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The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq

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Kenneth Pollack has provided essential background reading for every member of the public who wants to have an intelligent opinion on the question of what we should do about Iraq. If you're like me, you have a hard time remembering who did what to whom when and why it matters -- and the first section of "The Threatening Storm" is devoted to a brief (100 pages) summary of Iraqi history, from colonial government through Saddam's rise to power, US relations with Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and the tortured history of the UN sanctions. If you read only this much, you will at least understand why the containment/sanctions regime has failed (and has no realistic chance of being revived in any productive form).

The second section of the book (another 100 pages) gives an overview of the situation today -- the massive police state run by Saddam, the nature of the threat he poses, and what other Persian Gulf states (and others in the area and in Europe) think of his regime. The description of Saddam's repressive policies and the threat he poses are both chilling (both more realistic and more scary than anything I have heard from our current Administration). The country-by-country overview of current attitudes toward Iraq and what US policy should be was particularly fascinating. Pollack carefully proceeds through each country, explaining their own particular interests in and policies toward Iraq, and how they wish the US to act. This section provides some very interesting perspectives that I have not seen elsewhere in the popular media, particularly on Jordanian, Syrian and Turkish interests.

In the final 200 pages, Pollack turns to an analysis of US policy options. He carefully reviews all of the options, assessing their feasibility (the stumbling block of any renewed sanctions regime and of covert operations) and weighing the arguments pro and con. Pollack convinces me that the only real options are a fall back to "pure" deterrence (consisting of lifting the remaining sanctions, allowing Saddam to rebuild his military strength and eventually (soon) acquire nuclear weapons, while relying on the threat of US military intervention should he attempt to act beyond his own borders) or a full-scale invasion to remove Saddam and rebuild Iraq. As between deterrence and invasion, I wish that I could say that I think deterrence will work. I'm not excited about the US going to war -- ever -- and particularly not without an immediate provocation. I started this book looking to pick holes in the argument. But I have to confess that Pollack has convinced me that deterrence poses too many risks. Our Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union is often cited as an example -- but what we deterred the USSR from doing was attacking the US. We did not deter them from Berlin or Prague or Afghanistan, nor did we keep them from meddling in any number of African, Asian and South American countries. Instead, Soviet nuclear weapons deterred *us* from intervening. Once Saddam acquires nuclear weapons, will we really risk a nuclear attack on the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv in order to defend Kuwait? Even if Saddam does not invade Kuwait, he will have the economic and military power to make other Gulf states bend to his will, and could wind up effectively controlling a substantial share of the world's oil supply, with potentially devastating economic effects. By comparison to these risks, the costs of war, high though they may be, seem amply justified.

On the other hand, I also think that Pollack underestimates some of the problems associated with invasion. First, he more or less dismisses the need for a legal justification for invasion, saying it would be better if we had one, but it is not essential. I think that many Americans and most of our allies (in the Middle East and elsewhere) will find it hard to support any war that does not have an adequate legal cause. In the absence of overt provocation by Iraq, we at least need a United Nations mandate behind us. How can we call others "rogue states," if we ourselves act without an international consensus behind us? Second, Pollack makes a persuasive case that we can invade only with the support of the Saudis and other Gulf states, who will support us only if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is at least quiet. That hardly seems likely in the near future. If invasion also turns out not to be feasible, we may be left with no option but deterrence. At least having read "The Threatening Storm," I now know what risks that entails.

Pollack is eminently well-qualified to write about Iraq, having served in the CIA and the National Security Council during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. He writes well and provides enough detail to make his arguments compelling without bogging down in military detail. He gives all arguments a fair treatment, acknowledges that the costs of invasion will be high and vigorously advocates a rebuilding of the Iraqi state and economy as an essential element of any invasion policy. Nation-building is not Pollack's area of specialty, which shows in his chapter on reconstruction and probably makes him overly optimistic about what reconstruction will cost, its prospects for building a prosperous and stable Iraq, and its potential to rehabilitate the US in the eyes of the popular Arab world. Nevertheless, his point -- that it would be foolish for us to incur the cost of toppling one destabilizing regime only to allow chaos or another unstable regime to take its place -- is well taken, and undoubtedly other resources can fill in the nation-building picture.

Highly recommended to all who wish to have an informed opinion in the debate on Iraq.

If the current administration expects to galvanize Americans to support a full-scale military invasion of Iraq, this book will prove indispensable to that effort. As a liberal democrat, I had no intention of reading this book because I assumed (erroneously) that it was no more than an insidious cocktail of Bush hagiography, right-wing invective, and knee-jerk patriotism. I was completely wrong. This book is simply remarkable. My opinion of George W. Bush is still what it was (very low), but Pollack has shown me that even a broken watch is right twice a day. Unfortunately, people tend to gravitate toward material which supports previously held opinions. I fear that Pollack's book will be championed by those already in lock-step with other administration sycophants (i.e., Ann Coulter, Rush Limbaugh, Peggy Noonan). This book is too good for that sad fate and it would be a colossal mistake to relegate its readership to the choir.

I read this book when it first came out. I thought it was very well researched, well written and had some very useful insights into reasons for going to war with Iraq.

I've re-read parts of the book recently with the benefit of more than a year in hindsight. Pollack's claims of WMDs - similar to the claims by both US and foreign intelligence agencies - proved to be totally wrong. Some of Pollack's other reasons for going after Saddam (that he was a very bad man and did very bad things) could just as easily be applied to dozens of other countries all around the world. (One could take many of those arguments, apply them to North Korea, and ask why when we have totally verifiable proof that a rogue nation with a history of aggression towards its neighbors and the US is in possession of WMDs, our response is to do nothing more than talk.)

Yet although one premise of Pollack's book turned out to be totally wrong, the book still has useful background on recent Iraqi history, Saddam's rise to power, and the US approach to that part of the world. It also features some good information on the various factions and elements that make up Iraqi society. But it is difficult to read the last chapters and not chuckle sadly - Pollack makes some good recomendations on how to rebuild Iraq after a war. The problem is that his recomendations did not take into consideration the political realities of Washington or of the possibility that Iraqis might not be so amenable to dealing with an occupying force of coalition troops.

If Pollack's book is a good reflection of what Washington policymakers believed in the run-up to war with Iraq, then it shows how badly off the mark everyone was.

In January of 1991, I marched around the White House with thousands of others, protesting the war with Iraq. Not a pacifist by any stretch, I felt the recommendations of Colin Powell to try sactions and containment had not been given a chance. Keeping troops to defend Saudi Arabia was fine with me; it just seemed that a focused multilateral effort to pressure Saddam would have resulted in the liberation of Kuwait without a war.

I was wrong. As Kenneth Pollack clearly shows, containment would have never worked. As a policy to prevent Saddam from developing WMD, containment (coupled with inspections) has been a complete failure, due in part to various nations (i.e. France, Russia, China) circumventing the policy to serve their own economic self-interests. Pollack demostrates the implosion of containment in explicit detail. Those who proclaim that a U.S decision to go it alone and invade Iraq represents a defeat for multilateralism should wake up and smell the coffee; multilaterism died with the failure of containment.

With containment off the table, Pollack leaves us with two choices: deterrence or invasion. Pollack claims a policy of deterrence will result in an Iraq with nuclear weapons and the ability to blackmail the world by threatening to nuke the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. That leaves us with invasion. But what if a threat to Saudi oil didn't threaten our economic interests? If the West and Japan pursued policies that drastically reduced our dependence on oil, deterrence might be an option. Pollack doesn't address this possibility at all. It is the one failing in an otherwise excellent book. Before reading it, I was on the fence. Not anymore.

I just finished reading The Threatening Storm, and Mr. Pollack makes a powerful and richly documented case for regime change in Iraq at the earliest feasible date. As he says, invasion does seem like the best of a set of bad choices, if it is done with the proper preparation. And there's the rub: in Pollack's terms, several essential elements are missing at the present moment to proceed with invasion:

1) He sees it as essential that there is a sense that the war against Al Queda is well in hand. He specifically says that we should be beyond periodic alerts for terrorist attack in the U.S. Thank God I have plenty of duct tape.

2) Also essential from his perspective is at least a ceasefire in the Iraeli-Palestinian conflict with real positive momentum towards a settlement. We have never been further from this, with no daylight showing between Bush and Sharon.

3) The U.S. electorate must be prepared for the burden of nation building in Iraq. According to Pollack, this would involve an occupation of over five years, with at least 200,000 troops initially, tapering down to about 100,000 after five years, and with a semi-permanent presence of at least a division. He says the model must be Bosnia, not Afghanistan.

These are, from his perspective, essential criteria for a successful outcome for an invasion of Iraq. I'll let you be the judge as to whether these have been met.

(BTW, I think he would have advised focusing on these issues, rather than seeking Security Council support. His view of the fecklessness of the French is very prescient.)

I bought this book after seeing an interview with Mr. Pollack on the Charlie Rose show (PBS). I must say the book is well written, VERY informative, and it's obvious, Mr Pollack knows his stuff. My only negative comment is that certain parts of the book are a bit repetitive.

The book should be required reading for ALL AMERICANS. Skip CNN, MSNBC and get the true information and inside story of the relationship between Iraq & the United States.

The Threatening Storm provides the most unique of opportunities, a thorough analysis of the most urgent and fluid issue in the world. For anyone who wants to firmly understand the arguments for an invasion, all one needs to do is read this book.

Mr. Pollack, while favoring an invasion, is sincere in his contention that it is really the last and only option before us. Pollack goes through every possible option for disarming Iraq. His arguments are convincing and, more importantly, he critiques the weaker arguments that favor his position (e.g. Hussein's link to terrorism). The result is a reasoned analysis that does not throw the kitchen sink at you and instead provides the most concise and powerful argument possible for an invasion.

As strong as the analysis is, I don't think he anticipated the situation unfolding quite as it has. He provides relatively short shrift to a new attempt at inspections, believing that it is such a weak option that it does not require an extensive review. He also does not anticipate the resistance that is coming from France and Germany.

What he does get right is the assessment that Hussein's strategy is clearly to divide the U.N. and the international community. His arguments for action are largely based on the weakening of sanctions and the failure of containment. The inability of the U.N. to be tough on containment is what on one hand provides the reason for invasion and at the same time demonstrates the inability of the international community to muster the will to take action.

Reading this book will enable the reader to fully appreciate the politics of the situation (particularly the extent that France and Russia are literally profiting from the current situation) and the stakes that the casual observer will not understand.

The author clearly knows a lot about Iraq and the middle east. He makes a strong case that the choice is war now or war later, and that invading in the next year is the best of a bunch of bad choices. This case rests on a number of beliefs. The first is that containment (embargoes and weapons and inspectors) may not prevent Saddam from building nuclear weapons. The lack of faith in containment partially stems from the memory of a continuing Iraqi nuclear program after the Persian Gulf war, under the noses of UN inspectors noses, which was dismantled only after Saddam's son-in-law defected. The author also finds it unlikely that the UN and US can muster the will to effectively maintain containment for more than a year or two before Saddam backslides again, and seems worried that war may not be politically feasible in the future. Given past history, this seems sadly reasonable.
Deterrance is frightening because Saddam has a long and bloody history of responding to perceived weakness at home with aggression abroad, by invading Iran, Kuwait (1990 and perhaps intending to in 1994) , and parts of Kurdistan. In addition, Saddam has always been strongly motivated by revenge and has blood grudges afainst Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and the US. Covert action and the Afghan approach don't seem workable either (nobody really disputes that). Therefore, invading is the best of a bad set of choices.
The book does a convincing job of justifying invasion; certainly it's a LOT more convincing than anything heard recently from the administration. However, it does nothing to convince me that the US needs to invade in the next month, just sometime before Saddam may get nuclear weapons (which the CIA estimated to be between 2004 and 2008 with an uninterrupted program began in 1998). And the book itself highlights the importance of having allies to assist in the reconstruction period. So why is the administration in such a hurry, and so disrespectful of world opinion and the world leaders that represent it?
Regardless of how one feels about the issue, the book is well written by someone who has spent much of his life dealing with the problems. Reading it -- along with Kiddir Hamza's remarkable book "Saddam's bombmaker" -- has taught me alot more about this crucial issue than everything I've heard or read in the press over the past 5 years.

If you only read one book about (what appears to be) the pending invasion of Iraq, let this be the one. Kenneth M. Pollack lays out his case in three parts. Starting with Part I, Iraq and the United States, he clearly lays out the our history. Historically, the US involvement in the region has been minimal in comparison to France and England. The US did not exist during the crusades, did not colonize north africa and the mid east, and recognized modern day borders that define the mid east after they were drawn by Winston Churchill and Gertrude Bell, both British citizerns. Ironically, it is the US that is today the symbol of all that history in which it played no (so little) part.

Pollack pulls no punches as he outlines the many mistakes made by the US in its dealing with Saddam. Through his eyes you can see the workings of intelligence, the disagreements, the miscalculations, the reassessments, and how international priorities are set, disgarded, and reset. He thinks that the US misunderstood just who Sadaam is; he thinks that Sadaam misunderstood just who the US is.

Part II, Iraq Today, and Part III, The Options, he lays out the case for the invasion. Containment has not worked. This book does not blame Democrats, nor does it blame the Rebublicans for where we find ourselves today. Pollack acknowledges mistakes and miscalculation were made by both. He does blame the perifdy of the French, Chinese and Russians, who "not only walked away from the committments they joined the international community in making in 1990-91 but actively worked to undermine them."

If you want to be convinced that invasion is the right thing to do, then read this book. If you want to understand how we got here, then read this book. If you just need to know more than the headlines about this impending confrontation, then read this book.

A friend of mine urged me to read this book because I was on the fence about our Iraq policy. This book gave me everything I ever wanted. It is a marvelous book, maybe the best I have ever read on a political subject. It is well-written, balanced, and very thoughtful, which made it easy to read. I appreciated Mr. Pollock's thoroughness and his respect for the reader. The book starts out by giving a brief history of Iraq and Saddam Hussein's reign and then provides a lot of the basics about Iraq including its political and economic situations, its military capabilities, and Hussein's goals and methods. The description of the Iraqi police state was chilling and Pollock's treatment of the impact of sanctions was very even-handed.

What I liked most about the book was how it explored all of the different policy options that people have discussed. It explained what each one would mean and then assessed whether or not it was likely to work. I especially appreciated the fact that Pollock did not simply make statements but explained his answers and backed them up with history, facts and other evidence. Although he clearly knows a huge amount about the subject, he never browbeat the reader but explained his logic and the evidence for it. He also was very responsible about laying out both the pros and the cons of each policy, including being very honest about the costs of a war with Iraq. He never tried to claim that a war was going to be easy or that reconstructing Iraq afterwards would be unnecessary, which was a refreshing change from so many other hawks.

I found this book entirely persuasive and am very glad I read it. Like the author, I am not excited about the prospect of a war with Iraq, but this book convinced me that we probably have no alternative. I agree that the choice America faces is probably one of going to war with Iraq in the near future while Hussein is relatively weak and does not have nuclear weapons, or having to go to war with him later when he will be much stronger and the costs of war will be much larger. I think the Bush Administration could learn more than a few lessons from this book, especially about how to explain why this war is important to the American people, and about levelling with us about the costs. I think far more Americans would support them if they did.