Truth and Ontology [Hardcover]

Trenton Merricks (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 14, 2007 | ISBN-10: 019920523X | ISBN-13: 978-0199205233 | Edition: First Edition

That there are no white ravens is true because there are no white ravens. and so there is a sense in which that truth "depends on the world". But this sort of dependence is trivial. After all, it does not imply that there is anything that is that truth's "truthmaker". Nor does it imply that something exists to which that truth corresponds. Nor does it imply that there are properties whose exemplification grounds that truth.

Trenton Merricks explores whether and how truth depends substantively on the world or on things or on being. And he takes a careful look at philosophical debates concerning, among other things, modality, time, and dispositions. He looks at these debates because any account of truth's substantive dependence on being has implications for them. And these debates likewise have implications for how and whether truth depends on being. Along the way, Merricks makes a number of new points about each of these debates that are of independent interest, of interest apart from the question of truth's dependence on being.

Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all. One result of this conclusion is that it is a mistake to oppose a philosophical theory merely because it violates truth's alleged substantive dependence on being. Another result is that the correspondence theory of truth is false and, more generally, that truth itself is not a relation of any sort between truth-bearers and that which "makes them true".

Editorial Reviews

Review

excellent new book...This is an important contemporary debate, and Merricks' book is a very important move within it. Philip Goff, Times Literary Supplement

About the Author

Trenton Merricks is a Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of Virginia.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 206 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA; First Edition edition (June 14, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 019920523X
• ISBN-13: 978-0199205233
• Product Dimensions: 8.1 x 5.4 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,598,047 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Merricks on Truth, January 3, 2011

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Jfarris - See all my reviews

This review is from: Truth and Ontology (Paperback)

As a work on truth and its relation to ontology this is a helpful treatment of various theories of truth. Trenton Merricks does a fine job laying out some of the various theories in the dialogue on metaphysics and truth. It is a helpful contribution to the debate. Merricks works through the truthmaker, truth supervenes on being, the correspondence, identity, coherence theories of truth. A great deal of Merricks's thought is devoted to the truthmaker theory of truth. Primarily, Merricks argues that it has a problem dealing with negative existentials and statements that have no real being in reality. In chapter 4, Merricks considers a theory similar to the truthmaker theory ( called truth supervenes on being (TSB). To demonstrate this further, Merricks handles other issues that are problematic for the truthmaker theorist and truth supervenes on being theory, including: modality, presentism, and subjunctive conditionals. The final chapter contains other potential theories. Merricks considers the correspondence theory of truth, realism about truth, coherence and identity theories and finally truth as primitive. These theories, aleibet alternatives, are put forth as similar to truthmaker and TSB. All but realism about truth and truth as primitive are similar in that they are all theories of truth with a similar motivation as the truthmaker. They construe truth as being a relational property or a relation to being, in general. The problem with this is that these properties are mysterious, but more importantly these theories require an actual existing being to make a proposition or statement true. This certainly seems to be a problem. Merricks is not convinced by these theories, yet still holds to a conviction of realism about truth. That a proposition or statements truthfulness is either true or false--this is keeping with Aristotle. In keeping with this Merricks offers an alternative theory that adheres to the previous insight without the problems of the so called "relational theories" of truth to being. He offers a theory that considers truth to be a primitive monadic property in reality. It is not relational but an actual property that is non-intrinsic and primitive, thus not analysable and sui generis. Neither is it a form of deflationsim that holds there is no property. This book is certainly worth of the attention of those who are interested in general ontology and epistemology. At this point, I am not thoroughly convinced of his proposed theory of truth yet it certainly has challenged my understanding of the correspondence theory of truth. All in all, this is a fine work worthy of reading.