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Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution

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As well as completely changing the political and geographical structure of Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union has significantly altered the approach of historical scholarship about the Russian Revolution.

In Three Whys of the Russian Revolution, the eminent scholar of Russian history, Richard Pipes, confronts the challenge of assessing the causes and course of the Russian Revolutions from a post-Cold War perspective.

Pipes explains that for 70 years prior to the 1990's, historians in the West adopted a "revisionist" perspective of the Russian Revolutions that was largely influenced by Communist scholarship. The events of 1917, these Communist scholars concluded, were nothing but revolutionary activity.

Western scholarship's acceptance of this conclusion stems, Pipes explains, from a lack of source material, much of which was deemed classified by the Soviet regime.

But access to this information is now open, and Pipes, among others, has utilized this opportunity in an attempt to re-evaluate the Revolutions, with the product being two extensive works (on which these essays are based). Not surprisingly, his understanding of the events of 1917 has changed somewhat, and thus the three essays in the book are a continued attempt to debunk much of the "revisionist" perspective with less radical conclusions.

Among the notions that Pipes challenges is the very insistence by the "revisionists" that the Revolutions were in fact revolutions.

As the author clearly outlines, the events of 1917 were actually the work of a small group of intellectuals headed by the idealist Lenin. His overthrow of the Czarist regime is argued by Pipes as being a coup d'etat which involved the people as a whole in only a small degree.

This brings Pipes to his second major argument. Were the people ready, willing, or even a part of the coup d'etat process? It has often been a marvel to historians that the agrarian based nation of Russia was the one nation to take heed of Marx's dialectical writings. But, as Pipes explains, the people (that is, peasantry) indeed had little reason or precedent to desire a change in the ruling regime, and the radical writings of Lenin and his cohorts had little impact on them, since it offered little in the way of a betterment of lifestyle.

Lastly Pipes addresses the post-coup d'etat events surrounding the ascension of Stalin as the next leader of the Soviet Regime. Several years after the events of 1917, Lenin's failing health allowed Stalin to enter the scene, a man who Lenin recognized as having an unstable personality, one unviable for effectively continuing the Communist programmes as Lenin had planned.

This opposition to Stalin was glossed over by Communist scholars to maintain a healthy image of the leadership, and thus was subsequently adopted by Western scholars.

It is easily said, then, that there is much of value in Three Whys of the Russian Revolution to history students and others interested in the events of 1917. Pipes' three essays present sound, articulate, and compelling arguments as to the causes and course of the Revolutions, and is thus an important asset for future scholarship on the subject.

This book explored three very important questions regarding the Russian Revolution: Why Tsarism fell, why the Bolsheviks gained power, and why Stalin succeeded Lenin. However, Pipes does not limit himself to giving simple solutions to these questions (which was a very good thing). He examines the events through different perspectives and, in effect, teaches the reader many interesting things that are not common knowledge concerning the Revolution. It was very well written and structured, and overall it was a great book. It is often difficult to read an historical book, but Pipes makes it easy.

Yes, Professor Pipes argues some conservative points, but this book is a very useful antidote to other histories written by persons with left-wing axes to grind. Pipes at least is open and honest about his background and perspective, and based upon his other works which I have read he has conducted careful, extensive scholarship. In his other more detailed books--The Russian Revolution and Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime--he provides further evidence for judgments provided in this volume, and narrative history of the Russian Revolution and its immediate aftermath.

One part of this book which I found particularly interesting was the discussion of why Stalin came to power. Pipes argues that, rather than being a deviation from the natural course of Bolshevism, Stalinism was a logical outcome, and Stalin implemented some, though not all, of Lenin's goals. Pipes also shows how Stalin achieved and consolidated his power through his skill at administration, and his ability to insert his supporters into key positions.

The Three Why's is written in a lively style without jargon. In addition to describing the collapse of the Tsarist regime, the Bolshevik seizure of power and Stalin's rise, it includes a general review of the historiography of the Russian Revolution, and a few brief observations on events during the breakup of the Soviet Union.

When was the Russian Revolution? The conventional answer would be October 1917. After all, people associate Lenin with the October Revolution, don't they? Well, Mr. Pipes (amongst an increasing group of others) would stop you right there. Upon the tsar's abdication Russia's first free elections (promised since that February) were held November 12, 1917. This was but days after Lenin's Bolsheviks supposedly "rode to power on a wave of popular support," yet Lenin's ilk only received enought votes to garner 175 seats out of 707! The Bolshevik takeover was more akin to a putsch, consequently. Trotsky himself wrote (in his memoirs) "that 25,000 or 30,000 people, at most, took part in the events of October in Petrograd"; this in a city of 2 million. It was largely bloodless and basically upended the hopelessly incompetent Provisional Government in the dead of one night in favor of the Petersburg Council---or "Soviet," to utilize the Russian word for council. And it was through this organ of competing power that Lenin was able to forestall Russian military units from marching in to St. Petersburg to resist him. In January when Russia's first Constituent Assemby opened Lenin immediately proposed a motion that would have prevented the duly elected Assembly from wielding any real power over the Petersburg Soviet, or any of the other Soviets in other cities. Lenin's Bolsheviks were handedly defeated in this, however; which marked the end of democracy in Russia. The next day Bolshevik Red Guards closed down the Assembly and it was never permitted to sit again. How Lenin was able to engineer this is the subject of the second part of this tri-part (extremely concise & worthy) mini-book of 84 pages. Pipes shows, in addition, how nothing of this was at all inevitable. Tsarism fell for particular reasons, mostly political, and whence it did was replaced by a Provisional Government (PG) bereft of any legitimacy. Said PG was meant to be a caretaker until elections for a Constituent Assembly could be held; elections which weren't held until more than 8 months later. The interim thus provided much time for Lenin & Company to champion the Soviets and their radical maneuverings---which disrupted the economy and war effort---while constantly calling for the elections for the CA to be held (the same Assembly which they smothered by armed force as soon as it sat). "No other group in Russia," but the Bolsheviks, Pipes writes "was prepared to consort with the enemy, and therefore, none could compete with him [meaning Lenin] effectively once the struggle for power got under way." And funds were not a problem either. "There is no longer any question," Pipes writes, "that he [Lenin] took money from Imperial Germany even while Russia & Germany were at war; we have plenty of [recently opened Russian archival] documents dating from 1917-18 proving this fact." Why didn't the democratic socialists ("who between them had garnered nearly 3/4 of the national vote") confront the Bolsheviks "on any other but the verbal level"? In Pipes's reading of the situation this was because these socialsits believed time to be on their side; that "the Bolsheviks would have no choice but sooner or later to invite them into government" to be able to get anything accomplished. Lenin, however, choose instead (based on his long written view to rule alone) to employ the use of terror to impose his will instead. Thus Pipes debunks fallacy #3 in this short treatise---that Stalin was an aberration when, in fact, he was a rather natural successor to Lenin. (Read Gorbachev advisor A. Yakovlev's book "A Century of Violence" for proof of Lenin's terror methods.) While Stalin's rise wasn't inevitable, it was a heck of a lot more likely than the 2 fallacies that he lays bare herein concerning the fall of tsarism & Lenin's rise. Tsarism's fall when it did wasn't inevitable & neither was Lenin's rise. (See Pipes's "A Concise History of the Russian Revolution" for all the details of the above.) (06Apr) Cheers!

As a college student reserching european history, I chose this book for a book review. Pipes has a reputation of being a sophisticated historian, but his book on the Three "Whys" expresses his complex thoughts in the simplist and easiest ways possible. Even though I haven't read his other works, I have heard that he combined his thoughts into this book from his other works on the examination of The Russia Revolution. I encourage any one to read this book who is looking for something easy to read or is looking for something that is straight to the point.

As one can well discern from the title, Richard Pipes addresses the three main questions surrounding the Russian Revolution - Why did Tsarism fall?, Why Did the Bolsheviks Triumph?, and Why Did Stalin Succeed Lenin? And while answering these questions, Pipes continually challenges the revisionist school of thought. According to him, the revisionist interpretation of the Russian Revolution was heavily influenced by "interpretation of the Russian Revolution that was mandatory in the Soviet Union". Pipes makes use of the Soviet archives that were `opened up' after the Cold War to perceive the Russian Revolution from the political standpoint and question revisionist historiography.

Firstly, as to answering the question Why did Tsarism fall?, unlike revisionists, Pipes argues that the fall of Tsarism was not preordained, but can be explained by a number of "long duree, intermediate and short term" causes such as the economic weaknesses of the Tsarist regime, the social instability and the success of the intelligentsia in affecting the Tsarist regime. But before mentioning these causes, Pipes shows why Tsarism need not have collapsed. Here, he challenges the revisionists again and explains with evidence that the fall of Tsarism was very unexpected in 1917. And then he goes on to investigate the causes of the collapse of Tsarism.

On answering his second question, Pipes, right from the first chapter argues that the "Bolshevik power seizure was something of a fluke". The phrase `Bolshevik power seizure' must have given you an idea of Pipes opinion on the October Revolution. Pipes challenges the use of the term `revolution' to define the October Revolution. Pipes goes on to explain why the term `coup d'etat' would have been more suitable, giving us statistics and Lenin's words. Pipes totally disregards the social influence on the October Revolution, keen on wrong-footing the revisionists. Though the political factors might have been the most important in dictating the course of the revolution, it is true that social forces did play a role, which are disregarded in this book.

Pipes starts dealing with the third question right in the first chapter. According to him - "once it [Bolshevik power seizure] occurred and the totalitarian machine was in place, then the rise of Stalin became virtually a forgone conclusion". Pipes mentions that Stalin uses bureaucracy and the emerging resistance from the working class to gain his standing in the party. Pipes also tries to use evidence to illustrate that Trotsky did not stand a chance of following Lenin, all because of his `Jewishness' and Lenin's dislike for him. Coming from a renowned historian, this seems quite superficial.

Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution lacks the evidence for Pipes's numerous generalisations. Furthermore, at many instances, Pipes does not support his conflicting statements. For example, while stating that Lenin laid the foundation for purges, beginning with the SR trial, he also mentions - "the killing of fellow Communists - a crime Lenin did not commit". Also, Pipes totally disregards other, especially revisionist interpretations of the Russian Revolution, though these interpretations might shed some light on the matter. This narrow-minded approach of Pipes limits his interpretations on the Russian Revolution, notably the reasons for the Bolshevik's triumph. The length of the book might have been a restricting factor, thus limiting Pipes's analysis. On the bright side, this book gives us some new ideas and interpretations of the `Whys' of the Russian Revolution to think about. Pipes language filled with sarcasm and irony makes the book an interesting read. But if one is looking for depth, then maybe we should refer to one of his more voluminous writings.

This view of the Russian Revolution leaves out much of the history and the viewpoint is very to the right. In other words, Lenin was a bad guy, a coward, a tyrant, and a poor administrator after the Revolution. Trotsky would have done the same as Stalin if he had been in power. Lenin approved of Stalin being in power after his stroke. Trotsky couldn't find Lenin's house after he was ill and thus proves he was not 'close' to Lenin. So much is slanted toward the Revolution being a Political Coup d'etat instead of a Revolution that the book eliminates any "social forces" at work. The author admits this from the start. He does not believe in 'social forces' influencing how history plays out, but believes in politics and personality. He calls all other views than his "Revisionist". While there may be something to this author's views, here is one fact that he left out: Lenin wrote a statement before his death that Stalin should not be the leader of the party and that Trotsky should. Why does he leave this fact out? Stalin proved to be one of the most brutal dictators in history and then in just one sentence he concludes that Trotsky would have been the same. This is not what Trotsky wrote subsequent to his being sent into exile by Stalin. There is much more wrong with the book but it is still interesting as the subject is so fascinating. Thus I give it 2 stars instead of just one.

Although Richards Pipes does an excellent job of supporting his thesis that the October 1917 revolution was fundamentally a coup without significant popular support, he neglects to satisfactorily answer the question of why the Bolsheviks triumphed in the civil war that ensued. The logistical details of Lenin's coup, while meriting some attention, are probably of less importance than the long, arduous civil war through which the Bolsheviks had to prevail. Pipes implies that once the Bolsheviks seized power, communist domination would be inevitable.

Pipe's arguments about the October Revolution are more aimed at refuting the interpretations of Soviet and libertarian historiographers than providing a coherent explanation of why the Bolsheviks triumphed. Pipes barely explores the social, political, or economic factors which led to significant proportions of Russia's population to support the Reds at one point. Why did Aleksei Brusilov, a man whose patriotism would be near-impossible to impugn, choose to lead the Red Army rather than the White? What, exactly, assured the Communists' rise to power after the October putsch? Pipes neglects these questions, instead choosing to proceed directly to the question of Stalin's ascendancy in the mid-1920s.

Pipes's interpretation of the Russian Revolution in Three "Whys" of The Russian Revolution is tight and well-constructed but in some ways very incomplete. He explains the events leading up to both revolutions impeccably well, but fails to put the October revolution in detailed social or political context. Some disagreements I may have with his dismissal of social or economic factors may be merely tautological; he classifies some events that I would define as social, cultural, or economic, such as food shortages or deeply rooted anti-government sentiments, as merely political or short-term phenomena.

As a refutation for pseudo-scientific Marxist theories of history, Pipes makes an excellent argument. As a comprehensive explanation of the causes leading up to the Russian Revolution, this condensed booklet fails.

I enjoyed Richard Pipes short but too the point look at the Russian Revolution. I have read and heard that he is one of the top authorities on the Russian Revolution. The book was well written and very informative. However, while far from a revisionist, I found his explanation too conservative and way too political towards the right wing. His arguements that WWI and the Czars oppressive government were not as important to the revolution as we like to think is a bit much. I can't buy into that even as a traditionalist and anti-revisionist. Pipe's just seemed a little too preachy a little too political in his explanations. I feel he, though from another prospective, is no better than the revisionists in letting his politics take away from his history. I think it is a good investment of time to read this little book, but take it with a grain of salt. Right wing salt.

The series of lectures comprising this book show Pipes at his 'best', clearly justifying critics views of him as "among the most politically reactionary and intellectually unscrupulous of the "totalitarian" school of American Sovietologists". This book provides a good counter-analysis to the works of Figes, Fitzpatrick and Service, showing an outdated 'top-down' approach to 20th century Russian historiography. A must for those who wish to see the product of America's cold war generation of intellectuals.