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Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law)

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The Supreme Court, in Nix v. Whiteside, 374 U.S. 157, 158 (1986), solemnly intoned that "The very nature of a [criminal] trial [is] a search for truth," and this sentiment has been echoed by lower courts. For example, both People v. Santorelli, 5 N.Y.2d 412, 420-421, 41 N.E.2d 493, 497 (N.Y. 2000), and Floyd v. State, 902 So.2d 775, 778 (Fla. 2005), speak of "the search for truth in criminal cases."

Laudan begins with this premise and explores how well the American criminal justice system does the job of searching for truth. His verdict? Not very well. As Laudan dissects our criminal justice system, he demonstrates that it is driven by numerous considerations which have nothing whatsoever to do with discovery of the truth and which actually impede the determination of truth. As Laudan sees things, the system is in dire need of repair, and in the closing chapter he makes some modest suggestions for improving it.

I think it highly unlikely that any of Laudan's suggestions will ever be implemented, but I do believe his critique is one which everyone involved in criminal justice should seriously consider. If this were to happen, we might possibly prevent further erosion of our ability to determine truth in criminal trials.