Customer Reviews

Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

The author strongly makes the case that the Abu Ghraib torture scandal was not caused by a few rotten apples on the night shift, but was systematic torture as policy. The Red Cross report and other valid reports are in the book so that the reader can see for himself that the torture at Abu Ghraib was certainly far more than a few rotten apples that were military police serving in the reserves that were sent to Abu Ghraib.

There was sadism at Abu Ghraib. There was a breakdown in law and order at Abu Ghraib. There was a breakdown in discipline at Abu Ghraib. This, of course, puts our entire Country and our entire military at risk.

Not only is the torture wrong, but, beyond that, torture is ineffective and many of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib had no intelligence value in the first place. Torture is very harmful to our Country politically speaking. It is certainly the case that any information that was obtained by torture would be overshadowed by the political damage caused by the activities.

This is by far the best journalistic account of the torture of suspects at Abu Ghraib. This is also the best book to read after reading the books of documents, which give you the vital context for understanding Danner's book. Read them first and then this one - you will then be able to understand what really happened and why. British and US troops really did commit terribe acts against their prisoners, with tragic consequences for the reputation of both nations in the Middle East. Read Danner and the documents books to discove why. Christopher Catherwood (author of CHURCHILL'S FOLLY: HOW WINSTON CHURCHILL CREATED MODERN IRAQ: Carroll and Graf, hardcover 2004, paperback 2005)

I bought Mark Danner's TORTURE AND TRUTH several months ago from Amazon, and find it ever more relevant to current events. For the numbers of people detained and tortured in the War on Terror-- many of them believed by reputable individuals and organizations to be innocent-- continues to rise, and extends far beyond Abu Ghraib. The very fact that the majority of these people have never been formally charged with involvement in terrorist activity nor tried seems to prove their innocence, for it would be very easy to keep someone in jail these days if one could present solid evidence of their involvment in terrorism. Those who object that the tortures inflicted on these detaninees is not as bad as that which some totalitarian governments inflict upon their victims ignore the fact that the "soft torture" techniques in development since the end of World War II have been found to be more effective in "breaking" victims than simple brutality (see Alfred McCoy, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR). The suffering of these wretched detainees keeps me awake at night, yet to this day most people seem unconcerned about their plight. Danner's comment from the Introduction to his book still holds true: "Like other scandals that have erupted during the Iraq War and the war on terror, it is not about revelation or disclosure but about the failure, once wrongdoing is disclosed, of politicians, officials, the press, and, ultimately, citizens to act."

Like its companion, The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, Torture and Truth is an essential resource for scholars or researchers on this subject. However, because of its length (500+ pages)and scope it is an excellent choice for the more general reader. It is a compilation of reports and letters, mostly from the Bush Administration, on the Iraq War and torture issues. Because of its primary source components, it is invaluable for anyone doing research on the subject. It is well-organized, and will find a place in many dissertations in the years to come.

Movies have separate ratings for violence, sexual content or language, so should books. Mark Danner's "Torture and Truth" deserves separate consideration. The book is a singular reference for the academic or historian who will try to make sense of an age when Americans acted out of fear instead of strength and confidence, and became the world's bully instead of its protector. As such, this is not for the reader who wants to be entertained. The detailed memoranda that describe intradepartmental and interdepartmental conflict will prevent that, so will the myriad of abbreviations and acronyms that will make the reader turn to the appendix again and again. A few readers will be lucky enough to know what sigint, UCMJ or CSM mean without seeking clarification, but the constant turn to the appendix will cause frustration and disrupt the continuity of reading.

What becomes apparent is that torture was considered even before we started taking prisoners or that there was "actionable intelligence" to be gained from them. Colin Powel's State Department sends a flurry of memoranda attempting to convince the Bush administration to act within the rules of the Geneva Convention. The Departments of Justice and Defense, the Office of Legal Counsel, and Bush's own lawyer write the opposite. The forces against Powell are strong. Afghanistan is declared a failed state, the Geneva Convention will be observed but not practiced, and torture is given such a narrow definition as to allow almost any practice short of permanent injury or death.

What doesn't need to be looked at in detail are the pictures of Americans acting as barbarians. It is obvious from the photographs that they were not seeking intelligence information by sitting on top of nude prisoners, torturing them in hallways, putting them on a leash, making one prisoner fellate another, stacking them nude, in human pyramids, or tying them to beds or cell doors while they were also nude. Smiling faces of American women over an Iraqi corpse may sicken the viewer almost as much as seeing the hooded man, standing on a box, believing that electrodes are clipped to his fingers. These are photos of Americans as einsatzgrūppe.

The sworn statements from prisoners and the February 2004 Report of the International Red Cross show a pattern of brutality in too many facilities to be considered isolated incidents committed by "bad apples." "Certain Coalition Forces military intelligence officers told the ICRC that in their estimate between 70% and 90%of the persons deprived of their liberty in Iraq had been arrested by mistake."

The Taguba, Fay, and Schlessinger Investigations point to a lack of leadership, command and control, logistics, training, and continuity to explain the mayhem that resulted, but no investigation is aimed at the decision-makers in Washington. Prisoners are not taken to the rear as doctrine called for because the rising insurgency means there is no rear and no central point to process detainees who exchange number and identification with each other. Soldiers operating under the dilemma of using harsh techniques to provide intelligence and act humanely were given no moral compass by leadership or command and control. In other words, who was in charge? Those who were well-led, knew SOP and policy acted professionally. Some officers, NCO's and enlisted men made it their mission to act professionally, but only some.

The U. S. does not plan for combat operations in Iraq to end as quickly as it does. It expects to turn over Iraq to a sycophant who turns out to be a double agent. The U. S. doesn't, and stays. Neither event is planned for. The administration is unprepared for an occupation, an occupation that has no front line, plenty of time for things to turn for the worse, and not enough troops to handle it when it does.

It is also apparent that America had come full circle since 1945. It had become the invader instead of the liberator. It had become the brute and the bully instead of the protector. It now leads other nations through domination and coercion, instead of by example and cooperation.

This book was written in 2004. To date, no national policymaker has been held accountable for what happened.