Customer Reviews

Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series)

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Notwithstanding discussion about the Germans putting long range bombers on the Azores, I'm not sure whether Goda actually proves that Hitler intended to use North African/Atlantic island bases to attack the US, since the evidence could be read to suggest that they would be primarily to defend territorial gains in Europe and Africa, still it is a very interesting book that I read all the way through. Much of it is diplomatic history illustrating the frustrations of the Germans in attempting to "square the circle" of securing the cooperation of three Mediterreanean powers: Italy, Spain, and Vichy France. Couldn't be done as they all had overlapping ambitions in the same regions of North Africa. One bit of news to this reader: Franco's Spain was at many times eager and willing to join the war on Germany's side, they just could never work out a satisfactory deal. I had thought Spain had always been reluctant to join the war.

Tomorrow the World is an odd book. The title and the inside flap explain that Germany had designs on the United States, and intended to conquer said nation, eventually. The proof, supposedly, is in this book. What you get, instead, is an in-depth analysis of German diplomatic and military initiatives in Spain and northwest Africa 1940-2. This is OK, but given that it doesn't live up to what it promises, frankly it's a bit disappointing.

The proof of the author's contention is embedded in various obscure diplomatic and military maneuvers that the Germans made, often supposedly at Hitler's behest directly, which according to the author show that Hitler was intending to confront the U.S. someday. Unfortunately most of these maneuvers involved either islands in the Atlantic (the Canaries or Azores, for instance) or French North Africa. None of this certainly shows Germany preparing for war with the U.S., because all of the actions could have been taken for other reasons, equally plausible ones. So all you're left with is a recounting of German diplomatic initiatives with regards to these locations, and that, while interesting, is at best a footnote to WW2.

One further note: this book is based on the author's doctoral thesis, and it reads like it. Paragraphs run to more than a page, sentences are interminable, and often it's hard to get the point. This is not for the faint of heart, or someone who isn't interested in the subject at a very detailed level.

Norman Goda's book is interesting, however there is except for a chapter or two, very scant information about Hitler's intentions toward the United States. The book loses its focus in Hitler's convoluted aims toward Northwest Africa and just what he planned to do with those bases if he ever got them, is really never discussed. However, a previous reviewer is wrong, Hitler was never a decent military tactician, he was a horrible tactician. If his generals had always listened to what Hitler ordered, Germany would have lost the war a lot faster than it did, this wasn't a case of Hitler planning just for an eventuality. Goda is very persuasive in his contention that Hitler did have a goal to attack and eliminate the United States at least since 1927-28. Unfortunately, Goda only discusses the H Class ships and the Amerika bomber in passing and never provides any evidence of just what Hitler planned to do with the bases he wanted in any attack toward America.

Norman Goda would have us believe that Hitler was on the verge of launching an attack on the America mainland. Certainly, Hitler had grandiose war aims, and certainly conquering America was one of them. But then again, given the chance, Hitler would have turned all non-German lands into some mixture of an Aryan Disneyland and penal colony.

Any decent tactician, which Hitler was, would plan for wartime eventualities, such as a conflict with the US. Goda presents a lot of "what if's" for armchair historians to consider, but given that Hitler only ever landed a dozen or so saboteurs on American soil, one cannot say with any precision how workable Hitler's long-range plans were.