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Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values

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Phillipe Sands book brings together a lot that was already known with some new information provided by interviews. This book was valuable in that it places the information in a coherent narrative. Sands lets his Interviewees speak for themselves and succeeds in not judging them personally, nor questioning their motives, but only points out where the International and US law may be used to judge them and their possible guilt. He interviews Jim Haynes, General Hill, Doug Feith, Diane Beaver, General Myers and others, devoting a chapter to each interview. The overall effect of these interviews is at times startling.

Sands focuses his main argument on the fact that lawyers were not guided by law in their memos and advice to the President, VP, Secretary of Defense, and others, but were subservient to the policy choices of our leaders. To use a phrase of Vice President Cheney, the Pentagon and Justice Department lawyers tried to write the law from the "dark side." We the readers are the jury who will decide if they stayed within the bounds of the rule of law.

I think Sands does show, in disagreement with Alberto Gonzalez, General Myers, and Jim Haynes that the mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo was not in response to a request for guidance from below but was the premeditated, concerted effort of the lead Principals and Lawyers in the Bush Administration to bypass Army FM 34-52. The timeframe of the discussions, memos and interrogation policies of Guantanamo all support that conclusion. There can be no question of coincidental connections.

Phillipe Sands convincingly connects the dots in my opinion. President Bush and his advisors made two momentous decisions. First, they set aside the Geneva Conventions and second, they augmented FM 34-52 with 18 interrogation techniques used separately and in concert. These interrogations left Al-Qahanti, the first target of this new policy, in the words of one Army interrogator, with "eyes, black as coals."

In his interview with Dr Abigail Seltzer, psychiatrist, and medical expert who has had extensive experience with torture survivors, we learn that deciding whether techniques are torture, a lot can be gleaned from the reaction of the victim. The interview, based on the actual interrogation logs of Mohammed Al-Qahtani, Detainee 063, is chilling, to say the least.

Critics may find that Sands spends too much time on Mohammed al-Qahtani Detainee 063 and exaggerates the importance of the treatment of one detainee, but I believe he shows how the part reveals the whole. Philippe Sands is very thorough in his analysis of detainee 063's case. He speaks with lawyers and medical experts to determine whether the treatment of 063 crossed the line into torture. His concentration, primarily on one case, did not detract from his book but strengthened it in my opinion. Sands also makes the point that illegal activity in regards to violations of Geneva Art. 3 can be imputed to a defendant based on only one case.

In one interview with an International Judge and Prosecutor, Sands quotes them as saying the Administration Principals and lawyers' attempt in the Military Commissions Act to immunize themselves from prosecution in the treatment of detainees before the passage of the Act was stupid and may come back to haunt them. In rejecting U.S. courts oversight of their cases they open themselves up to judgment by International Commissions and Courts. It could lead to a tap on the shoulder if the Principles visit other countries, much in the same way that Pinochet was arrested in Britain for crimes committed while he was the leader in Argentina.

Underlining the seriousness of this book and its charges, Sands quotes Justice Anthony Kennedy who wrote that acts against Geneva Art 3 are war crimes. The Supreme Court, in Hamdan vs Rumsfeld, overturned the President's decision and OLC and Pentagon lawyers' position that Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda.

Critics are not going to like his drawing on the Nuremburg trials with inference that the US leaders and lawyers can be compared to Nazis. Sands is very careful to note that it is not his intention to make such a comparison, but only to use the legal principles derived from that era that are still applicable today. Mr. Sands does all this without swamping the average readers with a lot of legalese and jargon. Anyone with a patience and openness can follow his common sense approach.

Sadly this story is not over and much more is to come about meetings and involvement of top officials in the US government with torture. The Torture Team will provide an excellent bridge to future revelations and responses.

Postcript: On May 19th, Phillipe Sands revealed in the Manchester Guardian that the Pentagon has dropped all charges against Mohammed Al-Qahtani Detainee 063.

Postscrpt 2 Jan 14, 2009 "We tortured [Mohammed al-] Qahtani," said Susan J. Crawford, in her first interview since being named convening authority of military commissions by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in February 2007. "His treatment met the legal definition of torture. And that's why I did not refer the case" for prosecution.

Crawford, a retired judge who served as general counsel for the Army during the Reagan administration and as Pentagon inspector general when Dick Cheney was secretary of defense, is the first senior Bush administration official responsible for reviewing practices at Guantanamo to publicly state that a detainee was tortured.

This is not a wild diatribe about the misguided Bush administration or an 'anti' anything. It's a well written and well documented account by an eminent British QC (Queens Council) of how Rumsfeld bent US and International law to allow interorgators to use torture in the prison camps in violation of the Geneva convention. It exposes part of the shame that Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld has brought on the great USA by invading Iraq.
Should be read by all loyal US citizens to make them aware of how important it is to use the voting booth in an enlightned way to ensure that an honorable and wise government is empowered.

Philippe Sands QC, Professor of Law at University College London, wrote the acclaimed Lawless World. In this new book he investigates how the US state introduced aggressive interrogation techniques at Guantanamo and elsewhere.

He interviewed key figures in the US Department of Defense, including Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commanding Officer of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo until 8 November 2002, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General James Hill, Commander of US Southern Command.

Sands shows that the highest US authorities authorised criminal acts. As Abraham Lincoln said in 1863, "military necessity does not admit of cruelty ... nor of torture to extract confessions." Aggressive interrogation techniques, as well as being immoral, are unnecessary because they are unreliable, and they are also counter-productive because they discredit the user, undermine the user side's war effort and increase the risks to the user side's POWs. A National Defense Intelligence College study of 2006 concluded that there was almost no scientific evidence to support their use.

Yet in February 2002, President George W. Bush ruled that none of the Guantanamo detainees could rely on any of the protections granted by the Geneva Conventions. This ruling was intended to remove all constraints on interrogation, as Douglas Feith confirmed to Sands. On 2 December 2002 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed an `Action Memo' one of whose four attachments authorised the use of eighteen interrogation techniques. These all contravened US Army Field Manual 34-52, the rule book for military interrogation, and broke Common Article 3 of the Conventions, which prohibits cruel or inhumane treatment and `outrages upon personal dignity', without exceptions for `necessity' or national security.

Further, as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger concluded in his report, "the augmented techniques for Guantanamo migrated to Afghanistan and Iraq where they were neither limited nor safeguarded." US pressure also led British forces in Iraq to adopt more aggressive interrogation techniques, as Brigadier Ewan Duncan, responsible for British HUMINT operations, acknowledged to Sands.

In June 2006 the US Supreme Court ruled that Bush's decision was unlawful and that Common Article 3 applied to all Guantanamo detainees. As Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "violations of Common Article 3 are considered `war crimes'." All acts of torture and all acts of complicity or participation in torture are criminal offences.

In November 2001, al-Qahtani Mohammed was captured in Afghanistan and sent to the American detention facility at Guantanamo, Cuba. About a year later, it was discovered that he had likely been an additional hijacker for the 9-11 terrorist attacks and a member of al-Qaeda, and so he was placed in isolation for 160 days. During that time he was subjected to aggressive interrogation techniques twenty hours a day for fifty-four straight days. His interrogation logs, in fact, were published by Time magazine on March 3, 2006, and Sands sprinkles excerpts of them throughout his book. al-Qahtani was not charged with any crimes for six years, not until February 11, 2008, and those charges were dropped by the Pentagon on May 12, 2008.

Philippe Sands teaches at the University College London, and is a leading expert in international law. He participated in the torture cases of Pinochet and Charles Taylor. His book is meticulous in detail, exhaustive in its research, fairminded in letting all the protagonists explain their versions of the story, cautious in his language, suprisingly suspenseful given the arcane and complex nature of the subject matter, and, more than anything else, devastating in its conclusions. Sands believes that al-Qahtani's treatment amounted to torture, and that those who were responsible for his treatment are guilty of war crimes in light of the Geneva Conventions (Article 3) and the 1984 Torture Convention. Of course, in the world of realpolitik they will not be prosecuted here in America, but Sands is deadly serious in his sober advice to the Bush lawyers (William Haynes, Doug Feith, David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, John Yoo, and Jay Bybee) who provided legal rationalizations for the torture -- be very careful about traveling overseas.

Sands draws other conclusions. The decision to torture al-Qahtani did not bubble up from the bottom at Guantanamo, as the Bush administration claimed, but was explicitly directed by Rumsfeld's office and his now infamous "torture memo" that included eighteen interrogation techniques. Abuses at Guantanamo clearly "migrated" to Abu Ghraib. Torture is always immoral in principle (cf. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Experts suggest that it produces unreliable results, and that proved to be the case with al-Qahtani, as no meaningful intelligence was gathered from him. His treatment was a betrayal of American values and longstanding military practice. It put American soldiers at risk and undermined America's reputation abroad. But the Bush administration argued that the extraordinary times required extraordinary measures, that there were palpable fears of further attacks, and so they sought the legal fig leaf to cover what they intended to do no matter what. As with the run-up to the Iraq war, normal processes were subverted.

In his acknowledgements Sands pays special tribute to the career military lawyers he encountered. A list of principal characters and a chronology of events supplement his narrative. This book has earned high reviews, and is often mentioned in conjunction with The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How The War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals (2008) by Jane Mayer.

After seeing Sands on Moyers, I ordered this book. The detail he brings to the possible prosecution of Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/Yoo/Haynes/Feith for war crimes is remarkable. His interview with Dr. Abigail Seltzer in evaluating whether the treatment of Detainee 063 constituted torture is unsurpassed. His summation in Chapter 25 lays out the case with assistance from Lord Wright, who chaired the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Such a fine read!

Philippe (correct spelling) Sands' 'Torture Team' is the best summary, to date, of the intricate policies the U.S. government devised for hiding the truth about their torture policies. The Q.C's research is impeccable. Interviews with important people involved in the torture decisions are riveting. The book reads like a John le Carre novel, but is unfortunately and (disgracefully) true. It will be interesting to see if the lack of a 'paper trail' is helpful in keeping some participants from being prosecuted as war criminals. a MUST READ.

Philippe Sands, a respected barrister and Queen's Counsel in the Matrix Chambers in England, as well as a Professor of International Law at University College London, writes a comprehensive and well-researched book that permits the reader to understand the process whereby torture became an accepted part of the fabric of the Global War on Terror. By interviewing many of the major players, and having access to many of the principal documents and memoranda, Philippe Sands takes us on a ride through the labyrinth of the Department of Defense that led to the harsh and brutal treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The research is factual and surprisingly forceful, and the ability to get many of the architects to open up and give their views makes the book both informative and eminently readable. And yet, despite a walk down a difficult road that leaves the reader with no doubts as to the current Administration's views of the benefits of torture, the author manages to keep the book dispassionate and focused..and the author finds heroes in the Armed Forces who stand out for their courage and commitment to legality. One senses that this book will become required reading for those lawyers who will specialize in human rights whether in the United States of America or in the Europe. Research such as this will form the fabric on which future historians will judge current events and make legal judgments. It should be required reading for all those interested in the study of human rights and its application today.

Along with documents made available dating back to 2002 - the Yoo/Bybee "torture memo", the Jim Haynes memo originating in Guantanamo and approved by Rumsfeld, and the interrogation logs of prisoner 063, al Qahtani - the author conducts a series of interviews that help us point to where the authority for "enhanced interrogation techniques" came from. It's now fairly clear that the impetus of the abuse that was applied to al-Qahtani at Guantanamo or that was depicted graphically at Abu Graib did not originate with a "few bad apples" in the lower ranks but came from up high; and that those at the lower ranks such as Diane Beaver were in some sense used as scapegoats.

The author uses a measured approach throughout the book, carefully interviewing many of the players involved, careful not to jump to conclusions but alert to missing links. As an English barrister and expert in international law, he brings knowledge of the dealings of the British government with the IRA, the arrest of Pinochet, and the British government's experiences in Iraq. He is someone who does not want to see undone the past efforts of the American government to reign in the use of torture around the world.

The treatment of al-Qahtani involved a systematic attempt to break a human personality down to something below an animal. All the eighteen interrogation techniques approved by Rumsfeld fell within the Yoo/Bybee legal guidelines of not being torture (Rumsfeld even mocked one of them as being a lot less than something he did every day), but taken together over an extended period of some fifty days - solitary confinement, lack of sleep, sensory overload, dehydration, extreme temperatures, humiliation, etc - they had a combined effect that can only be seen as torture - at least torture of the human soul, if not strictly speaking the body. The body was constantly monitored by physicians. And was all this necessary? The author makes clear that the "ticking time bomb scenario" was not in play here because 9/11 was already a year old. Was anything gained? Nothing that anyone knows, and soon before this book was published al-Qahtani was released without a trial.

A signal moment in the chain of events occurred on February 7, 2002 when George W. Bush announced that the U.S was not going to abide by the Geneva Conventions. In August of 2002 the OLC of the Justice Department produced the "torture memo". The basis for the forthcoming interrogation methods was set. The author interviews up the chain of command as far as Rumsfeld's legal counsel Jim Haynes in an attempt to see how they were originated and then used on al-Qahtani. The military side of the Pentagon was at least sceptical if not outright opposed to the aggressive approach the civilians - Feith and Haynes especially - were espousing. But Haynes, in his position of legal authority at the Pentagon, managed to lock the military out the process. The question beyond the scope of this book and hidden behind the wall of national security is how he was influenced by the top of the government.

As it turns out, what Philippe Sands has exposed in Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values is the well-documented truth, reinforced by the power of Internet access, of how the Bush Administration's political agenda poisoned the fundamentals of this Nation's long-held leadership in human rights. A Professor of Law at University College in London and Academic Member of the prestigious Matrix Chambers where he specializes in international law, this Queen's Counsel is an unlikely but welcomed chronicler of what has happened to the rule of law in this country during the past seven years.

Building upon a few fundamental documents that first came to light in response to the scandal at Abu Ghraib, he pulled together an impressive list of first-person interviews of those legally involved and turned the most commonly thought perceptions of the cause of the abuses in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib on their head! Sands narrative takes us through an entangled chronology of events more in the manner of a storyteller rather than a legal scholar with refreshing results. His analysis is quite clear. While some may insist that these actions were merely part of a process that first stretched the boundaries of our laws and then later corrected itself, others believe that binding international laws and treaties were either ignored or deliberately overlooked by those involved.

Although the author offers great praise for America's legal professionals both within the military and the Government, the fact that we as a Nation have collectively acted in this manner should be very sobering for all of us. Be you zealot, patriot or cynic, America's abhorrence of inhumane treatment dates back to the days of Lincoln. Cruelty, humiliation and the use of torture were prohibited by international law with the Geneva Convention and reinforced by the Convention Against Torture in 1984, which criminalized such acts. Additionally, Sands discussion of the actual trials of lawyers at Nuremberg, watching Stanley Kramer's classic Judgment at Nuremberg again, pondering the underlying principles and the parallels raised and the popularizing of the myth 'that torture works' by Jack Bauer and the Emmy-winning '24 - Season One' television series that began in 2002 adds a contemporary twist to this book.

While its revelations and his conclusions may never be echoed in any global forums or international halls of justice, Sands words will hopefully resonate within each of us and inspire some old-fashioned American soul searching for all of us.

Bob Magnant is the author of The Last Transition... - a fact-based novel about Iran, Iraq and the Middle East.

In Torture Team, Philippe Sands, professor at University College London and a respected international lawyer, carefully examines how Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush, and a team of compliant lawyers consciously set aside international rules constraining interrogations and thereby both destroyed the historic American commitment to the rule of law and opened themselves up for possible war crimes trials. "That decision," writes Sands, "was motivated by a combination of factors, including fear and ideology and an almost visceral disdain for international obligations." The book is carefully researched, meticulously documented, and always respectful. It should be required reading for anyone interested in the rule of law, and perhaps more ominously, for anyone concerned with what Hannah Arendt labeled, "the banality of evil."

Most of the book is bracketed by actions taken in 2002 and 2006. It was in February of that first year when George Bush declared that the Geneva Conventions did not protect detainees in Guantánamo. And it was on December 2 of the same year that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed a document, drafted by his General Counsel, Jim Haynes, which authorized eighteen aggressive interrogation techniques that might be used in questioning terror suspects.

Then, in June of 2006 the Supreme Court ruled, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied to the treatment of those captured in the "War on Terror." In his concurring opinion Justice Kennedy wrote that, "By Act of Congress... violations of Common Article 3 are considered `war crimes,' punishable as federal offenses, when committed by or against United States nationals and military personnel."

Both of the actions taken in 2002, Sand observes, went against international law and long-standing U.S. military practice. Then, in the chapters that follow, he carefully builds his argument showing how both actions were rationalized and "legalized" by lawyers willing to forgo their obligations to please their clients. Through extensive interviews with most of those responsible for the legal advice, and many of those responsible for its implementation, Sands leaves the reader convinced that some legal action must be taken against those responsible if the United States is to undo the damage done to its reputation as a supporter of human rights and to the integrity of international law. Difficult as it might be to imagine, that would mean, in a just world, that Cheney, Bush, Rumsfeld, David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, John Yoo and Jim Haynes would face an international tribunal.

Much of the book is woven around the released interrogation log of detainee 063 (Mohammed al-Qahtani). In a fitting postscript, after years in Guantánamo, after being accused of being the "20th highjacker," after months of being subjected to what must be called torturous interrogation, all charges against detainee 063 were dismissed "without prejudice."