Customer Reviews

True to Life: Why Truth Matters (Bradford Books)

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This book has all of the qualities that might be attributed to the term "thought-provoking". Common questions regarding the attainability, relativity, and inherent goodness of truth, are addressed. Also includes popular criticisms of truth as a means to and end and truth as fiction- are analyzed rigorously. Easily accessible to everyone from the casual reader to the doctoral candidate. Katherine Wylie

If you've read much of the philosophical literature on truth, there is a strong chance that you have asked whether the discussion is relevant to your life and circumstances. It is very easy to pigeonhole this subject as academic and move on to others that seem more applicable to everyday life.

In a much needed work on the topic, Lynch argues that the concept of truth *is* important in one's personal and political life. The book proceeds by exposing the existing theories that have contributed to the attitude that the concept of truth is either unnecessary or insignificant, and providing specific reasons to tie truth to our desire for leading a full and authentic life.

Though previous reviews have claimed that Lynch's "politics intrude at several points," I would argue that any political color found in the book is merely supplemental, and can be taken or left aside from the central theses. Also, given that the book is intended to bridge the gap between the seemingly academic and the moral and political, some degree of commentary on current political events are a natural element to the book.

The takeaway is that the book is a stimulating read, and I would recommend it to anyone who either is interested in truth as a subject to itself, or is dubious/curious about its relation to everyday life.

Michael Lynch offers a thoughtful account of the import of truth as it applies to our lives individually and collectively. His is not an introduction to theories of truth (Thus, suggestion that he takes for granted the trouble in defining truth is unfair). Rather, it is an exposition on the value of truth as objective in contrast with relativism in general. As individuals, we can value truth and pursue it for its own sake and collectively, we can and should demand truth, particularly in light of tenuous political claims that affect our lives globally. Such demand is inherently predicated on a sense and endorsement of truth as objective, which is precisely Lynch's point, among others.

I suspect my comment comes too late, but, having finished Professor Lynch's book and enjoyed it, I am motivated to write, even if no one reads what I say.

Professor Lynch does commit both the naturalistic fallacy and the is/ought fallacy. But he does not conflate them. Indeed the key to his argument is that he doesn't. Instead he applies a pollster's or psychologist's empirical approach to the "ought" problem. Maybe the better way to put it, he applies a kind of Delphi method to the "ought" problem. But he does not use a naive "intuitionist" or "sentimentalist" approach, as does Hume. Professor Lynch is more thoughtful than that. So Mr. Heersinki's criticism is solid, and would be even more so were he to make the following distinctions in Professor Lynch's methodology.

Rather than committing straight-forwardly the naturalistic fallacy, a simply confusion between "is" and "ought," Professor Lynch is more provocative. He repeatedly founds his "ought" statements on what he believes most people think or almost instinctively feel. So he asks if he or we would like to be brains in vats, and he is correct to say neither he nor I nor most of the rest of us (probably) would choose that option. He argues therefore, what most people think is an indication, empirically valuable data, of whether the truth is an objectively existing "ought." In other words, he is saying, "XXX million people must be on to something for them to all feel alike."

But it is here he makes a fundamental error, not of logic but of empiricism. Though one's first reaction is to say that it is a deep fallacy to implicitly assert the truth of a proposition based on what some number of people thinks it is true, I do not believe the truth value of widely shared feelings and beliefs can be so easily dismissed. Certainly, the earth is not flat, no matter whether everyone in the world thinks it is, and it is highly likely the Theory of Evolution is true, regardless of the large number of Creationists.

But I do not automatically dismiss the views of Creationists. Rather, a view held by so many motivates me to think, not dismiss. Similarly we also know empirically there is "wisdom in crowds," at least as to certain questions. When a great many people believe something to be true, it deserves our attention, though that alone is not sufficient to support agreement.

That attention it deserves arises from the demonstrable truth that what a great many people think often turns out to have substance or partial truth, though hardly all the time. Put another way, what a great many people believe or feel are legitimate data for addressing "ought" questions. If one is asking whether finding and acting according to the truth brings happiness or a certain satisfaction to many people, instrumentally or as an end in itself, an empirical finding that the truth does bring those things cannot be ignored as irrelevant to certain, important "ought" propositions..

If it is empirically supportable that finding and acting according to the truth brings happiness or a certain satisfaction to many people, then one to say to many (most)(all) people, "You ought to seek the truth, if you have as your goal happiness or a certain satisfaction." Our study of human behavior empirically supports this contingent "ought" assertion.

In that way, the is/ought distinction can be substantially blurred or even eliminated. Professor Quine does something similar, I believe, in his criticism of skepticism, Hume, and the analytical/synthetic distinction.

What remains then is for Professor Lynch is to show empirically how many people actually believe as he says they do. His argument based on what you and I might believe, explicitly or tacitly, just isn't remotely good enough to even suspect his "ought" conclusion is true. He can substantiate that conclusion only if he can show empirically that most do indeed find happiness or that certain satisfaction when finding and acting according to the truth of the world or the semantic position that asserts it.

I recently began delving into philosophy and am reading a number of books on philosophical subjects. I read and reviewed the The Dream Weaver: One Boy's Journey Through the Landscape of Reality (Anniversary Edition) (2nd Edition)and am currently reading Sophie's World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy (FSG Classics)and The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods (CourseSmart). I firmly believe that philosophy has a lot to offer to get a better understanding of reality and to form sound beliefs. At the same time this new endeavor is a challenge and yet another reason why I should have paid more attention while in college, particularly since I attended Columbia where the required core curriculum course Contemporary Civilization covered all of the major works in the subject.

True to Life attempts to make the case that not only is truth something good to strive for its own sake but also something necessary for a well-functioning liberal society. For each of his own arguments, Lynch presents possible opposing views as well as his refutations to those views. Overall, I think he makes a convincing case that the pursuit of truth is necessary because it is both instrumentally good and because it is good for its own sake. I will not pretend to be able to restate his case but I will attempt to add a couple of other reasons why the pursuit of truth is good. First, lying can become a habit, one that can become more comfortable with the more it is practiced. This can lead to decline in other virtues and an increase in other vices. For example, the person who gets comfortable with lying about why they are home getting late from work, while perhaps initially for no bad reason, may soon be tempted to engage in some other wrongdoing during the time that now covered by the lie. Second, lying deprives, in a sense, other people of the opportunity to exercise other good character traits. For example, being honest about a harm caused gives the offended person the chance to exercise forgiveness, compassion and understanding. Obviously that would not be the primary purpose of truth-telling, but the reality is that these characteristics are also ones that need introduction and practice for one to become "good" at them, as in to know when to exercise them properly.

That said, as a layperson, I found Lynch's book to be relatively easy to comprehend and appropriately challenging when the details called for it. I highly recommend it for anyone wanting a thorough understanding of the philosophical viewpoints on truth, both those that see it as a worthwhile pursuit, and those that do not.

A generally excellent book which gives a powerful argument for the importance of truth. There are a few points of discussion where I would have liked more details. He touches on the idea that truth is different in different domains I was left wanting to more about this. While he critiques pragmatism, it may be true that in certain domains the value of a concept is it's usefulness. Also of course there are areas of life where truth is clearly relative. If I say I like Mexican food, and you say Mexican foods is awful, who is right? Both are really stating the truth about their personal preferences. I would have liked more discussion of when truth is indeed relative, and stating that is my opinion is not just a way to avoid argument as Lynch suggests.

"True to Life" is a needed tonic against postmodernist dismissals of the objectivity and knowability of truth. The author handles philosophical controversies with clarity and without oversimplication. While not a technical work, Lynch takes the readers fairly deep into the discussions while always trying to explain the pertinence of the issues. For example, if there is no objective truth, how is it possible to "speak truth to power" or call for moral reform based on moral realities and not just the perspective or preference or language game of the speaker?

One drawback is that Lynch's worldview is pervasively secular. He doesn't seem to see that the notion of knowable objective truth is far more "at home" within a theistic worldview than in a materialistic one in which "mind" is a mere product of nature (time, chance, brute natural laws, and matter). If we are designed to know the world, our knowledge is metaphysically justified. If not, why think that mindless nature would kick up beings capable of such significant knowledge, that which far transcends what is needed for mere survival?

Moreover, the relationship between a belief and its object is not a material relationship. Lynch basically holds to a realist or correspondence view of truth in which a belief is true if it connects with the facts in question. But a belief's content (X is true) is only true if X exists objectively. This is not a causal relationship or a material relationship of any kind. It is the immaterial relationship between a mental state and a state outside the mind (whether material or immaterial--such as a moral principle).

Lastly, Lynch's politics intrude at several points. His views are quite left-wing, and often given in an acerbic manner. More conservative ideas are never considered.

Nevertheless, Professor Lynch's defense of the existence of objective truth and its value for us is to be commended for its clarity and importance.

One wants to resist the need to criticize a basically good book, for serious logical, ontological, epistemological, and causal errors. If these landmines were not so glaring, this lay approach to inductive reasoning and sophistry would be worth recommending. But the errors are too serious to do anything other than pan.

One of the many forms of human reasoning is the search for truth, and these forms can take several different approaches, with greater or lesser degrees of approximation. Overall, Lynch's objective is meritorious and commendatory, and many of his intuitionist claims will probably receive nods of approval. But philosophy of all enterprises does not end with intuitions. And, any author who commits the Fact/Value Fallacy right out of the gate is too sloppy to take seriously.

Among our many axiological (value judgments) concerns, is the valuation of the truth. Our system of justice, our interpersonal relations, our understanding of ourselves and our world, all depend on making value judgments, and one of those values hopefully is to value facts.

But values are neither "true of false," only "facts are." Values are either "good" or "bad." Values are relative measures to some perceived good. Facts, stand in and of themselves as to "true" or "false," and are determined solely on reason, correspondence, experience, and tests. So, while we value the truth for its usefulness in making value judgments (we don't want to make values on the wrong facts), values are not facts, nor are facts values.

That's a fallacy, exposed by David Hume in 1740 and slain by G. E. Moore in the early 20th C., which our author commits repeatedly, all the way to "Truth and Happiness" through "Truth as a Means to an End" (that should jar some ethicists and scientists). FROM a purported philosopher? Not even Aristotle commits these errors (Aquinas does big time), and this philosopher is oblivious to the is/ought, fact/value, "Naturalistic Fallacy" he commits repeatedly?

Since no bibliography is included (by MIT imprint, no less), it is noteworthy that numerous individuals are omitted in the Index, but there on page Ninety our author cites Hume's is/ought fallacy, and there on pages 88-91 is G. E. Moore (no mention of Moore's "Naturalistic Fallacy," but a lot of metaphysical conceptualism (at least he mentions Moore's observation that the word "good" is unanalyzable, which is untrue, because "good" and "bad" are valuative terms of approval and opprobrium we analyze one way, compared to "factual" STATEMENTS, which are analyzable by "true" and "false" standards). Moore's "Principia Ethica" can be consulted if Lynch leaves you unclear, and Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature," III.i.1 is also useful.

Overall, many of Lynch's observations are fairly well understood, several observations worth making, but repeatedly repeating the Naturalistic (fact/value) Fallacy is done only by Holy Mother Roman Catholic Church and her application of Aquinas's Natural Law Theory. Aristotle did not do it. Hume repudiates it. Moore slays it. But our pop-philosopher pops away, boldly conflating Aristotle's theoretical reasoning in the Physics (facts) to his instrumental reasoning (values) in Nichomachean Ethics ("truth as a means to an end" is unconscionable phrase for a philosopher to state, much less use as a Chapter).

PASS. BURN. Or USE pedagogically.

Michael Lynch's "True to Life" makes the case that truth is objective and that a concern for truth is necessary to a good human life. As Lynch notes, nothing is more certain than the fact that humans make mistakes -- and the possibility of mistake proves that the world is independent of our beliefs.

"True to Life" is short, readable, and wise. However, I'm unsure whether anyone untainted by post-modernism would find it necessary to defend the reality or value of truth. Reading the book mainly left me wondering why anyone bothers to read or write analytic philosophy at all -- and wishing that I had read "Going After Cacciato" instead (Lynch uses Tim O'Brien's novel to illustrate the importance of knowing what is truly important to us).

The copyright is 2005, that many years after a man arrived who said he was the way, the truth, and the life and who said, under what for you and me would be great duress, that he came into the world to testify to the truth and that everyone on the side of truth listened to him. Wiggenstein, Satre, Bertrand Russell, they're all here, though they will be soon forgotten. Odd that a book on truth and which ventures beyond the observations of the scientist would omit treatment of the man whose life, death, and, many believe, resurrection dates the very book written. Isn't that still the only question: "Who say you is Christ?"