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A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge

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This is not the place for a philosophical analysis of Berkeley's original text, and its content of argument. The review concerns the specific book edited by Dancy, and its worth in respect of its further contribution to understanding the Treatise.
This book is to be strongly recommended as it provides a multitude of resources that contextualise, criticise, and clarify, the positions put forward by Berkeley in this work.

The most substantial contribution is the extensive introduction comprised of 15 punchy sections, covering Berkeley's life, his academic heritage, and analysis of his thought (both internal and external to that given in the Treatise). Dancy is fair to Berkeley in setting forth the most robust defences of his position, and marshalling critical arguments against the Berkelian stance. This is supplemented by an extremely thorough set of endnotes that are continually present in the background of the text, offering detailed guidance whenever necessary, or desired.

Additionally, the book offers a summarised concise overview of the arguments provided in the Treatise, a glossary of archaic terms(!), and a very helpful short section entitled "How to use this book" (why don't more books include this sort of thing?). There is also a manageable annotated bibliography of further reading to trail a path for academic expansion.

Overall, I found that this book provided a systematic treatment of the text and provided a solid structure of support surrounding the subject. Also included, the letters between Berkeley and Johnson, provide an unexpected bonus. This book is relatively cheap, considering its breadth and depth. In my opinion, it is an ideal text through which to study (and enjoy) Berkeley's Treatise.

This is a very important work of George Berkeley. On of its most interesting topics is that about the existence of matter. As, for human beings, the "existence" of something is related to its perception, there is a very close link between "things" and ideas. Both cannot have their existence completely proved. The arguments place the book among the most interesting on the top issues discussed in its time (empiricism, materialism, etc.)

This is a very important work of George Berkeley. On of its most interesting topics is that about the existence of matter. As, for human beings, the "existence" of something is related to its perception, there is a very close link between "things" and ideas. Both cannot have their existence completely proved. The arguments place the book among the most interesting on the top issues discussed in its time (empiricism, materialism, etc.)

A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Commonly called "Treatise" when referring to Berkeley's works) is a 1710 work by the Irish Empiricist philosopher George Berkeley. This book largely seeks to refute the claims made by his contemporary John Locke about the nature of human perception. Whilst, like all the Empiricist philosophers, both Locke and Berkeley agreed that there was an outside world, and it was this world which caused the ideas one has within one's mind; Berkeley sought to prove that outside world was also composed solely of ideas. Berkeley did this by suggesting that "Ideas can only resemble Ideas" - the mental ideas that we possessed could only resemble other ideas (not physical objects) and thus the external world consisted not of physical form, but rather ideas. This world was given logic and regularity by some other force, which Berkeley did his best to conclude was a God.

Long refuted by most philosophers, Berkeley's claims are often felt to have been a form of rationalisation - Berkeley later became Bishop of Cloyne, and was a highly religious man. Treastise's suggestion that the world was made of ideas with an omnipitent force guiding was his alternative to the Lockean Empiricism popular at the time, which Berkeley felt led to skepticism. In spite of this Berkeley was a capable, respected and entertaining thinker. Some doubt exists as to whether he truly believed his conclusion that the world at large was composed of ideas; with modern thinking tending towards him indeed having thought this to be the case.

Berkeley's treatise is hopelessly opportunistic and naive and cannot be taken seriously, at least insofar as it deals with mathematics and science (which it does quite extensively). I propose to prove as much by two examples.

As our first example of Berkeley's childishly simplistic crusade on science we may consider his rejection of absolute space. Newton of course presented his famous bucket argument in favour of the theory of absolute space. Berkeley proposes to weasel out of this argument by redefining the concept of relative motion in a very opportunistic manner:

"To denominate a body moved, it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the force or action occasioning that change be applied to it." (§115)

In Newton's theory, of course, such a separation of force and motion is impossible, since force and acceleration are interdefinable (F=ma). So apparently Berkeley has some other mysterious notion of "force" in mind, which he does not specify. All we know about Berkeley's concept of "force" is that apparently it is somehow logically prior to motion: before we can tell if an object is moving or not we must first decide if there is a "force" acting on it. Since Berkeley gives no indication of how to determine whether or not forces are present, his pseudo-definition of motion amounts to this: "an object is moving if and only if I, George Berkeley, self-absorbed dilettante, say so."

If we turn to Berkeley's discussion of geometry we again find nothing but unsubstantiated posturing. For example, Berkeley rejects infinite divisibility in favour of a sort of geometrical atomism:

"There is no such thing as a ten-thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth ... The ten-thousandth part of that [one-inch] line ... is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without any error" (§127).

This idea, claims Berkeley, "at once clears the science of geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions ... which render the study of mathematics so difficult and tedious" (§123). For while infinite divisibility has always been "thought to have so inseparable and essential an connexion with the principles and demonstrations in geometry" (§123), this is a mistake, and, in fact, according to Berkeley, "whatever is useful in geometry ... doth still remain firm and unshaken on our principles" (§131).

All of this is arrogantly asserted without a trace of an argument; which is no wonder since it is such madness. Infinite divisibility is not "thought" to be essential to geometry, it plainly is so. Berkeley's rejection of this principle essentially nullifies every single geometrical proof that has ever been devised, while of course leaving us completely in the dark as to how "whatever is useful in geometry" is supposed to survive this geometrical armageddon. As an example, it is easy to see that Berkeley's claim entails the rejection of Euclid's axiom that a line is determined by two points: consider an equilateral triangle ABC with sides that are divisible into ten thousand parts; now take a line segment DE that is not divisible into ten thousand parts and place it parallel to the base AB and touching the other sides AC and BC; now divide AB into ten thousand parts and let F and G be two points one ten-thousandth apart; then, according to Berkeley, since DE is not divisible into such parts, the lines FC and GC both go through the same point H of DE; thus the points C and H do not uniquely determine a line.