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5.0 out of 5 stars
Good book on Jewish pogroms in Russia, December 3, 2005
This review is from: Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Series in Russian and East European Studies) (Hardcover)
In the spring of 1881, a wave of anti-Jewish rioting and violence engulfed southern Russia, specifically areas within Ukraine. Called pogroms, they spread through both city and countryside following the assassination of Alexander II. The interpretation of the pogroms directly following the events and continued by subsequent historians saw them as being well-planned in advance, and that the Russian government or elements connected to the government played a leading role in the planning and/or carrying out of the pogroms with the complicity of officials in St. Petersburg. E. B. Levin wrote that "the anti-Jewish movement was not spontaneous ... and that it could easily and quickly have been suppressed and taken care of by orders from above...". I. Michael Aronson, in his book Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia, rejects this interpretation, and concludes that the not only was there no `conspiracy' by any group, let alone the government, to promote anti-Jewish rioting, the government was indeed against the pogroms, and though largely unsuccessful, attempted to prevent, and then halt, the pogroms. While anti-Jewish sentiment was widespread throughout the corridors of Russian power, the preservation of order and the fear that the rioters might turn against the state overrode any racist tendencies.
Aronson begins by placing the time of the pogroms in its Russian context. The Ukrainian provinces where the pogroms took place were the most prosperous in all of Russia. But though statistically the peasants were better off than those in central Russia, they nevertheless felt they were getting poorer. With the expansion of large-scale agriculture for export and the increasing industrialization of the region, more and more peasants looking for work traveled to the area. This transient population was "forced to confront or adopt new modes of behavior, attitudes, and values. This situation of upheaval and dislocation was a fertile breeding ground for frustration, alienation, and discontent."
In the economy of Ukraine, Jews played a major role, often as middlemen for both the peasantry and the urban lower-classes. They participated in almost all peasant business dealings and often excluded non-Jewish competitors. But the trading, manufacturing, and middleman occupations the Jews were concentrated in were considered "to be almost worthless and even exploitive by their very nature." The lower classes felt they were being taken advantage of by the Jews, and Christian businessmen wanted to increase their share of the market. In the year or so leading up to the spring of 1881, local crop failures in Ukraine had pushed the population to the verge of starving, and an empire-wide industrial depression further eradicated much of the work which laborers from other parts of Russia were still pouring into the region to find. "Thus the ranks of the unemployed and discontented swelled," Aronson writes, "and a roving and prolific source of anti-Jewish activities emerged."
Aronson tells us that "the pogrom movement began with an anti-Semitic press campaign." In the years preceding the pogroms, many influential newspapers accused the Jews of being exploiters of the lower classes. After Alexander II was assassinated, Jewish complicity was touted by the press. One of the major newspapers of the region under discussion, Novorossiski Telegraf, was a leading anti-Jewish organ. Aronson writes that "the government's tolerance of the Jew-baiting press was popularly interpreted as official approval." As Easter of 1881 approached, the newspaper reported that there were rumors of anti-Jewish rioting that would take place at Easter. While there was no instance found of the press openly calling for anti-Jewish violence, the prejudices of the masses were reinforced by the openly anti-Jewish newspaper reporting. Those that follow the interpretation that the pogroms were government-led point to the anti-Jewish press as an example, for, after all, there was strict censorship in Russia, and nothing could have been published without the government's approval. However, the pogroms began during the relatively liberal tenure of Loris-Melikov as interior minister, and censorship regulations had been increasingly relaxed. Not only that, but as Loris-Melikov's successor commented, "the provincial government does not satisfy even the most unexacting demands." As long as there was no open call to violence, the regime allowed for anti-Jewish sentiments in the press, but this certainly doesn't mean the government wanted the pogroms.
Rumors, as Aronson notes, had always played an important role in public events in Russia, and the pogroms of 1881 were no exception. One rumor in particular played an important role in the creation and spread of the pogroms, and the gist of the rumor was that the new Tsar had issued an ukaz which called on the people to beat the Jews. This ukaz was never actually produced or published by anybody, but this could be, in the mind of the mob, because of Jewish bribery and trickery. The rumors of the ukaz corresponded with the mass feeling of Jewish economic exploitation. But far from promoting the dissemination of the rumors, local officials sought to combat them. However, "the government had no formal or orderly means for communicating its will and intentions to the people." It was this vacuum that rumors filled.
One way in which the mass's belief in the rumored ukaz grew was in relation to the action (or inaction) in defense of the Jews. Some historians allege that local officials were ordered to react leniently with the rioters. Aronson, discounts this view, stating that "the sources demonstrate incontrovertibly that instructions were given to prevent" anti-Jewish violence. All sorts of measures were taken to combat, and in certain instances prevent, the pogroms, but control was extremely difficult to achieve. Frequently officials blamed inadequate manpower or fear for their or their subordinate's safety in the face of the angry mob. Uncertain lines of command and divisions of authority between civilian police officials and military commanders also contributed to the uncertainty on the ground. Authorities knew how to deal with problems in the countryside, but this was a new type of conflict and it was in the cities. All of these factors contributed to uncertainty and inaction by the military and police on the streets, which reinforced the people's belief that they were rightly acting in the manner the ukaz professed. As noted previously, an accepted historiographical interpretation of the pogroms was that the government could clamp down on the violence whenever it wanted to, but chose against it. Aronson tosses this aside, for the government "was simply not powerful enough or competent enough to exercise such control over the population at large or even its own officials."
The lenient way in which the authorities dealt with rioters also was interpreted in the minds of many contemporaries and subsequent historians as a sign of approval. Few were arrested, and many that were gained their release before trial. Punishment was meted out only in extreme cases. Authorities were reluctant to resort to arms or employ repressive measures on the general population, and this in turn reinforced the rioter's belief that the government approved their activities. Historians who believe in the government plot theory call the leniency intentional. Aronson points out, however, that Russian law was completely unprepared to deal with the unfolding events, without any laws or regulations dealing with this new kind of phenomena. Many officials called for swift and strict accountability before the law. But they realized that "severity in defense of the Jews might only anger the highly agitated population even more and ultimately lead to attacks on the regime itself." Many in positions in authority `understood' the rioters, but they nevertheless disapproved of their methods and sought to maintain order somehow. They could, however, deal with them leniently, and in this way "avoiding any measures that might dispel the mob's originally loyalist inclinations." The authorities sought the restoration of order without alienating the population. The fear that the anger of the mob might turn on the government, Aronson writes, "may account for the delay until 1882 in applying" relatively more severe regulations and punishments.
Aronson seeks to disprove that far from the government instigating and controlling the pogroms of 1881, it actually had no role it the promoting the actions of the rioters, and indeed sought to curtail the mob's violent activities. By setting the pogroms within their historical Russian context, he concludes the pogroms were a spontaneous reaction of segments of the population to the complex changes occurring in the country, and the regime's inability to adapt to that change. Russia as a whole, and the southern Ukraine in particular, was undergoing the massive social and structural changes that occurs with the growing pains of industrialization. The government, for its part, attempted certain reforms to deal with these changes, but was overall concerned with preserving order and the autocracy, and therefore hadn't the necessary ability to mount an appropriate response to the uncertainties that this period generated. This is shown by the pogroms of 1881. The regime didn't perpetuate or condone the riots as officials at all levels were against the mass violence and disorder which occurred during the pogroms. Their overriding fear was that the anger being vented would be turned against the regime, perhaps led by socialist revolutionaries. This, not some conspiracy, caused local authorities to work cautiously in dealing with the enraged mobs both on the ground and in the courts. The spread of rumors was historically prevalent in Russia during uncertain times,...
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