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Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945 (Modern Wars)

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This is a brilliant book; incredibly well researched, organized and written. Having exploited the latest Soviet and German archival material, "Thunder in the East" provides new and important insights into the German-Soviet war on the Eastern Front. And unlike previous Eastern Front histories, which tend to focus on one side or the other, Mawdsley, a professor of Soviet and Russian history, tells the story from both sides. The result is a powerful and balanced narrative, which touches on every aspect of the titanic struggle between Hitler's Third Reich and Stalin's Soviet Russia.

World War II historians have attempted to provide different explanations for the survival of the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, despite horrendous losses, and then its reemergence and resurrgence in 1943, leading to the defeat of the German armed forces in 1945. Mawdsley shows that rather than a single explanation, a number of factors were at work, depending on the period of the war, including the quantity of troops and equipment, the quality of technology, and the industrial capabilities of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.

The author doesn't shy away from addressing the Holocaust in the Soviet Union and the deliberate elimination of Jews and Red Army prisoners by the German army working willingly alongside the SS. Accordingly to Mawdsley, some 500,000 Jews were murdered outright by mobile SS killing units and other Nazi police units, assisted by the German Army, in the first sweep of killing in the USSR.

In his conclusion the author discusses the cost of the war to the Soviet Union, noting that some 27 million Soviet citizens were killed, including 10 million Red Army soldiers. The war damaged the USSR more than it damaged Germany and cost the country ten years development. "It is probably also true," writes Mawdsley, "that the Soviet economy never recovered from the war." And he makes it clear that a Wehrmacht victory in Russia would have been far worse for both the Russians and the rest of Europe and the world.

"Thunder in the East" is World War II history at its very best!

If you are new to the Eastern Front this is an excellent new short history of the war. It concentrates a little on the military aspect, on the politics, economics, and of course the social intricacies of the war. The author uses a lot of newly released Soviet secondary sources, many of which I have at home and can vouch for, to present the war in a somewhat new light. There are a few mistakes and some omissions throughout the book but nothing too major. I like the authors conclusions about the purges in 1937-1938, while they were costly for the Red Army there is no reason to think that it crippled the officer corps, although it did create an atmosphere of fear and compliance with Stalin which in the end simply added to the disaster that was 1941. All the battles, offensive and defensive operations, are listed and gone through. Losses are given for the Red Army from Krivosheev's book for every operation, this book has become the standard use for Red Army losses in WWII although there are still some controversies about it. But in the end it's very interesting to see how Soviet losses (KIA, MIA, and POW) went down throughout the war. The author gives a good account of the Warsaw uprising and shows how impossible it was for the Red Army to do anything when it occurred, but something might have been done in late August or mid September. Then again the Poles wanted to take the city and use it as a bargaining chip against the Soviets, so it would have served no purpose in putting the Red Army in that kind of situation with no benefit to Stalin. Overall with the use of these new Russian sources from a variety of authors I have to say this is today the best short history of the war and I would gladly recommend it to anyone who wants an introduction to the Eastern Front.

Beautifully written, extremely informative, and well-packaged by the publisher, this is another must have for the WWII buff's library. Using the info from the Russian archives which has come out in the past 10-15 years, Professor Mawdsley does a magnificent job of presenting an overview of the War on the Eastern Front. It touches on about every matter you can think of, and has quality footnotes taking you to leading secondary works on almost each subject. A good bibliography, but an annotated one would have been even better. It focuses far more on Russian matters than German, but also has some interesting information on the Nazi side of the hill. Not the only book you should read on the Eastern Front, but a great place to start.

Professor Mawdsley does an admirable job of dissecting and narrating the conflict between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union from 1941-1945, a period which saw some of human history's most intense battles and most horrific atrocities. The book is an in-depth study of Nazi and Soviet strategy, taking each event in turn, from Kharkov and Kiev, to Moscow and Leningrad, pointing out strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The sheer specificity of the text may be off-putting to some, as Mawdsley names dozens of German and Russian commanders, Bock, Kluge, Manstein, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Guderian, Hoth, Zhukov, Budyenni, all names you would expect to see, and he outlines their individual performances, no matter how disgraceful or outstanding they may be. Though not the focus of the text, Mawdsley does make mention of how the Germans treat Jews and Soviet POWs, but he also talks of Stalin's crimes, and how he executes his own generals, and gives orders without regard for civilian lives (which, of course, Hitler does as well). The starvation of Leningrad is described briefly, but enough to make one consider it one of the great tragedies of the war. As a work of military history, it is extraordinary, particularly in its scope, and how it covers every aspect of the Eastern Front.

This book could and possibly should have been titled "Zhukov, Stalin, and the Stavka" because that is the overwhelming focus. Evan Mawdsley is a Russian historian, and it definitely shows here. It gives an in depth analysis of RUSSIAN strategy and wartime evolution, but very little of the German side. Look elsewhere if this is what you desire.

This is a CONCISE history. Concise histories are usually rather dry and skeletal. I slogged through the whole thing, but I fell asleep reading it many a night. Compelling reading it is not.

Be forewarned that this is a history of the war from a GRAND STRATEGIC LEVEL. Mawdsley covers army GROUP movements. An army group is just that--a whole number of various tank and infantry armies grouped together. DO NOT EXPECT TO BE DOWN AND DIRTY IN THE TRENCHES HERE. The cold and desperation at Stalingrad, the T-34 versus the Panther tank at Kursk, the Sturmgewehr versus the PPsh-1, Messerschmidt versus Yak, the morale of individual Soviet versus German soldiers as the war dragged on etc. etc. is NOT here. It's all senior generals, marshals, and supreme leaders stuff. You know, the guys with clean buttoned-up uniforms that move little flags around on a table map.

So much is omitted. Incredibly Mawdsley devotes exactly 3 sentences to the appalling behavior of the Red Army once it entered eastern Europe. The systematic wholesale atrocities committed by the Red Army in East Prussia, Pomerania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are not mentioned. The three sentences refer to Russian bad behavior only during the final battle around Berlin. Similarly, the grotesque Nazi Einzattsgruppen activity is also barely mentioned. Why? This savagery made the Eastern front UNIQUE from the Western and Italian fronts and characterized the war between these two reprehensible regimes.

Most unforgivable of all are the woefully inadeqate maps. There are exactly 11 of them. Not nearly enough, and they are poor sparse black-and-white affairs with nothing more than front lines drawn on them. You will constantly need an atlas at your side to comprehend the army movements.

There are a very few photos--none memorable.

Only recommended if you are looking for a short history of Zhukov and Stalin's growth as war leaders, and grand strategic army group movements from the Russian point of view.

Evan Mawdsley, a Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow is an expert on Soviet Russian history. He has devoted his obviously comprehensive knowledge to writing a concise history of World War II on the Eastern Front. This narrative is not an exhaustive attempt to cover every aspect of the war or to cover it in great depth. The author's main effort is focused on the events and decisions that cost Germany the war or perhaps its more appropriate to say on Russia winning the war since this book is clearly Russian centric.
While describing, from a high altitude, the key events and happenings of the war, the author explains the reasons and consequences of battle, its decisions, results and in many cases their ramifications for the future war effort. These discussions are important and for me a prime reason for liking the book. The included Conclusions at the end of each chapter are also pertinent and add to the value of the book. The author also includes 21 tables of updated statistics on casualty figures, production numbers, tank and plane losses which were useful. Mr Mawdsley has relied quite heavily for these figures and more on the bevy of Russian books that have recently been published. Mr Krivosheev is a favorite source that is quoted often.

The book is divided into two sections and 13 chapters and laid out for the most part, until the last year of war, in chronological order. The first section involves the German victories of the first two years and include some of the key battles in Operations Barbarossa, Typhoon, Blue and ending with Stalingrad. The last section highlights the Russian turnaround and improving war strategy. The surrender of Stalingrad and the other victories of 1943 is considered the pivotal year of the war. Kursk, the race to the Dniepr, Operation Bagration, Berlin are some of the key events discussed. The battle coverage of each section is preceded by background information for each respective dictator / country. You'll learn about Hitler and therefore Germany's rise from the ashes of WWI as well as treaties between the two countries. On the Russian side, you will learn about purges of the late 1930s, mobilization and the state of unreadiness of the Russian armies among other things.

The author feels quite strongly that proponents who claim the Russian victory was the result of massive manpower alone to be in error and are discounting the improved war doctrine, production capacities and the Russian spirit.
In addition to the military coverage, you will also read, to a lesser degree, about the impact of occupation on the civilian population, partisan action, the brutal actions on Jews and Communists. Lend-Lease, weapons and the concept of total war is discussed as well. The author distinguishes between German and Russian brutality including Stalin's on his own people. With different motives for precipitating those terrible actions Mr Mawdsley seem to be more forgiving to the Russians as understandable while German actions are completely reprehensible.

Seeing that this narrative does not include the actual battle action, the eleven maps that are included are not battle specific but are a generic series of where the front lines were during the course of the war. The maps were appropriate for the format of the book. There are also a few photos.
There is also an awesome Notes section and a large Bibliography of secondary sources if further reading is wanted. Both sections will be quite useful.
Its obvious the author is knowledgeable and well read on Russia and the war years and while touching on many aspects of the war, it's a shame that greater depth on battle aspects and weaponry, intelligence as well as greater coverage of Hitler and Stalin wasn't within the purview of the author. It would've been interesting to read more on Stalin's political impact on the war and his relationships with Churchill and FDR.

The ideal audience for this book are people looking for a concise and creditable overview of the war and are not concern with the tactical aspects of battle or for those people interested in reading the latest statistics emanating from Russia.

Evan Mawdsley, a Professor of Modern History at the University of Glasgow is an expert in Soviet Russia. He has devoted his obviously comprehensive knowledge and considerable talents to writing a thorough history of the worst of conflicts, World War II on the Eastern Front. The destruction of material and human resources by that conflict easily surpassed each and every of it's predecessors. It remains unique in the annals of war, not only in terms of destruction, but in terms of magnitude and, quite possibly, human folly, as well. The author prepares a compelling case in both these areas in the first two chapters and a brilliant summary in the concluding chapter. The intervening sections exhaustively review the strategy, tactics, men and machines that fought the war. As might be expected by students of the subject, the German General Staff and overall command structure are poorly rated by Mawdsley. He presents a case for inevitable failure of the German military enterprise based on irrational premises held by Hitler and his various paladins. The case is convincing and well argued, though it appeared to be occasionally contradicted. The resilience of the Soviet system was emphasized, as was that of the Nazi regime. Stalin was characterized as an apt strategist and overall military commander, at least in so far as his conceptual grasp of grand stragegy and his ability to appoint highly capable theatre commanders and military advisors. Hitler, in contradistinction, was fighting an ideological war and was hamstrung by the delusions that accompanied this approach. His frequent interference and dismissal of capable commanders illustrates the problem, but it was of even greater dimension: the command structure was illogical, strategy was poorly conceived and the capabilities of the Soviet adversary were grossly underestimated. The book is a major contribution to the literature and is based on archives not available to previous researchers. It stands as a benchmark for future historians of the topic.

I read this book after reading a review of a number of books on the subject that was publiched in Atlantic Monthly. I am not an expert on this subject but I have read several dozen books on the Eastern War, and I found this to be an excellent overall review. Very readable and very thorough within the confines of a single book covering such a vast sequence of events across such a vast front.

"Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945", by Historian Evan Mawdsley, is a one-volume history of the war on the Eastern Front during World War II. Mr Mawdsley is a Professor of International History at the University of Glascow, specializing in Russian History, and was able to take advantage of new studies and source material from the former Soviet Union when writing this book.

I'm somewhat of an amateur historian and own over 500 books on World War II. Most of the books I've read about the Eastern Front tend to have a "German" slant, because until the last 15-20 years, the Soviet archives were not assessable to historians and what was released was highly censored, so German sources and accounts were primarily used. In recent years, though, western historians such as David Glantz (as well as a younger generation of Russian historians) have been able to examine and incorporate newly released material into fresh examinations of the Soviet role in World War II and publish new accounts and analyses in English.

In this book, Mr Mawdsley examines the Soviet positions (and to a lesser extent the Germans ones) ... economically, militarily, politically ... and explains why the war unfolded as it did, and how things changed as time when on. He gives overviews of the major battles, but in a refreshing change, he covers all of the Soviet offensives as well as the German ones. (There were a lot of Soviet offensives that were dismal failures, which were officially "forgotten" on the Soviet side, and not really covered on the German side as they didn't result in major changes to their front.) He also shows how each side's strategy evolved as the war went on, and what impact those changes had on the fighting. This work is written more from the Soviet perspective rather than the German perspective, which is fine by me, as I already own a multitude of books from the German point-of-view.

This is the first book I've read that ties all aspects of the Soviet side of the war together in such a logical, compact, and yet complete manner. It does not go into great depth on the battles themselves ... the book would have to be triple its length to even begin to provide that level of detail ... but it gives an outstanding overview, explanation, analysis, and summary of the war on the Eastern Front. The only nit I have is that the book probably needs a few more maps.

I'm not given to gushing, but I've enjoyed this book as much as any I've read all year, and it's earned a place on my top shelf. Mr Mawdsley's writing style is crisp and easy to digest, and he organized his material very well. As I mentioned above, while this book is written more from the Soviet perspective, it was not biased toward either side in my opinion. I highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the Eastern Front of World War II.

In this useful study of the war on the Eastern Front, Evan Mawdsley focuses on the military campaigns and his anti-Soviet bias is evident throughout.

Hew Strachan, in his excellent Preface, writes, "The Wehrmacht was complicit in war crimes and particularly so on the Eastern Front." He notes, "Guderian was a committed Nazi and Manstein ordered the extermination of Jews and Bolsheviks." And he points out, "The causes of the Russians' early and well-nigh catastrophic defeats in 1941 lie not in the purge but elsewhere." Mawdsley points out, "The weather was not the basic reason for the Moscow turnaround. Soviet reserves and resistance were the critical factors."

Hitler's criminal programme of a `war of annihilation' against the USSR was a development of the traditional German strategic concept of a `battle of annihilation'.

He observes of the Soviets, "They were right, too, to accuse Roosevelt and Churchill of bad faith. The Western Allies made strategic promises that they knew they could not keep."

He notes, "Had Britain made peace in the summer of 1940 the Germans might actually have been able to conquer European Russia, as they almost did in 1917-18. Britain, fortunately for Stalin, did not make peace." The Soviet Union, fortunately for Britain, played the main role in defeating the Nazis.

Mawdsley concludes his book, "There is no doubt that the alternative outcome, the victory for the Wehrmacht and of National Socialism, would have been far worse, both for the Russians and for the rest of Europe and the world."