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Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown

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Michael D. Pearlman, PhD, an award-winning historian, surgically dissects the Truman-MacArthur confrontation in his outstanding new book, Truman & MacArthur: Policy, Politics and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. In doing so, he cuts through over fifty years of partisan mythmaking by the champions of both men to present the most accurate and in-depth account to date of what led Truman to relieve MacArthur of command on April 11, 1951 and the firestorm of controversy that act produced. Pearlman's insightful account was not written to please advocates for either Truman or MacArthur. The author set himself a different task: "My job, writing some fifty years after the fact, is not to produce another partisan polemic for one individual or the other;" in short, he did not set out - as many books on this subject have done -- to make a case for justifying the actions of either man. His meticulously documented, painstakingly researched book removes the shroud of folklore that has clouded the controversy for decades and shatters long held myths -- instead of perpetuating them. Despite the fact that any political-military-diplomatic historian of long standing could not possibly embark upon such a book without having at least some preconceptions about the principal actors, Pearlman reveals that "I no longer have certain opinions held when beginning my research several years ago" - evidence of a rare open mindedness about a subject usually dominated by fixed opinions and partisanship. The result, to borrow a well-known news network tag line, is the most "fair and balanced" presentation of this complicated, highly-nuanced civil-military crisis yet published.

Pearlman does history a great service by using well documented facts to destroy the mythology surrounding the controversy, much of it purposely created by Truman and his partisan supporters in the wake of the relief in an attempt to weather the storm of public outrage and to fix the "feisty old Harry" image in the public conscious. Indeed, much of what today is presumed to be "known" about the Truman-MacArthur controversy is little more than myth or folklore, peppered with a scattering of "facts" removed from the context within which they occurred. Those who have accepted the mythology regarding MacArthur's relief and assume they know what really happened would be well advised to read Pearlman's Truman & MacArthur, the most revealing, well written account yet published about this watershed event in U. S. civil-military relations.

Michael D. Pearlman's TRUMAN AND MACARTHUR: POLICY, POLITICS, AND THE HUNGER FOR HONOR AND RENOWN is yet an addition to the many published books about one of the two most misunderstood leaders in American history, Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. And one asks, what is the difference between this book and previous ones that have examined the gripping relationship between these two men that has centered on the Korean War? This book was somewhat a labor of love on the part of Pearlman who spent several years researching his subjects, and his intention is not to debunk the myths that have already been covered. Readers will see that he is getting down to the bottom of the complex mind and personalities of Truman and MacArthur, which shows how similar they really were despite the possible hint of jealously that may have been the culprit to tensions that erupted and led to MacArthur being relieved of his duties. As with most writers and historians reexamining history, although Pearlman attests that he is looking through an objective eye and with partisan politics in mind as they applied to the hackling that occurred on the battlefield and in Washington. And one may also observe that he was reflecting on the more recent past.

This is a well-documented and detailed book. The only qualm but interesting aspect about Pearlman's narrative is that he hastily discusses the politics about General MacArthur's run for the presidency. For those who lived during this part of history or have extensively studied MacArthur, it is a fact that he attempted to run for president alongside fellow five-star general, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and it is unfortunate that Pearlman did not elaborate on that topic. But another insightful part of the book is the tremendous amount of information embedded in each of the pages that show the character traits about Truman and MacArthur. Both men were avid readers of history and opposed the imminent threat of communism that infected the political climate of the 1950s and most importantly the men's involvement during the Korean War. And at an attempt to parallel Civil War history with references to Robert E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson to Truman and MacArthur's leadership, Pearlman almost colloquially intersperses and ties it in throughout the book.

Overall, TRUMAN AND MACARTHUR is clearly a book geared toward academic readers. However, that should not discount history buffs and aficionados to read the history of the Korean War and the most important aspect that involved the complex relationship between Truman and MacArthur. And now may be a good time to revisit this part of history in order to understand and learn about the past.

Historian Michael Pealman once again delves into the nature of civil-military relations, this time focusing on two strong leaders and the ways in which they understood the threat of communism and the Cold War. If you read Pearlman's last book, Warmaking and American Democracy, you will appreciate his unique storytelling voice that is marked by a brisk pace, attention to detail, and some great turns of phrase.

Pearlman traces Truman and MacArthur's struggles to defeat commumism while simultaneously attempting to establish their place in history. History, in fact, was vitally important to both men, and the author shows how their respective readings of history from Hannibal to the American Civil War influenced their conduct, especially as it pertained to the relationship between presidents and generals. Truman hesitated to over-reach in military affairs lest he become a Jefferson Davis. Similarly, MacArthur lionized Lee and the "double envelopment" which he attempted to reenact during WWII and the Korean War.

Neither man emerges from the book as a saint. We see how MacArthur relied on intuition and searched for facts to support his case rather than looking at facts to inform his decision making. He disparaged the Chinese communists as "primative" fighters before June 1950, then, after they entered the war in late 1950, he called them a well-organized and disciplined force. As US resistance stiffened in early 1951 and the weaknesses of the Chinese forces became more apparent, he once again disparaged them, in hopes of convincing his superiors to authorize carrying the war north again. Truman was hands-off with MacArthur for a long time---too long, Pearlman suggests---but Truman felt he could not hand the Republican Party a ready-made hero and risk a wider war in Asia or Europe.

This is not just a study of Truman and MacArthur. The book is a gold mine of behind the scenes maneuverings of the Joint Chiefs, Secretaries of Defense and State, and US field commanders as well as Mao and his subordinates, Stalin, Kim Il-sung and the foreign offices of NATO allies. Readers interested in the military history, the Cold War, and civil-military relations will value this timely, thoroughly researched, and engagingly written book.

According to Michael Pearlman, Truman was one of the main reasons that MacArthur felt free to criticize the government and advance into North Korea and past Pyongyang. Truman had an overly romantic view of war and thought that his heroes Hannibal and Lee were constrained by civilian leaders. This view of military leadership made it possible for MacArthur to support the KMT government contrary to secretary of state Dean Acheson's wishes. Truman gave MacArthur further reign in Korea by letting him cross into the North Korean border and then close to the Yalu river. MacArthur was only stoped and eventually removed by Truman when after the Chinese invasion he suggested that KMT troops should become involved in the Korean War to a member of the Republican party, Joseph Martin. Truman felt that MacArthur was getting innvolved in domestic politics in which generals should avoid. The only weakness of this book is that the last fifty pages of the dragged on, but this is essential reading for those like John McCain and Robert Kaplan, who believe that the military alone should dictate military strategy.

"The inside details of the clash between the President and the General and how MacArthur was fired."