Customer Reviews

The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival

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This book is a must read for all ranks. Today's military is falsely secure in its ability to prosecute military operations via the use of high tech weapons and combat support systems, while continuously failing to realize that the human dimension is where warfare truly lies. Such a false sense of security may
result in a preventable number of deaths of our servicemen - especially today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More money, more fancy contract competing complicated weapon systems and competing battle rhythms do not equal success. Such upper level stresses are impacting the Warfighters ability to fight and survive.

Since it is unfortunate that the United States population is a "quick fix" society and is easily manipulated by today's, often slanted, media reports which endangers the lives of service men and women, Poole's book quickly provides insight into what commanders, troops, media reporters and citizens of this country need to understand about our technologically inferior enemies. And, that as long as the United States remains a Super/Mega Power, technologically inferior forces will attempt to find gaps and exploit them in order to limit/stunt U.S. resolve.

John Poole takes the reader into the Eastern Mindset of warfare. Although the concepts he centers on pertain mostly to Far East Asia (i.e. China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam), those concepts have spread into Central and South West Asia as specified in this book which is well cited. The major take-away in The Tiger's Way, is the enemy's employment of deception and carefully choosing battles that are intended to be already won before execution, with the most important concept being that the enemy will let you see what he wants you to see.

So why is The Tiger's Way a must read for reporters? John Poole cites examples in how an enemy would use deception against U.S. armed forces to use weapon systems against innocent civilians and slow/deter the momentum of the U.S. resolve. This book also provides areas that reporters/investigative reporters might want to research to get as accurate a picture as possible into how a technologically inferior foe will attempt to defeat the United States.

Why is this a must read for Commanders? Commander's can see how staff exercises, command over tasking, limited free play and a reluctance to allow subordinates into developing their own initiative and decision making skills can contribute to their demise. This book also illustrates how U.S. forces are fighting today's threats like the linear fighting Brits tried to fight the Indians who employed guerilla tactics during the Seven Years War. The enemy sees us, while we cannot see him and the ENEMY CHOOSES THE TIME AND PLACE TO FIGHT.

Why is The Tiger's Way important for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs)? NCOs now have a tool they can use to develop training plans, and to develop initiative in their subordinates who have to be on the front lines for combat and rear area security operations. It's simply not enough that every Marine is a rifleman.

Why is this a read for other military personnel?

C2- John Poole's The Tiger's Way emphasizes, and explains how the enemy desires to eliminate Command and Control without high tech equipment and by disrupting U.S. forces decision making processes.

Intel- Intel types are provided insight into the importance of debriefing personnel, and teaching other small unit personnel how to debrief their own personnel in order to force the data to intelligence sections for accurate threat assessments. Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) are addressed that can assist an Intel Collections Manager in answering intelligence gaps. Indicators are provided too, or sought, by various collection tools to identify, target and eliminate a threat. The importance of a strong human intelligence collection capability is stressed as being significantly more important than high tech systems which can be deceived or avoided.

Logistics & Force Protection - Logistics types are given some ideas on how to protect their own logistics assets i.e. convoys, rear area security personnel, etc.

Fires- Fires personnel will understand what the enemy may very likely attempt to do in order to avoid being decimated by artillery or close air support.

Maneuver/Grunts- Warfighters will have an idea of what types of patterns to look for leading up to an enemy attack, or hostile intelligence collection effort. Warfighters will also understand that their collected and forwarded observations on site will provide members of the staff and supporting elements the needed data to properly ascertain and eliminate a threat. In other words, all warfighters are intel collectors and it is their job to forward the data to aid in putting an end to the conflict. Last, Poole's well cited book provides direction to other resources which are rare and difficult to find, information that is most important to the people who are actually doing the fighting. Another well written book by John Poole is Phantom Soldier which provides even more resources to facilitate further research.

Finally, The Tiger's Way is an intelligence product that provides insight into today's enemy threat and reducing uncertainty. Most intelligence products focus too much on terrain, weather and other quantitative issues and often ignore the human element to warfare. This book addresses what is ignored, and what ultimately kills our people.

My mentor, MAJ Donald E. Vandergriff, uses John Poole's books for the textbooks in his Military Science class here at Georgetown. I started reading them during my first years in the ROTC program. I was captivated by Mr. Poole's ingenious ideas. I must say that in my opinion, The Tiger's Way is his best book yet. It's one of those books that makes a highlighter useless. If you highlighted the important parts, you'd end up highlighting the whole thing! Mr. Poole wastes no space with information less than vital.
As an officer in training, I find that The Tiger's Way provides solutions to the countless questions that have perplexed me in the study of military art. Before I read The Tiger's Way I would always ask questions like, "What changes do we make when it's dark outside? Is that tactic really practical if you're getting shot at? How would that tactic work if the enemy did X or Y? What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect? What if the enemy hides underground?" Our future enemies will use all the tricks I wondered about and more. We cannot stubbornly hide behind our rigid doctrine and superior firepower. The US military will either evolve or suffer increased casualties at the hands of cunning adversaries. Mr. Poole offers a solution!
Mr. Poole lays out detailed descriptions of countless unconventional, deceptive tactics, drawing from a diverse and staggeringly immense list of sources. Mr. Poole's book will both expand Soldiers' tactical repertoire and warn them about what they might expect to encounter when facing a more deceptive adversary. Any cadet who is serious about actually fighting and winning someday should read The Tiger's Way backwards and forwards. Despite my limited experience in the military to this point, I can tell when I read something that is on target. It doesn't take a genius or a combat veteran to see the profound truth in Mr. Poole's writing.

Gunny Poole puts iron on target again. The Tigers Way is an in depth examination of Asian/Oriental small unit tactics, and how the American Army needs to restructure its command and control systems, as well as soldier training. The book is highly detailed and sometimes makes for tedious readng, but is very thorough. The appendices even include some training drills to improve our troops' knowledge base. I highly recommed this to any serving member of the infantry, from PV1 to flag rank.

The United States now contends with a non-western foe whose combat success relies on guile and not upon force alone. The U.S. grunt faces a foe entirely different from his former "Cold War" opponent. H.John Poole attempts to show how the U.S. fighting man (and woman) can prevail against this opponent.
"Tiger's Way" examines the eastern Eurasian grunt's tactical edge over the U.S. approach to infantry combat. Part I discusses the U.S. fighting style as it relates to the highly touted "maneuver warfare" which the American military has dabbled with since the 1980s. The author concludes that hi-tech U.S. weapons can come up short against the current opponent's skills and techniques at the 75 yard-line. Part II describes those proficiencies attributed to the "Eastern Way" warrior - and necessary for the U.S. grunt to prevail within this 75 yard-line - where, more and more the outcomes will count in strategic currency. Part III continues with tactical applications of these skills, illustrating these with examples from past conflicts. Part IV indicates directions for reform. Appendices provide tables of perceived casualties from the Korean and Vietnam wars, examples of "Eastern Way" combatants' training and battle drills to build the U.S. grunt's proficiencies.
The book is very readable and well researched. Some common themes interwoven through the work include: the "Eastern Way" warrior has eveolved tactically and practiced maneuver warfare for quite some time; U.S. forces are over-controlled, highly dependant on sophisticated arms and continue to conduct "attrition" combat which, rather than out-thinking the opponent, focuses upon destroying him; this reflecting a lack of field proficiency and short-range combat skills. The "eastern Way" grunt is learning to deal with American hi-tech weapons through flexible combat command and short-range tactical skills.
The discerning reader must bear in mind some of the book's limitations. The "Eastern Way" opponent refers to some very culturally-diverse nations - an awfully broad swath of Eurasia including Japan and Germany. The author also tends to assign a uniformly high effectiveness to their training regimes such that every enemy individual has mastered those skills his American opponent lacks. During prolonged combat, experiential learning is temperd with inertia - the "fog of war" - such that tactical outcomes may be come less and less predictable. While Asian armies may recognize and exploit this "fog" through shared concepts, NOT every Eurasian fighting man is a ninjutsu master.
Through his survey of "Eastern Way" military institutions, tactics and training, the author has ignored the one western contender who successfully applied many of the skills he describes, who scored the highest kill ratio (10 to one) against a foe during World War II, who, even in defeat, insured that his nation remained independant to become the modern, economically-successful society it is today. Who might this contender be? None other than the Finnish army - the unsung soldiers of World War II. Perhaps their tactical accomplishments rate more than mere mention. HOW did the Finnish soldier develop such a high level of tactical skill - given that he possessed few of the armaments of his foes?
Perhaps the most significant limitation in "Tiger's Way" is the lack of a focused discussion on how the U.S. military culture needs to change such that these maneuver-oriented, flexible tactical skills might be developed. The American approach to short range infantry combat doesn't exist in a vaccum. Combat leaders have to contend with "up-or-out" promotion policies and frequent rotation in and out of units. Successful experiments such as "cohort" units are dropped in favor of continuing skill-limiting individual replacement systems. Poole provides some good ideas for battle drills at the small unit level but little on how the entire force may make the "cultural leap" such that tactical skills would evolve in the author's recommended directions.
Given these limitations, is "Tiger's Way" worth a read? ABSOLUTELY. This is a MUST-READ book for any professional tactician, combat historian and military reformer. Poole is one of few authors addressing what most strategic thinkers ignore: the significance of combat at the grunt's level and what must happen if U.S. combatants are to win against the "Eastern Way" opponent. Lastly, this ex-Marine Vietnam war veteran grunt can give no highter recommendation than that he would rather have been trained as H. John Poole prescribes in "The Tiger's Way".

This is John Poole's best writing yet.

The Tiger's Way is the best book by the man who is shaping future doctrine. If you want to understand how the future battles are going to be won - read this book.

The fight for terrorism will need competent soldiers, soldiers that can think and make their own decisions. Those decisions will be based on information from lots of different sources and their understanding and knowledge of the enemy. To be able to use this information and make the right decisions they need to be trained in decision making. In Tiger's Way we learn even more of how our opponents think and acts.

In the years to come we will see more of small groups of soldiers doing the job rather than big battalions creeping about. You may call it distributed operations, small unit action, special operations - but it all boils down to the same - patrols. Patrolling will be the most common way for soldiers to seek the enemy out and then take action - either by them self, with other patrols and/or supporting arms. In John Poole's books you learn what it takes to be a successful patrol.

If your job is to reform a fighting force - read this and learn the old lessons again.
If your job is to train a fighting force - read this for inspiration.
If your job is to fight - read this to survive.

Edit of 5 April to add ten links supporting error of US ways.

This is an extraordinary book, one that should guide all U.S. and Western infantry training, and in a larger sense, leadership development and acquisition strategy as well.

The author examines, in a careful, objective manner, the many ways in which Asian and Middle Eastern and other "Third World" insurgent infantry are trained in the art of stealth and close quarters infiltration and ambush. The bottom line is as the author ends the book: [Our enemy] prepares its privates to loosely follow orders, outwit enemy technology, and take on many times their number. In contrast, the American military prepares its privates to strictly follow orders, master their own technology, and seek a 3 to 1 advantage."

In combination with Jonathan Schell's book "Unconquerable World," and other books about the larger losses of moral status and legitimate alliances that American has suffered since 9-11, this book, at a grass-roots "down in the gutter" level, is daunting, troubling, provocative, and deeply critical.

It has been updated to address the current situation in Iraq, where foreign fighters and indigenous insurgents are slowly grinding down the U.S. occupying forces, while the improvised explosive device and suicidal terrorism techniques of Hezbollah spread rapidly to other countries.

Sad to say, but this book is also a manual for how easily our homeland infrastructure, nuclear and chemical plants, and other key notes, will be penetrated and taken down by a handfull of skilled individuals, most of whom need not die in the endeavor. "The Tiger's Way" is at once an indictment of U.S. military infantry training, and a handbook for just how vulnerable we are across every county in America.

The author is in many ways a complement to Ralph Peters, our own Lawrence of Arabia. The two together offer all that we need to know to transform our military and reassert our morality.

See for the larger context:
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush
The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage)
9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, Fourth Edition
DVD Why We Fight
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

This book terrified me and gave me hope.

As an NCO, I was tasked by the Army to study the Chinese language and culture. As an officer, I am continually struck by how little the Army as a whole really understands about the eastern way of thinking. We have faced eastern militaries three times in our history, and only once have we been victorious. In Korea we drew a bloody stalemate, and it is beyond dispute that Vietnam was a loss. Even our victory in WWII was achieved only through tremendous loss of life and material.

We cannot hope to expend so many lives in future conflicts. More to the point, we should arduously seek to avoid such losses. We no longer have the luxury of preparing for set-piece battles, training from a limited and inflexible list of Common Training Tasks. As we have learned in Vietnam, and sadly are relearning in Iraq, our superior technology is no assurance of victory.

For many years the Army has been paying lip service to the idea of empowering junior leadership. It is time to make that more than a slogan and empower our NCOs to devise their own required tactics and training. No one understands war like the grunt in the weeds. If we are to be victorious, tactics and training like those described in this book will be the key. We should be grateful for the courage and wisdom of men like H. John Poole who do not fear to speak the truth and challenge hide-bound institutional cultures.

In our time, we are privy to scores of books, interviews, and op eds dedicated to the strategic sphere of military conduct. Most analysts, those types that enjoy their time on CNN, seek to explain American failures in Iraq and Afghanistan in purely general terms: lack of troops, lack of allies, lack of materials, lack of goals. And while these issues certainly deserve their proper analysis, their role in military failures are grossly exaggerated.

The truth, as the fella said, is in the details. John Poole's The Tiger's Way is concerned with just such details. Poole knows well the tactical sphere: that area where the average U.S. Army infantry private spends his time. He knows and understands the techniques used by "eastern" opponents against Western forces, and he is better at illuminating our vulnerabilities to those techniques than any author in the last 50 years. If this were simply a book on those techniques and exploits, it would be quite a triumph. But there's more.

This book focuses on why our techniques are failing, as well as how they might be tailored to fit in our current environment. Folks like Rumsfeld can talk "light, mobile, and fast forces" all they want, but without applying the dispersion techniques outlined by Poole, maneuver warfare will remain stagnant.

If you are a citizen seeking to better understand what our forces are doing on the ground, and how they might do it better, you should buy this book. If you're a soldier on the ground, you should buy two: one for yourself and one for your unit.

Normally, I'd drop more points for the heavy handed editorializing, but the content was good enough to rise above that.

The book was published in 2003 and paints an unfair picture of U.S. ground forces as city kids who never get out of their vehicles. The wasn't true then and less so now. Equally misleading is the depiction of all Eastern soldiers as elite shadow warriors who can sneak under your table and steal your breakfast without you being any the wiser. And I'm very confident that Germans and Russians would not be amused when lumped with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Koreans under the rubric "Eastern". And the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Koreans probably wouldn't appreciate it either. I'll give the author the benefit of a doubt and allow as how it could have been a rhetorical device to emphasize the need to think outside the box and look at how other nations' ground forces do things.

The book has four sections; "A Growing Threat at 75 Yards", "The New Basics", "What the Eastern Soldier Does", and "The Winning Edge". In these sections, he addresses the need for better training for dismounted infantry and their leaders, and for raising the expectations of soldiers and marines. He lays down clear recommendations on how to train soldiers to use their senses more effectively, train to move more quietly, and in less direct but often more effective tactics.

The underlying thought throughout the book is that technology doesn't address every issue, that their are no magic pills for problems, and that you can't buy your way out of a conflict. It is consistent with my personal priciple that tools are things to extend human ability, but a greater benefit comes from improving the human's abilities.

Poole emphasizes human ability over technology, which I fundamentally agree with, but historically the side that masters emerging technology dominates the battle field, and a balance must be struck. In 2003, when this was published, the scales were weighted heavily on the side of gadgets, but since then the military has come back into a better balance.

An excellent resource for anyone in a ground force or serving with ground forces (as some sailors that I used to work with had).

E.M. Van Court

Readers of this book will look at the Army and Marines different. While the IG and other groups says they care about soldiers the readers of this book will actually care more about the thing that matters: YOUR SOLDIERS LIVES.

Here are two things a possible buyer of this book should consider. In WWII it was thought that the Japanese soldier was born in the jungle. Nothing could be further from the truth. Japan has as much Jungle as Oklahoma. What made the difference between the Japanese and American soldier was training. Their soldiers were taught stealth, hand-to-hand fighting, and all their other combat skills. Little noted in WWII was Japan won land battles against much larger American and British Armies in 1942. Only massive allied firepower turned the tide. Second, in Korea the UN forces often used the machinegun to excess. After a night of fighting the only result would be a few dead communist soldiers. Turkish soldiers, using eastern combat methods, had dozens of dead communists in front of their positions. All were dead by knife wounds.

If this book was followed the results would be nothing but positive things for the USA. First, we would have a better trained Army and Marines that would be able to handle the stress of combat better. We would have less dead men. Second, the Army and Marines could be smaller. We would have more warfighters but less of a logistics tail. Third, we would have less technological dependence. That means a savings of money.

I admire this book. John Poole goes through the combat tables and says what this reader long suspected; we often lose more men in combat with eastern armies. The only real reason we beat German forces in WWII is they wanted to be beat by us, the Soviets were their nightmare. Iraq could have had an eastern army but it was so over controlled and regulated by 2003 that nearly any good army could have taken them.

John Poole says that our infared night vision gear is of limited use. Tanks are not a great asset to any army. Good landmines and RPGs can take out any tank. The weird thing is the US Marines nearly issued the vast store of captured RPGs from Grenada to the Marines. The DoD killed this idea. The reason is American makes superior equipment and all that rubbish...

I really liked this book. This book should be required reading for any member on the House or Senate Armed Service committees. The trouble is our modern politicians are too busy trying to make the mothers of soldiers happy with training and not concentrating on the training of the soldiers to keep them from getting killed and accomplishing the mission.

This is the second book I've read from Poole in a week. It has been sent to my old ROTC school. Perhaps a future lieutenant can take wisdom from the pages of this book.

This book should be the vangard of the change needed in our Army and Marines. We need better training. We need soldiers who can take charge of the tactical situation. We need to get rid of the top-down structure that plagues the Army and Marines in tactical situations.

I wish some good soldiers, marines, and politicians could read this book and put it into use.

Until this book is followed our Army and Marines are little better than Activated Militia.