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The Trouble with Science

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Current reviews of this book complain either that Dunbar's effort is too light, with a few interesting surprises, or that it is too focussed on elevating the perceived defects of science (reductionism) to unlikely levels of excitement and interest, and failing to observe that there is simply more to life than science. The first criticism neglects that this is, indeed, a focussed treatment, intended to show, without apology, exactly what we miss by not giving science sufficient importance in our lives, and in fact that it could be the difference between life and death itself. The second criticism completely misses Dunbar's central point that science is, in fact, one of the most basic activities of life, not to say of human life.

Whether it is instrumental or essential in itself, the reality is that science, in one form or another, remains the bulwark that saves us from superstition, which in the end could just save us from extinction. That it also, in its purest reality, engages us in a truly wonderous process of discovery should not be obscured by its analytic and reductive requirements, and that is also one of Dunbar's magnificently subtle and essential points.

Without belaboring what has become truely unsuccessful and often misleading popularization, such as trying to show how science somehow ultimately "proves" the reality of spirit, Dunbar manages to convey the very exciting, but just audible message, that the process of discovery in which science engages us is as much self-discovery as it is discovery of the world in which we live.

In the early and mid -90's, it seems that there was a push to popularize science. Authors came out in droves to write books the public could understand on what seemed beyond the publics understanding. Dunbar actually remembers, in one section, that it was not too long ago that any bookstore had a FICTION section (maybe even subdivided by type) and a NONFICTION section in which everything from physics to music history was shelved together. Those days are no more.

This book's goal is not only to tell the laypublic that science is exciting, worthy of attention, and not in the least the strawman that cultural relativists have set up for them. The problem (the big one, that is) is that he never really makes the point. For the first 2/3rds of the book (in my view, the most interesting bit), Dunbar gets no-where near that topic - talking instead about how humans from all cultures, and animals from many species have used a scientific outlook to solve problems. As the animal section is likely the most counter-intuitive, that is the best section here.

For a while, too, we also talk about (in a good, but really irrelevant chapter) about how chimpanzees have developed, to a smaller degree than us, the same kind of social thinking that we have. They run in hierarchies of rank, they engage in deceptive psychological trickery (obviously requiring a sense of relating to others) and develop complex social relations. Dunbars point here is that maybe evolution gave us much more ability to understand social relations better than the natural sciences. If so, that would very well explain the overwhelming popularity of the "human sciences" like sociology, psychology and law, but all in all, this is a very loose connection made by Dunbar. He never actually ties it in.

Another interesting part of the book, although a subtle one, is Dunbars decidedly instrumental stance on why we do science. I'm not sure how many scientists this will [annoy], but I know most scientists do not seriously hold instrumentalism. For Dunbar, science is instrumental in that we do it because our brains have evolved by making sense of (or observing sense in?) the world and gaining control over it by hypothesis testing. Dunbar really says no more about it than this, whereas most scientists figure that science (and with it, truth) are useful in themselves; science can be used instrumentally (technology) but truth is also good in itself. I agree with Dunbar.

In conclusion, an interesting book and a very easy read for those uninitiated with science. Even those who know science quite well, this will not be a complete waste of time as it will only take a few hours. Still though, if we are looking for good popularizations, go with Dawkins "Unweaving the Rainbow" (see my review) and Carl Sagan's "Demon Haunted World". On the difficulties of thinkilng scientifically, try John Horgan's "The End of Science".

In an age dependent on scientific progress and scientific methodology, Robin Dunbar points out the woeful level of understanding of science, and particularly the lengths
that universities must go to in order to attract students onto scientific courses. The ultimate cost of this will be a poorer grade of scientist, and a decline in standards in scientific education in general by osmosis. This book is intended to be a part remedy to this problem, by encouraging a greater interest in the subject.

As a potted history of the development of science and its underlying philosophy (for the book is less than 200 pages long), it is very readable. However, in trying to engender interest in the modern reader, it shoots itself in the foot on two or three occasions.
Science did not begin with Newton, and has always been used, even in `pre-scientific' times, both by humans as well as animals. On one occasion, he points out the tremendous feat of memory exhibited by a native who, having crossed a desert in his
childhood, was able to remember the way in adulthood from various markings en route, and was able to lead an expedition on a 1000 mile journey in more or less a straight line. Such knowledge and the ability to absorb it, we are told, was essential to his survival, while we commit such information to computers and rely on technology to show the way. That is surely the point, which prevented one ancient King from accepting the written word from Thoth, on the grounds that it would make his soldiers lazy. We are the inheritors of the latter, and our survival does not depend on knowledge we carry within us, but on socio-economic factors. Most people may know nothing about quantum theory, yet have an incredibly detailed knowledge of ISAs, PEPs, the meaning of capital growth and so on.
However, this is a minor point in comparison to the case he makes for science, by turning its negative components into a sort of charm. To do this, he defends the reductionist stance by defining two forms of it to the exclusion of a third, the third
being responsible for the lack of interest in science.
No-one would dispute the necessity of breaking up knowledge into compartments that produces useful information and knowledge, which is the source of the two forms of reductionism he refers to, but he makes no mention of the fact that science since the
Enlightenment is based on the unquestioned assumption of inertia, an assumption which by its nature excludes any reference to what he called the elan vital (quoting Bergson) and which he feels is responsible for so many problems with respect to the acceptability of science. Ultimately, scientific statements reduce to this principle, and must show some allegiance to it, even though it is impossible to derive any principles of self-activation from it, principles which by their nature transcend the knowledge of science. It is not the difficulties of science, nor its uncommon sense that makes
science so unattractive - it is the fact that it has nothing to offer the human consciousness with respect to the nature of its own self-esteem and self-worth.
All this is glossed over, however, in the attempt to make science more attractive. The problem is that ultimately, he is suggesting a kind of science `national service', an enforced learning programme that makes people more aware of the importance of science. The fact that people are voting with their feet to stay away from science is as much due to this form of reduction as it may be for the reasons he gives, but I tend to
favour the former. In that light, his book reflects a form of dogmatism one associates with thinking that has reached its sell-by date and outgrown its usefulness. Yes, science is important, but it is not everything.