefs. So memetic transmission is effectively a model of a feedback loop where a belief is spread from one person to another, then that belief influences the receiver to further spread the belief. Lynch further makes the idea more accessible by showing distinct "modes" (plausible mechanisms) by which beliefs may be said to propagate themselves. But it is in the details of the transmission modes that I find it hard to believe that memetic theories can stand independently of individual psychology.

For example, A taboo against masturbation, Lynch suggests, might lead us to reproduce more, thus leading to more offspring, who presumably would inherit the taboo from their parents, thus spreading it. This is an example of Lynch's "parental quantity" mode. The modes, he admits, are not distinct; they interact and overlap with each other, complicating the study of how beliefs are transmitted. Thus, the question of why an adult should retain the taboo against masturbation imposed on them as children and pass it on in turn to their children.

The role played by a belief over the lifespan of an individual is de-emphasized in memetic analysis, as are the qualities of individuals which lead them to either accept or reject the "memes" that others attempt to infect them with.

One of the best examples of this is given by Lynch in a brief passage about political philosophy spread as thought contagion. He notes that poverty seems to influence people to accept memes that promise to raise them out of poverty (socialism, communism). He also notes that memes of capitalism tend to propgate themselves partly because the bring wealth to the holders. Finally, he points out that memes that don't make promises they can't keep (Islam, for example, makes not claim to enrich material wealth) have some additional stability because people are less likely to become disenchanted with them when they don't seem to bring what was promised. So unfalsifiability becomes a positive factor in the longevity of meme, but at the same time, believable promises also help the spread of memes.

The underlying assumption of this reasoning though complicates the meme concept, because it means that memes are not just spread due to their own characteristics, but also because of the way they are interpreted and evaluated by individuals. And that process is known to be heavily influenced by social context, not just by the content of the belief in question. Social scientists seem to find all sorts of things like authority, group identity, birth order, the historical era we grow up in, gender, and our past experience, that heavily influence whether we accept an idea.

While the meme itself may plausibly influence its own spread by causing "spread me" behavior in its host, it probably has less success in influencing "accept me" behavior in new potential hosts. That's the part, at the boundaries, that memetics becomes difficult to separate from other behavioral sciences, and seems to need to consider the individual characteristics of hosts. A consideration that muddles the concept and its pristine focus on the characteristics of beliefs which influence their own spread. Lynch, as other memetics proponents, addresses this important aspect, but only in passing. A future text that makes these boundary conditions at least as clear as Lynch makes the various modes of transmission will be a particularly welcome contribution to the fundamental memetics idea.

Aaron Lynch is an ex-Fermilab physicist who co-independently discovered the meme in 1978, and has been researching memetics full-time since 1986. His work has been cited by Douglas Hofstadter as important, and he co-edits the online peer-reviewed 'Journal of Memetics'.

'Thought Contagion' is the first mainstream book published on this new science, and has some excellent early chapters on the history of memetics, and importantly, the relationship between memetics and other sciences such as socio-biology, epidemiology, and the social sciences. Lynch draws on the earlier work of Dawkins, Dennett, and Hofstadter to present a solid scientific model, which he has developed elsewhere via extensive mathematical proofs.

The presentation of propagation modes is more precise and scientific than a more populist evolutionary psychology/drives-hot button influenced work like Richard Brodie's 'Virus of the Mind' (Integral Press, 1996). Brodie has interestingly admitted that Lynch actually began his work before Brodie did, and that Lynch's book was stalled by a careful peer-review process (leaving aside the heated Brodie/Lynch debates on the future direction of memetics and its public presentation). The bibliography is also incredibly useful. Lynch's writing is crisp and clear, very readable but also very serious. Lynch wants to convince you, and often succeeds.

Where most memetics books become controversial is in their analysis of contemporary social issues. For many readers, the archetypal book on memetics is still to be written, but the science is still in its infancy, and has developed much over the past several years.

Lynch does an admirable job of examining a broad range of issues, from the prevalence of different forms of religious fundamentalism and talk-show/advocacy journalism politics to debates on human sexuality, drug addiction, and gun control. The latter are so hotly debated that Lynch is likely to come across sounding subdued compared to typical media hype. But this is a scientist talking rationally, not a journalist.

Lynch is at his best when he takes an indepth case-study approach, backing up his arguments with scientific data and graphs (a sample case-study on the Amish is presented in the opening chapter, and is available online). Readers are more likely to disagree with his handling of other issues, and not look at either his presentation, or how he subtly works thought contagion theory into his arguments. It takes several readings to appreciate his sections on linguistics and abstract mathematics as well.

Definitely worth reading, Lynch's book was the first to give a serious indication of the potential of memetics as a valid new science, and to hint at powerful social applications. Lynch continues to reveal and further develop his key models, important mathematical proofs, and real-world applications.

Meme theory is an interesting concept, as exemplified by its analysis of the spread of Christianity. Likewise, Lynch has created a usable outline of the means through which memes spread, for example proselytization vs. procreation. However Lynch's lack of humility is insufferable and damaging. This manifests itself most obviously in his incessant hyperbolic sales pitch that memetics is a revolutionary "new science" or a paradigm shift comparable to the discovery that the Earth is round. Less immediately noticeable, but ultimately more damaging to his case is his refusal to seriously consider existing theory. This is most evident in the "missing link" chapter -- allegedly an overview of memetic's unifying place among the social and behavioral sciences -- which really shows the missing link in Lynch's theory is an understanding of the disciplines he expects to conquer. For instance, the well-established social psychology theory of cognitive dissonance deals with the evolution and interaction of ideas and the propensity of an individual to adopt and disseminate an idea, exactly the topics of Lynch's book, yet he does not integrate, confront, or even mention it. Ironically for a theory that originated in biology, Lynch even tends to ignore the importance of old-fashioned genetics -- for instance in his assertion that straight men look at women's breasts because it serves to advertise their heterosexuality. I think that meme theory may be a promising perspective for the social sciences, but it will only fulfill this promise when a more talented theorist becomes "infected" with the meme theory meme.

This slim volume is just packed with information about memetics and meme transmission. Beginning with a review of how memes spread, the book then goes into a whirlwind tour of memetic analyses that intrigue as well as educate. Lynch's writing is well-balanced and intelligent, and his analyses are quite fascinating. Be sure to check out his website at http://www.thoughtcontagion.com, where you can find more memetic analyses and excerpts from an upcoming project.

If you're looking for an introduction to memetics, this is definitely the best book I've found on the subject (though of course you should read Dawkins' "The Selfish Gene" too). Need more (or more wide-ranging) information? Try http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DEFAULT.html (Principia Cybernetica Web) or http://library.thinkquest.org/C004367 (Replicators: Evolutionary Powerhouses).

This book is a poor exposition of a poor theory. The idea of a viral analogue for ideas spreading is not that profound (it's a kind of lightweight analogy that fails to identify the nature of the host, the nature of the contagion, the nature of the conversion etc). If you want to read the best account of the standard Meme theory, then read Dawkin's Selfish Gene.

However, rather than that you might want to go back to a genuine mathematical epidemic model for the spread of beliefs. This was put forward by Goffman et in 1967-71 in a series of papers in Nature and other journals, analysing the spread of symbolic logic through Europe in the 19th century - these are very interesting to read in and of themselves, but also show why the Meme theory is insufficient in and of itself. Refs are

GOFFMAN, W., and NEWILL, V.A. Communication and epidemic processes. Proc. Royal Soc. A 298 (May 1967), pp316-334.

GOFFMAN, W. Mathematical approach to the spread of scientific ideas. Nature. 212 (Oct. 1966), pp449-452

GOFFMAN, W. A Mathematical Method for Analyzing the Growth of a Scientific Discipline (JACM 18(2) April 1971 pp12-28

GOFFMAN, W., & HARMON, G. Mathematical approach to the prediction of scientific discovery. Nature, 229, 1971 103-104.

GOFFMAN, W., & WARREN, K. S. Scientific information systems and the principle of selectivity (pp. 22-25). New York, NY: Praeger Publishers. 1980

GOFFMAN, W., & KATZ, M. J. Performance of ontogenetic patterns. Philosophy of Science, 48, 1981 438-453.

There is also a use of the system to examine the spread of the APL mathematical programming language in J. C. Rault and G. Demars - Is APL epidemic? or a study of its growth through an extended bibliography in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on APL 1972 pp1-21 1972, which revisits the idea with 400 references drawn from the literature

The book is very disappointing. I would not recommend it to anyone. Anyone with an ounce of imagination and a glass of beer could create the types of analysis presented here. Indeed it reads more like an undergraduate beer session discussion that an account of a field of scholarship. It is difficult even to review since there is no wholeness to the ideas as they are presented in the book.

The first chapter of `Thought Contagion' supplies some useful information about the modes by which memes of ideas may propagate through humanity. Unfortunately the author does not build upon this to provide a model of meme propagation. The rest of the book is a collection of `just-so' stories bout various ideas and how they can spread, work in synergy or conflict etc. These accounts are not deep but are comprised of only shallow arm-waving analysis. The author continually hints at deeper ideas of meta-memes, synergistic assemblies of memes creating self-sustaining groups, antagonistic sets of memes resulting in oscillations in the numbers of adherents etc. Even in some of the `just-so' stories, the author refers to these ideas but never explicitly demonstrates them. The reader is left with chapter after chapter of what appears to be shallow conjecture.

The author implies that he has a mathematical model that confirms some of his analysis. I assume that he does but he never presents even a hint of it. The book would be much better if he had expressed some of his examples in a mathemaical strcture to show the commonality among his models that he continually hints at. The reader can easily see that most of the examples conform to a few simple patterns. If the author had shown these patterns and fitted examples ot them, he would have better explained his ideas.

This book is a rare gem, providing the general reader with an interesting and valuble way of looking at the sometimes mysterious cults of popularity that many ideas including religions, taboos and politics engender. This is not a scholarly work (although it is based on substantial research) but a more of an introduction for the lay person to memetics.

I first read it when it first came out about 10 years ago, and like Eric K. Drexler's "Engines of Creation" it has kept echoing in my mind ever since.

Although this book doesn't contain much in the way of research it is an excellent primer to the field. I thought the book was fascinating and explained the concept extremely well with numerous examples to back up the concept. Although some other reviewers complain about the lack of research Lynch explains this in the book stating that the purpose of writing it is to stimulate research much as Darwin's "Origin of the Species" did.

The book reads like the rambling essay exam answer of a C student. In the book Lynch provides a light pencil sketch of a fascinating topic without any depth or research to support his theories. As such Lynch sounds like the know-it-all at a cocktail party explaining the wonders of how the world works to whomever will listen. This book is in such extremely rough form that you will find your interest sagging in 50 pages or so. A few in-depth case studies coupled with some suporting research could have made an exciting book. Maybe he'll write that one later. Who knows? The fact is that a book about the transmission and evolution of belief systems should be a great read full of references to history, philosophy, literature, and religion. The book ignores the first three and burns through religion in 36 pages. That's just not enough effort to analyze Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in any but the most superficial way. It was like drinking from an empty glass. There was nothing to make you sit back and think, or mull over the implications of his theories