"It has been said that those who do not heed the lessons and mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them. What if no one knows what the lessons are? Robert W. Chandler has provided an example of a case where the lessons of history have not been well established in the military mind. The lessons in this case involve a massive intelligence failure preceding operation Desert Storm....
Chandler is very thorough in addressing a serious problem present and future for the major powers. This problem is that well-funded terrorists and rogue nations can purchase WMD technology from the advanced nations....
This book is exceptionally informative and easy to read. The author not only provides the intelligence blueprint for future wars, he also gives concise and well-reasoned set of policy alternatives responding to the future world he foresees. These alternatives are eminently reasonable. Readers will be left to gather further insights in this excellent book. Professional and amateur intelligence specialists can thank Chandler for shining light on a serious post-Cold- War problem the United States faces major intelligence shortfalls." -- Dr. R. Norris Keeler, Kaman Diversified Technology Corporation, in Signal, December 1997
As America heads into the 21st century, U.S. national security strategy is focused on protecting vital interests abroad from regional aggression. Regional aggressors are now expected to be armed with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons the so-called "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) and the means to deliver them. How best to deal with WMD-armed adversaries has emerged as the subject of an intensifying debate in the national security and political communities. As highlighted by Robert Chandler's analysis, this book suggests that proliferation of WMD represents a fundamental change in the international security environment that cannot be addressed by "tinkering at the margins."
The lessons learned from the Iraqi experience yield a composite sketch of the 21st century proliferator. With this in hand, U.S. decisionmakers and military planners can now make legitimate assumptions about the regional WMD threat and begin constructing the most effective approach for countering it. Four main conclusions can be drawn from Iraq's ambitious program for developing WMD and the Coalition campaign to neutralize it during the Gulf War:
1. Regional WMD proliferation is no longer tomorrow's problem. Before Desert Storm, U.S. policymakers generally believed that regional WMD proliferation could be forestalled. The stunning series of post-Gulf War revelations about the size, scope, sophistication and maturity of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs captured in this report have changed all that. Washington now acknowledges that regional WMD proliferation is upon us and that U.S. strategy must now be reoriented to deal with it.
2. Regional WMD proliferation is likely to continue unabated. Regional states have powerful incentives to acquire WMD. Rogue states in search of regional hegemony seek WMD to intimidate and/or defeat their neighbors and to deter and, if necessary, disrupt U.S. intervention. Meanwhile, as more and more states proliferate, even non-aggressor states will feel compelled to follow suit to deter WMD-armed aggression. The Iraqi case also shows that proliferation is all but impossible to prevent, that Western nonproliferation efforts have little effect on a determined proliferator. Finally, many fear that nuclear expertise, advanced nuclear technology, high-grade nuclear materials, and possibly even full-up nuclear weapons will be available to the highest bidder from the cash-strapped former Soviet republics.
3. Monitoring WMD proliferation is extraordinarily difficult, particularly during crises and conflict. In retrospect, pre-Gulf War WMD-related intelligence was woefully inadequate. The Coalition air campaign planners, for example, targeted just eight Iraqi nuclear facilities during the war; in contrast, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors discovered fifty-six such sites afterward. Before Desert Storm, experts pegged Iraq as several years from fielding even a crude nuclear device; it is now believed they were just twelve to eighteen months away from producing one or more nuclear devices and/or deliverable weapons. It would be wrong, however, to cast full blame on the intelligence community. Iraq went to extraordinary lengths to shroud the development of its WMD triad; we can expect future proliferators to follow suit.
4. As a distinct target set, WMD programs present a daunting military challenge. Using the Iraqi WMD program (January 1991) as a baseline target set for future counterforce (counter- WMD) operations, one is immediately struck by the sheer scale of the projected effort. Planners would have to target over 250 "fixed" facilities and hundreds of other dispersed and/or mobile assets. Moreover, such an operation would be complex, technologically challenging, politically controversial, and very risky. The proliferator would undoubtedly know America viewed his WMD development as a burgeoning threat and that military action was a possibility. Defensive preparations, such as concealing and dispersing critical WMD assets and placing air defenses in a higher state of readiness, would likely be stepped up. Facilities could be located in hardened and/or deeply-buried bunkers resistant to all but the most advanced penetrating weapons and virtually invulnerable to current-generation cruise missiles; guarded by sophisticated air defenses; and located in, or indeed relocated to, heavily-populated urban areas.
America's three-pronged approach for countering the wide-ranging regional WMD threat is clearly inadequate: deterrence can never be guaranteed; theater missile defenses have gaping holes in them as a result of budgetary restructuring to cover "other Department priorities;" and passive defense programs are underfunded. This leaves counterforce operations, but they will remain militarily infeasible so long as theater-based aircraft are left to carry the precision strike burden. There is, in fact, little the United States can do to negate the many implications of proliferation short of "extending" the theater of operations beyond the range of enemy WMD. This is the subject of Robert Chandler's comprehensive strategy assessment and recommendations for redirection in The New Face of War (1998).
