This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.
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"Departs from the tradition of the standard microeconomics textbook by providing an in-depth treatment of a few core topics, rather than a standard comprehensive overview of the field, and by ignoring the standard competitive analysis altogether and focusing on imperfect competition, uncertainty and incomplete information, and incentives." Journal of Economic Literature
Book Description
This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.
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10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
lucid exposition and very modern focus,
By A Customer
This review is from: Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives (Paperback)
Wolfstetter has given us a book that is very much focused on modern microeconomic theory. It is indeed, as the title suggests, a "topics" book, not a universal micro theory textbook. For instance, he does not cover general equilibrium theory at all. But by concentrating on the fascinating newer insights of information economics and industrial economics, he is able to go deeper than most other textbooks, see for instance the outstanding chapter on auction theory. There is even a chapter on matching theory, a topic not usually covered in textbooks at all.The reader from Pasadena is right when he says that this is a book for academics. This is the audience the book was written for. But this reader is highly unfair for blaming the book for the fact that he is not an academic. In fact, for academics, this is an excellent book, and clearly deserves 5 stars!
5.0 out of 5 stars
buy this book,
By I'm an academic (Houston, TX) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives (Paperback)
note on the 1 star review:
Coase [1972] put forward an important conjecture on the time inconsistency problem in durable good monopoly. Readers who like to know if (a form of) this conjecture is correct can examine the careful thinking of Bulow [1982] and Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski [1989] as presented in section 1.6 of Topics in Microeconomics. (Yes, you'll need some background in mathematics.)
9 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
It is an excellent book,
By A Customer
This review is from: Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives (Paperback)
This book provides an extremely thorough and comprehensive treatment of important topics in microeconomics. This work manages to be both rigorous and pleasant to read.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
In this chapter we analyze the supply and pricing decisions of a pure, single-product monopolist facing a large number of price-taking buyers. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
surplus subsidy mechanism, full income insurance, uniformly distributed valuations, strict monotone decreasing, expected wage cost, inclusive reaction function, mixed entry strategies, stable matching procedure, wallet auction, competition subgame, equilibrium bid function, one stable matching, complementary monopoly, renegotiation offer, multiunit auctions, adverse selection bias, payoff equivalence, direct auction, screening equilibrium, intertemporal price discrimination, efficient risk allocation, accommodating price, noncompetitive results, local extreme value, surplus mechanism Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Proof Suppose, Assumptions Consider, Imperfect Competition, Bayesian Nash, Proof See Table, Salomon Brothers New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
In this chapter we analyze the supply and pricing decisions of a pure, single-product monopolist facing a large number of price-taking buyers. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
surplus subsidy mechanism, full income insurance, uniformly distributed valuations, strict monotone decreasing, expected wage cost, inclusive reaction function, mixed entry strategies, stable matching procedure, wallet auction, competition subgame, equilibrium bid function, one stable matching, complementary monopoly, renegotiation offer, multiunit auctions, adverse selection bias, payoff equivalence, direct auction, screening equilibrium, intertemporal price discrimination, efficient risk allocation, accommodating price, noncompetitive results, local extreme value, surplus mechanism Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Proof Suppose, Assumptions Consider, Imperfect Competition, Bayesian Nash, Proof See Table, Salomon Brothers New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 55
books:
See all 55 books this book cites
2
books
cite this book:
- Microeconomic Theory by Andreu Mas-Colell in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- The Economics of Imperfect Information by Louis Phlips in Back Matter
- The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 2nd Edition by Joan Robinson in Back Matter
- Advanced Industrial Economics: Lecturers' Manual by Stephen Martin in Back Matter
- Giants of Science - Isaac Newton by Michael White in Back Matter
See all 55 books this book cites
- Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization) by Costas Courcoubetis in Back Matter
- Leistungsorientierte Vergütung als Qualifizierungsanreiz: Theoretische Analyse und empirische Befunde (Management, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse) (German Edition) by Christian Lukas in Back Matter
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