The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq [Hardcover]

Kenneth M. Pollack (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 18, 2002

In The Threatening Storm, Kenneth M. Pollack, one of the world’s leading experts on Iraq, provides a masterly insider’s perspective on the crucial issues facing the United States as it moves toward a new confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

For the past fifteen years, as an analyst on Iraq for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, Kenneth Pollack has studied Saddam as closely as anyone else in the United States. In 1990, he was one of only three CIA analysts to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the principal author of the CIA’s history of Iraqi military strategy and operations during the Gulf War, Pollack gained rare insight into the methods and workings of what he believes to be the most brutal regime since Stalinist Russia.

Examining all sides of the debate and bringing a keen eye to the military and geopolitical forces at work, Pollack ultimately comes to this controversial conclusion: through our own mistakes, the perfidy of others, and Saddam’s cunning, the United States is left with few good policy options regarding Iraq. Increasingly, the option that makes the most sense is for the United States to launch a full-scale invasion, eradicate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, and rebuild Iraq as a prosperous and stable society—for the good of the United States, the Iraqi people, and the entire region.

Pollack believed for many years that the United States could prevent Saddam from threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf and the world through containment—a combination of sanctions and limited military operations. Here, Pollack explains why containment is no longer effective, and why other policies intended to deter Saddam ultimately pose a greater risk than confronting him now, before he gains possession of nuclear weapons and returns to his stated goal of dominating the Gulf region. “It is often said that war should be employed only in the last resort,” Pollack writes. “I reluctantly believe that in the case of the threat from Iraq, we have come to the last resort.”

Offering a view of the region that has the authority and force of an intelligence report, Pollack outlines what the leaders of neighboring Arab countries are thinking, what is necessary to gain their support for an invasion, how a successful U.S. operation would be mounted, what the likely costs would be, and how Saddam might react. He examines the state of Iraq today—its economy, its armed forces, its political system, the status of its weapons of mass destruction as best we understand them, and the terrifying security apparatus that keeps Saddam in power. Pollack also analyzes the last twenty years of relations between the United States and Iraq to explain how the two countries reached the unhappy standoff that currently prevails.

Commanding in its insights and full of detailed information about how leaders on both sides will make their decisions, The Threatening Storm is an essential guide to understanding what may be the crucial foreign policy challenge of our time.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"One of the most important books on American foreign policy in years. There is no greater strategic challenge than Iraq, and nobody better qualified to tackle it than Kenneth Pollack. To have such comprehensive, high-quality professional analysis available publicly and in real time is simply extraordinary. From now on, all serious debate over how to handle Saddam starts here."
-Gideon Rose, Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs

"Iraq is at the top of America's foreign policy agenda and this book should be at the top of your reading list. Kenneth Pollack approaches the problem of Saddam Hussein without ideological blinkers or prejudices. He provides an clear-eyed account of the breakdown of American policy toward Saddam Hussein and makes a powerful case for a shift in that policy. Whether or not you agree with Pollack's solution -- and I do -- you will admire The Threatening Storm. It is intelligent, balanced, and measured; a model of fair-minded analysis on a topic that rarely gets any. Before you make up your mind on Iraq, read this book."
-Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International

" Kenneth Pollack has brilliantly written a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the problem Iraq poses for the United States. This is a must read for those desiring an in depth understanding of the issues in this complex problem and for those who are responsible for developing policy."
-General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.)

From the Inside Flap

In The Threatening Storm, Kenneth M. Pollack, one of the world?s leading experts on Iraq, provides a masterly insider?s perspective on the crucial issues facing the United States as it moves toward a new confrontation with Saddam Hussein.

For the past fifteen years, as an analyst on Iraq for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council, Kenneth Pollack has studied Saddam as closely as anyone else in the United States. In 1990, he was one of only three CIA analysts to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the principal author of the CIA?s history of Iraqi military strategy and operations during the Gulf War, Pollack gained rare insight into the methods and workings of what he believes to be the most brutal regime since Stalinist Russia.

Examining all sides of the debate and bringing a keen eye to the military and geopolitical forces at work, Pollack ultimately comes to this controversial conclusion: through our own mistakes, the perfidy of others, and Saddam?s cunning, the United States is left with few good policy options regarding Iraq. Increasingly, the option that makes the most sense is for the United States to launch a full-scale invasion, eradicate Saddam?s weapons of mass destruction, and rebuild Iraq as a prosperous and stable society?for the good of the United States, the Iraqi people, and the entire region.

Pollack believed for many years that the United States could prevent Saddam from threatening the stability of the Persian Gulf and the world through containment?a combination of sanctions and limited military operations. Here, Pollack explains why containment is no longer effective, and why other policies intended to deter Saddam ultimately pose a greater risk than confronting him now, before he gains possession of nuclear weapons and returns to his stated goal of dominating the Gulf region. ?It is often said that war should be employed only in the last resort,? Pollack writes. ?I reluctantly believe that in the case of the threat from Iraq, we have come to the last resort.?

Offering a view of the region that has the authority and force of an intelligence report, Pollack outlines what the leaders of neighboring Arab countries are thinking, what is necessary to gain their support for an invasion, how a successful U.S. operation would be mounted, what the likely costs would be, and how Saddam might react. He examines the state of Iraq today?its economy, its armed forces, its political system, the status of its weapons of mass destruction as best we understand them, and the terrifying security apparatus that keeps Saddam in power. Pollack also analyzes the last twenty years of relations between the United States and Iraq to explain how the two countries reached the unhappy standoff that currently prevails.

Commanding in its insights and full of detailed information about how leaders on both sides will make their decisions, The Threatening Storm is an essential guide to understanding what may be the crucial foreign policy challenge of our time.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 528 pages
• Publisher: Random House; 1 edition (September 18, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0375509283
• ISBN-13: 978-0375509285
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.5 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (87 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #958,850 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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38 of 45 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Essential Reading for the Public Debate, October 27, 2002

By 

"krchicago" (Chicago, IL United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Hardcover)

Kenneth Pollack has provided essential background reading for every member of the public who wants to have an intelligent opinion on the question of what we should do about Iraq. If you're like me, you have a hard time remembering who did what to whom when and why it matters -- and the first section of "The Threatening Storm" is devoted to a brief (100 pages) summary of Iraqi history, from colonial government through Saddam's rise to power, US relations with Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and the tortured history of the UN sanctions. If you read only this much, you will at least understand why the containment/sanctions regime has failed (and has no realistic chance of being revived in any productive form).

The second section of the book (another 100 pages) gives an overview of the situation today -- the massive police state run by Saddam, the nature of the threat he poses, and what other Persian Gulf states (and others in the area and in Europe) think of his regime. The description of Saddam's repressive policies and the threat he poses are both chilling (both more realistic and more scary than anything I have heard from our current Administration). The country-by-country overview of current attitudes toward Iraq and what US policy should be was particularly fascinating. Pollack carefully proceeds through each country, explaining their own particular interests in and policies toward Iraq, and how they wish the US to act. This section provides some very interesting perspectives that I have not seen elsewhere in the popular media, particularly on Jordanian, Syrian and Turkish interests.

In the final 200 pages, Pollack turns to an analysis of US policy options. He carefully reviews all of the options, assessing their feasibility (the stumbling block of any renewed sanctions regime and of covert operations) and weighing the arguments pro and con. Pollack convinces me that the only real options are a fall back to "pure" deterrence (consisting of lifting the remaining sanctions, allowing Saddam to rebuild his military strength and eventually (soon) acquire nuclear weapons, while relying on the threat of US military intervention should he attempt to act beyond his own borders) or a full-scale invasion to remove Saddam and rebuild Iraq. As between deterrence and invasion, I wish that I could say that I think deterrence will work. I'm not excited about the US going to war -- ever -- and particularly not without an immediate provocation. I started this book looking to pick holes in the argument. But I have to confess that Pollack has convinced me that deterrence poses too many risks. Our Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union is often cited as an example -- but what we deterred the USSR from doing was attacking the US. We did not deter them from Berlin or Prague or Afghanistan, nor did we keep them from meddling in any number of African, Asian and South American countries. Instead, Soviet nuclear weapons deterred *us* from intervening. Once Saddam acquires nuclear weapons, will we really risk a nuclear attack on the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv in order to defend Kuwait? Even if Saddam does not invade Kuwait, he will have the economic and military power to make other Gulf states bend to his will, and could wind up effectively controlling a substantial share of the world's oil supply, with potentially devastating economic effects. By comparison to these risks, the costs of war, high though they may be, seem amply justified.

On the other hand, I also think that Pollack underestimates some of the problems associated with invasion. First, he more or less dismisses the need for a legal justification for invasion, saying it would be better if we had one, but it is not essential. I think that many Americans and most of our allies (in the Middle East and elsewhere) will find it hard to support any war that does not have an adequate legal cause. In the absence of overt provocation by Iraq, we at least need a United Nations mandate behind us. How can we call others "rogue states," if we ourselves act without an international consensus behind us? Second, Pollack makes a persuasive case that we can invade only with the support of the Saudis and other Gulf states, who will support us only if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is at least quiet. That hardly seems likely in the near future. If invasion also turns out not to be feasible, we may be left with no option but deterrence. At least having read "The Threatening Storm," I now know what risks that entails.

Pollack is eminently well-qualified to write about Iraq, having served in the CIA and the National Security Council during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. He writes well and provides enough detail to make his arguments compelling without bogging down in military detail. He gives all arguments a fair treatment, acknowledges that the costs of invasion will be high and vigorously advocates a rebuilding of the Iraqi state and economy as an essential element of any invasion policy. Nation-building is not Pollack's area of specialty, which shows in his chapter on reconstruction and probably makes him overly optimistic about what reconstruction will cost, its prospects for building a prosperous and stable Iraq, and its potential to rehabilitate the US in the eyes of the popular Arab world. Nevertheless, his point -- that it would be foolish for us to incur the cost of toppling one destabilizing regime only to allow chaos or another unstable regime to take its place -- is well taken, and undoubtedly other resources can fill in the nation-building picture.

Highly recommended to all who wish to have an informed opinion in the debate on Iraq.

38 of 45 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Another Perspective, October 25, 2002

By 

Kelly Cooper (Chicago, Illinois) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Hardcover)

If the current administration expects to galvanize Americans to support a full-scale military invasion of Iraq, this book will prove indispensable to that effort. As a liberal democrat, I had no intention of reading this book because I assumed (erroneously) that it was no more than an insidious cocktail of Bush hagiography, right-wing invective, and knee-jerk patriotism. I was completely wrong. This book is simply remarkable. My opinion of George W. Bush is still what it was (very low), but Pollack has shown me that even a broken watch is right twice a day. Unfortunately, people tend to gravitate toward material which supports previously held opinions. I fear that Pollack's book will be championed by those already in lock-step with other administration sycophants (i.e., Ann Coulter, Rush Limbaugh, Peggy Noonan). This book is too good for that sad fate and it would be a colossal mistake to relegate its readership to the choir.

33 of 39 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars The benefit of hindsight, August 31, 2004

By 

Helder Gil (Washington, DC USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Hardcover)

I read this book when it first came out. I thought it was very well researched, well written and had some very useful insights into reasons for going to war with Iraq.

I've re-read parts of the book recently with the benefit of more than a year in hindsight. Pollack's claims of WMDs - similar to the claims by both US and foreign intelligence agencies - proved to be totally wrong. Some of Pollack's other reasons for going after Saddam (that he was a very bad man and did very bad things) could just as easily be applied to dozens of other countries all around the world. (One could take many of those arguments, apply them to North Korea, and ask why when we have totally verifiable proof that a rogue nation with a history of aggression towards its neighbors and the US is in possession of WMDs, our response is to do nothing more than talk.)

Yet although one premise of Pollack's book turned out to be totally wrong, the book still has useful background on recent Iraqi history, Saddam's rise to power, and the US approach to that part of the world. It also features some good information on the various factions and elements that make up Iraqi society. But it is difficult to read the last chapters and not chuckle sadly - Pollack makes some good recomendations on how to rebuild Iraq after a war. The problem is that his recomendations did not take into consideration the political realities of Washington or of the possibility that Iraqis might not be so amenable to dealing with an occupying force of coalition troops.

If Pollack's book is a good reflection of what Washington policymakers believed in the run-up to war with Iraq, then it shows how badly off the mark everyone was.