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The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

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Those of us who are familiar with John Mearsheimers' illuminating and provocative work have been waiting quite a few years for him to put all his thoughts together in one coherent and all-encompassing book. The wait is finally over, and the result does not disappoint. Mearsheimer has written what is sure to be the standard text for the Realist paradigm for years to come. It is clear that he is in fact trying to place himself in the Realist cannon as the logical successor to Morgenthau and Waltz. Whereas Morgenthau could not explain why states are driven to be as aggressive as they are, and Waltz's Defensive Realism did not adequately describe the constant struggle for power among states, Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism claims to explain both. States are aggressive due to the anarchic nature of the state system, which leads them to not only seek to ensure their survival, but to also try to acquire power at every opportunity possible.
Mearsheimer's lengthy volume is divided roughly into two parts. The first half is the theoretical section, in which he presents his Offensive Realist theory in detail, along with an explanation of how to measure state power (population and wealth). Also included in this part is an entire chapter called "The Primacy of Land Power," in which he not only tries to explain why land power is the most important, but also goes into the limits of sea and air power, and the limited effectiveness of blockades and strategic bombing campaigns. It is somewhat surprising that these issues have generally been overlooked by IR theorists until now. Hopefully that will no longer be the case. The second half of the book is more empirical, including the histories of all the recent Great Powers, focusing on why and how they have been aggressive in their foreign affairs. Also included are chapter on the "Offshore Balancers" (UK and US), alliance behavior, and the origins of major wars.
Critics of this book are likely to be the usual assortment of Liberals, post-Modernists, Critical Theorists, and other Realists. But Mearsheimer has not only created the most coherent Realist theory yet, he has also solved some of the major contradictions within the Realist paradigm as well. It is a stunning accomplishment, and this is a book to be read by the general reader and seasoned IR Theorist alike. Indeed, Mearsheimer has written it in a style that is accessible to all, but with generous footnotes for those interested in more details. If you only read one book on International Relations in your life, let this be the one! It will explain more of the world around you than you would think possible.

Before any reader digs into Mearsheimer's tome, they should be aware of two things: First, the book is a study of GREAT POWER politics (which is why one should not expect the U.S.-led war against minor power Iraq or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to be accounted for; nor should they be cite these as examples of what the book lacks). Second, the book is not an international politics primer. Rather it is the most advanced presentation of the theory of offensive realism. Mearsheimer is the theory's leading proponent, and his book is not meant to be a balanced debate between realism and international liberalism, constructivism, etc.

That said, Mearsheimer's book is well-written and essential reading if one wishes to have a balanced view of international relations. The "Tragedy" of great power politics occurs when the power-maximization that nations pursue (which is almost mandated under international anarchy) leads to awesomely destructive hegemonic wars. Mearsheimer shatters the rhetoric surrounding great wars, reducing them to the basic elements of power. His theory is backed up by historical example, making for compelling reading. In addition, Mearsheimer looks to history and applies offensive realism in predicting that China will continue its rise and potentially challenge U.S. power in the near future.

Many will not agree with Mearsheimer's theory (this is the man, after all, who called for the nuclearization of Germany after the Cold War and pronounced NATO dead over a decade ago) but he is the leading Realist mind and strongest Realist voice in the IR community today. Love it or hate it, offensive realism does not get any more lucid than this.

First off, the book is very easy to get through - the primary theoretical points are clearly laid out and easy to understand, the selected empirical evidence is interesting, and the style is fluid and coherent. This is the strength of realist theory - clarity of thought, and results in a much more enjoyable read than something by a radical-constructivist or critical theorist. The disagreement over theory is clear from the wide range of ratings in the reviews, but I'd like to briefly cover some of the issues brought up by other reviewers.

Offensive realism, as posited by Mearsheimer is NOT a rehash of Waltz's structural realism but rather adds some important new elements to realist theory. As a result, it is still susceptible to some of the critiques of realist theory in general but also adds new theoretical problems.

Mearsheimer uses Waltz' assumptions on the anarchic nature of the international system and its implication for state behaviour but goes in a very different direction. Using the same assumptions, Waltz believes great powers will essentially be status-quo and defensive while Mearsheimer believes they will be revisionist and aggressive power-maximizers. Mearsheimer thus can avoid the argument against Waltz's defensive realist theory that it leaves no room for transformation of the international system. The potential for conflict is a direct result of the distribution of power in the anarchic system.

The assumptions used by both are by no means "given" and disagreement over them has come from liberal institutionalists, the English School, and the various subsets of constructivist theory. Whether state interests and identities are exogenous or endogenous, and whether there is any room for interests to be shaped by domestic politics, culture, ideology, or institutions is the primary diagreement. Realism says there are only structural variables.

If you think you're a realist, you might want to take note that no prominent realists supported the Iraq War. Realists would also pay no attention to the government of China - a hegemonic democratic China is as dangerous as a hegemonic authoritarian China. Also, the environment and potential for conflict in Europe is the same as in Asia - NATO and the EU, as institutions, are merely tools for great powers to position themselves in hegemonic struggle(this might be included because Mearsheimer said NATO was to be disbanded shortly after the end of the Cold War and needs to find a reason why it is still around). Ideational factors simply have no place in the theory.

Returning to Mearsheimer, he adds another variable to his theory, the impact of geopolitics on state interest. So not only does the distribution of power affect the potential for conflict, geographical factors also play a role. This complicates matters because no longer is there a single variable that can be used to determine causality, and it might be seen as a theoretical crutch. The US and UK both are exceptions to the rule that great powers expand aggressively. Some would say it is because they are liberal democracies, but Mearsheimer argues that it is because they are "offshore balancers", insular states that find it difficult to project power but also derive security from this. An exception to that exception is Japan in WWII, which Mearsheimer explains didn't have a lot of resistance and so couldn't help itself.

Another reviewer wrote of the unverifiability of Mearsheimer's theory. I think that the two variables and the stipulations he puts on power-maximization do make the theory a bit "slippery". Mearsheimer concludes the book by saying that, "Of course, states occasionally ignore the anarchic world in which they operate, choosing instead to pursue strategies that contradict balance-of-power logic." This is a contradiction of the book and realist theory in general. States shouldn't be able to choose how they behave but should be bound by the structure of the system (and geopolitics in Mearsheimer's version) to behave in a certain manner (offensively or defensively according to Mearsheimer or Waltz, respectively).

There are too many exceptions and stipulations to Mearsheimer's rule to make it particularly useful. Whereas the strength of Waltz's theory is its simplicity, Mearsheimer believes he combines theoretical simplicity with policy applicability. He succeeds in neither. Nevertheless, the book is the clearest articulation of offensive realism. Perhaps more comprehensive reading would be Mearsheimer's article on international institutions in International Security Winter 1994/1995, followed by responses from John Ruggie, Robert Keohane, Alexander Wendt, and the Kupchans, and a concluding reply by Mearsheimer.

As Mearsheimer's theories several other reviewers here have discussed I just want to add a few points. I always have a reluctant to accept someone who makes a political theory that only has a limited place for individuals.

However while Mearsheimer makes an extremely good case for his Offensive Realism, I found myself while reading though his examples a bit dubious over his explanations like Russia did not try to stay out of WW2 after the fall of France because she was trying to pass the buck. I think its because she was too weak to get involved in the conflict. Japan could have gone to war in 1941 against Russia rather then the US, in fact Mearsheimer's theories might suggest that Russia would have been a better target for them after all Russia was weak and their main rival in the region. At the end of WW2, the US with its forces in Europe would have been a hegemonic power there. Why did she not go for Eastern Europe too and why did she allow European powers to become independent? It controlled Japan too, why give that up?
Mearsheimer's himself admits having problems in explaining why Germany did not go to war in 1905 against France when his theories suggested that they should have.

The other issue is that this book states the system does not matter but what the rulers are interested in which is a relative advantages over their rivals. Well democratic societies, the electorate makes it quite clear it want *absolute* improvement in their living standards every year. If a leader of the US was to reduce the living standards of the US by reducing the living standards of China (as I think the writer suggests) I doubt the US voters would be pleased with their drop in living standards. If for example the US conquered Mexico then it would in the long term have made the Mexicans citizens, they would have voted, large sums of money would have gone into Mexico etc. The former US electorate would be upset as it sees large sums of money of its money going South. We can see such a situation actually occurring with Turkey attempts to join the EC. The rich states of EC don't want this drain in their living standards.

Also democratic societies electorates although they are prepared for a war, generally they want peace and will demand that they get it eg the Japanese electorate in the 1920s made the Japanese troops come back from its invasion of Eastern Russia, as did the US electorate in Vietnam and the Israel electorate in Lebanon. Both the Israeli and US electorates, are looking at the X of their troops that are getting killed not the 5*X terrorist that they are killing. In both, we can see that the electorate is saying lets get the troops to safety as soon as we can and a democratic leader that does not do so will find himself out soon.

First off, I'd like to say that I don't at all like Mr. Mearsheimer's thesis, nor the conclusions he draws. "Tragedy" is truly the perfect word to describe his theories. However, I have found the arguments to be so rock-solidly based on reality that I have had to put my feelings and opinions aside to accept the state of affairs that he brings forth.

Incredibly, his summarization of nearly 300 years of European history via the "offensive realism" lens explains many abberations throughout the history of human warfare. Most poignant of these is American involvement in WWII, coming as it did AFTER the near capitulation of all anti-German powers save Russia, effectively allowing Germany to crush any possible anti-American sentiment and resistance before American involvement was even an issue. I know a reviewer questioned why the US allowed Europe to exist as a separate political entity after the war, but if you take Mr. Mearsheimer's arguments that armies hold land belonging to the hegemonic power, then the question no longer exists. America's military reach has now expanded not just in Germany and Japan, but also in Korea, the Philippines, England, Turkey, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and recently Afghanistan and Iraq. If these armies constitute the "borders" of the American hegemony, then the only domains not completely covered are South America, Africa, parts of Central-South-East Asia, and most importantly, Russia/China -- everything else is under the American sphere of influence. This is exactly the point of Mr. Mearsheimer's theory - aggressive, hegemonic states such as America will not rest until all other threats are neutralized.

To explain why these satellite political entities (Europe, sections of the Middle-East, Japan and Korea) are allowed to exist despite over-arching American conventional/nuclear power, I point readers to Joseph Nye's book "The Paradox of American Power" as a supplement to Mr. Mearsheimer's book. Not only must civilizations be subject to the military might of the hegemon, they must also be allowed to economically participate and express via their own cultures their approval of America's dominant culture - or "soft power," as Mr. Nye puts it. Such "soft power" may explain why even though terrorists held a Korean hostage on world television and subsequently executed him after he begged and pleaded for his life, 3000 Korean troops left the next week for Iraq with nearly no political repercussions at America's request. How much clearer an example is needed of America's near hegemonic power over Korea's body politic? Is it that hard to compare this state of affairs to England, Germany, Japan, or even Saudi Arabia, and find similarities?

Another potent combination of these two theories may extend to the South-East Asian financial crisis and Long Term Capital Management. LTCM effectively destroyed economies surrounding China's coast along with Russia in what may be seen as an economic attack on the entire region, at the cost of a mere $100 billion bailout by private banks, or only 5% of the US government annual budget. The regions have since recovered, no doubt due to the resilience of one of the the intended targets: China, as evidence by CNOOC's strong challenge to Unocal's South-East Asian oil fields last year.

Mr. Mearsheimer's conclusion -- that despite America's isolationist and anti-war ideology and rhetoric, it still follows with amazing accuracy his theory of offensive realism --is self-evident when considering America's military reach, and the fact that America has the only effective nuclear arsenal capable of vaporizing all life on this planet, with no plans of diminishing this capability. America does not need to be accomodating in world politics, because America knows that it alone has the power to ensure it is the only one standing in any fight. Truly a pyrrhic victory, and truly a tragedy in the making.

This book, along with Mr. Nye's, is a must-read, not to feel good, but to feel informed of the current state of world politics. The most chilling aspect of Mr. Mearsheimer's argument is the historical precedence he continually illustrates to back his views. America may truly become what Germany, France, and England could not - a global hegemony.

It is widely assumed the world over that the end of the Cold War marked a new era - where the cynnical calculus of power politics will not apply and where the trading state will replace the warring the state. In short, many proclaim that interdependence (and globalization) forces states to cooperate and forgo relative gains. John Mearsheimer challenges this view. With his theory of 'offensive realism' he successfully shows that states are power-maximizers and the end of the Cold War did not change the anarchic nature of international politics. Nuclear weapons may have reduced the probability of war between the great powers, but great powers still try to maximize their share of power and this may very well lead to conflcit in the 21st century. (That the Great Powers are power maximizers is evident from the fact that the US plans to go ahead with the NMD and plans to develop an aerospace force - in the post-Cold War era without any systemic threats to US interests). There is no systemic proof for the liberal view that interdependence reduces the likelihood of war. In fact, globalization (with diffusion of technology and capital) will cause uneven growth rates around the world and will allow potential peers (China) to modernize and create wealth and ultimately challenge the leading power (US). In this book Mearsheimer shows that land power is still the dominant form of military power (even in the information age) and that states prefer buck-passing over balancing. This book is a must-read for all students and scholars in the fields of international relations and strategic studies. This book is in a league of its own and challenges among others Waltz's defensive realism (and supersedes it).

According to Mearsheimer, nations base their policies on a relentless drive for greater power and to check the power of potentially rival nations. Human rights, ideology, and peace considerations are secondary at best. Nor does a country's political system make much difference; no matter how free and democratic a country may be at home, it will still behave in the same dog-eat-dog way abroad.

Perhaps one of the most interesting ways to look at Mearsheimer's thought is how neatly it dovetails with the most left-wing critiques of American foreign policy. The United States did not enter World War II to liberate the victims of Hitler's genocide; it did so to prevent the emergence of a single dominant European power. The Cold War was not waged to free the world from communism, but simply to contain a rival power. Similarly, Soviet policy during the Cold War was not based on a fanatical desire to tyrannize the globe, but simply to expand its own power. Democracy and authoritarianism both ultimately respect the one ideology of international affairs: nationalism.

But although he may be correct in the motivations behind state behavior, his discussion is deeply flawed by its near-exclusive concentration on military power. Economics is only important insofar as it can be used to finance and develop the military.

As such, Mearsheimer hardly touches on international trade or finance. This is deeply shortsighted, since in practice that is where a large part of the conduct of foreign policy lies. Nor would such a discussion weaken his theory; it would only strengthen it.

It explains why the United States never tried to form a colonial empire as Britain and France did; it was content, instead, to allow other regions to retain their independence and govern their own affairs as long as the U.S. had access to their resources and labor.

If economics is added, this almost perfectly explains U.S.-Canadian relations along the most leftist lines. According to a purely territorial application of Mearsheimer's theory, the US would have invaded and conquered Canada in the mid-19th century; it did not because it already has as much access to Canadian resources and markets as it needs. It also explains the situation today, where Canada is permitted to maintain political independence, but economically remains essentially an American protectorate.

Mearsheimer points out that the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides of an arms race does not prevent the race from continuing in conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons do not buy security, but increase insecurity. By his logic, states like Iraq and North Korea that seek to acquire nuclear capability are doing so in perfectly rational self-interest, giving the lie to fatuous "axis of evil" claims - revealed as the rhetoric they are to promote simple American interest in remaining the "offshore balancer" in each respective region.

More troubling, though, is his assertion at the end of the book that the U.S. should seek to slow or reverse China's economic growth. Taken literally, this seems to mean that it is apparently in the American interest to sabotage or undermine the Chinese economy, despite its growing importance as a market for American products. Implied by this is the spectre of renegade economic warfare, various schemes to undermine a rival's economy and thus its military capability. If that happened, the Chinese would undoubtedly try to retaliate in kind, and before long every great power would descend into al-Qaeda type small attacks and subversions. Not a pleasant prospect.

Perhaps what is most saddening about this book is that the reason for war is given simply as the desire by states to either become a hegemon or prevent someone else from doing so. Dusty, academic theories of the balance of power are the reason millions of people are killed in senseless and brutal fighting.

Another flaw in the book is it concentrates largely on Europe and northeast Asia, paying scant attention to the rest of the world. This flaw becomes most glaring when he portrays the bipolar Cold War as a peaceful period, ignoring the fact that it was peaceful only in Europe. People in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Chile, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Somalia, and many other countries that had oppressive dictatorships installed, or brutal insurgencies financed (or both) by superpower meddling would beg to differ.

What really happened is actually described in the book, albeit in a different context - buck-passing. The Soviets, rather than fighting the U.S. directly, armed their proxies in North Vietnam and elsewhere. The Americans, similarly, overthrew the government of Chile and funded armed rebellions in several countries against regimes believed to be friendly to the USSR. While the superpowers played their chess game, millions in the Third World paid with their lives.

This is a well-written and thought-provoking book, but cannot be relied upon for a complete overview of world affairs. More and diverse perspectives are needed.

John Mearshieimer presents an excellent theory in the form of offensive realism that stands up to close scrutiny in his book the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. By clearly laying out his definitions of what state goals are and how he measures power he makes a compelling case for regional hegemony and the stopping power of water. By utilizing several case studies to prove his theory the points are well made. His analysis of military power is very interesting and well done.

It is hard to find good realist IR theory these days as so many people doubt that such a system is relevant in a post cold war world. Mearshiemer makes one of the better cases for it existing today and for categorizing the state of anarchy that exists in the world. He rightly recognizes that the potential for great power conflict is not likely in Europe and the Russia is to weak to invade there. His characterization of Asia is very strong and the possible conflict between China and the US is clearly analyzed and presented.

My only criticisms and they were not enough to drop the book down a star was that Africa and the Middle East was virtually ignored. Resource conflict is a major potential area of violence in the future and much of this focused on technological or military threats leaving out the recent prospects of resource conflict. By looking at a regional system these areas should have been included. Overall though excellent realist theory and a very enjoyable read.

As a former student of Professor Mearsheimer's, I was fairly familiar with many of the arguments he puts forward in this book. However, it is very gratifying to see finally his theory codified into a single volume, a Magnum Opus. Professor Mearsheimer's theory of "Offensive Realism" offers, without a doubt, the most comprehensive explanation for the behavior of Great Powers available to the student of international relations. While it does not explain everything in the world, it is like, in his own words, a powerful flashlight in a dark room, illuminating most of the room, but not every nook and cranny. However, given the profoundly pessimistic conclusions he reaches, many will wish to remain in the dark.

His theory is based on some very simple assumptions that really cannot be contested, such as anarchy, meaning the absence of an international police force that possesses the coercive wherewithal necessary to enforce rules of conduct among states, the desire to survive, and the uncertainty of intentions. From his basic assumptions, Professor Mearsheimer proceeds to discuss their implications for state behavior. His frighteningly rigorous logic leads to the conclusion that states must maximize their power vis-à-vis other states in order to survive. Therefore, the quest for security, which is, in reality, a quest for power, is a zero-sum game where the gains of one are always at the expense of another. States must aggressively seek power and expand whenever possible in order to assure their own survival. States that do not seek to maximize their power fall victim to those that do. Therein lies the "tragedy of great power politics." States must harm each other, not out of malice, but only because of the fear caused by the lack of physical security. This is a system that no one designed or intended. Unfortunately, it is not a system that we can leave or that is likely to be changed. The need for security overcomes any and all other considerations, such as ethics. How states seek to increase their security is also outlined. As much a historian as a political theorist, Professor Mearsheimer trolled through some two hundred years of history to provide ample evidence to support his theories as well as examples of their behaviors. The amount of historical evidence that he has marshaled for his work is staggering. It is this reliance on history that provides his theory with a credibility that one does not find in other works of international relations theory, especially those of the liberal schools. His work is more than a simple academic thought exercise in a vacuum, but rather one solidly grounded in reality.

Unfortunately, I do not believe his work will receive the credence that it deserves, despite the sound assumptions, powerful logic, and vast array of supporting historical evidence. I believe this because of the nature of his work and the method of his delivery. With an efficiency and rationality that borders on the ruthless, Professor Mearsheimer tears apart the halcyon pipedream held by many in the west, and lays bare the world, not as we would like it to be, but as it really is; a world where aggression is rewarded, where power matters, and where, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, force and fraud are the cardinal virtues. These are realities that are hard to accept. Professor Mearsheimer also makes no attempt to sugarcoat or palliate the harsh realities of the modern state system, using terms like "bleed them white" and "bait and bleed" to describe policies and strategies. People are accustomed to a peaceful world, where liberalism dominates and prosperity abounds, and are likely to blanch at the descriptions and especially the policy prescriptions found in this book, where aggressive warfare is a legitimate tool of statecraft and democracy has no special place or value. I imagine it will be difficult for most people to get past the harshness of the world as Professor Mearsheimer describes it, and may believe him to be a violent warmonger himself. This is, of course, completely wrong. His policy prescriptions are designed to improve the prospects of peace in light of the nature of the international system. While Professor Mearsheimer also provides clear explanations for the decades of peace that have been enjoyed in much of the world, most people will wish to reject them because they are based on the distribution of power. In addition to these fears, I have some particular disagreements with Professor Mearsheimer, but they are minute points and not ones that greatly oppose or disturb his overall theoretical framework. For example, I disagree with his use of GNP as the sole indicator of potential power. I would consider it to be an aspect of a composite index with, say energy consumption (which he uses earlier on) and total manufactured goods. I cannot stress enough my belief that this book is the most insightful and useful tool for understanding international politics available today, nor can I recommend this book strongly enough to anyone with an interest in world affairs or foreign policy.

This review will not cover the details of the theory, which are well covered by other reviewers, but rather will simply set out why I believe all students of IR should read this work.

John's work on offensive realism is clearly articulated in an easy to read book that builds on earlier works by many of the greats of the realist school of thought and bridges a gap in explaining why states behave as they do. It is a well structure and well written book that avoids the use of theoretical and technical terminology, which greatly assists the author in getting his message across.

The book only makes a limited attempt to refute common liberal and critical theorist criticisms of realist theory; however as the author points out this would require the book to be taken well beyond its intended scope. I thoroughly agree with this and believe that such an attempt would have `muddied the waters' in the presentation of the theory. It does, however use a wide range of examples from the Napoleonic wars through to the present to explain his theory and these examples add a lot of depth to the offensive realist theory.

No matter whether you view the world from a liberal, critical theory or realist perspective, this book has something to add to the overall theory of IR.

Finally, it would be interesting to see how this theory explains current US actions in Iraq (which I believe John Mearsheimer has criticised). A true test for the theory in the 21st centaury.