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Truth and Ontology

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As a work on truth and its relation to ontology this is a helpful treatment of various theories of truth. Trenton Merricks does a fine job laying out some of the various theories in the dialogue on metaphysics and truth. It is a helpful contribution to the debate. Merricks works through the truthmaker, truth supervenes on being, the correspondence, identity, coherence theories of truth. A great deal of Merricks's thought is devoted to the truthmaker theory of truth. Primarily, Merricks argues that it has a problem dealing with negative existentials and statements that have no real being in reality. In chapter 4, Merricks considers a theory similar to the truthmaker theory ( called truth supervenes on being (TSB). To demonstrate this further, Merricks handles other issues that are problematic for the truthmaker theorist and truth supervenes on being theory, including: modality, presentism, and subjunctive conditionals. The final chapter contains other potential theories. Merricks considers the correspondence theory of truth, realism about truth, coherence and identity theories and finally truth as primitive. These theories, aleibet alternatives, are put forth as similar to truthmaker and TSB. All but realism about truth and truth as primitive are similar in that they are all theories of truth with a similar motivation as the truthmaker. They construe truth as being a relational property or a relation to being, in general. The problem with this is that these properties are mysterious, but more importantly these theories require an actual existing being to make a proposition or statement true. This certainly seems to be a problem. Merricks is not convinced by these theories, yet still holds to a conviction of realism about truth. That a proposition or statements truthfulness is either true or false--this is keeping with Aristotle. In keeping with this Merricks offers an alternative theory that adheres to the previous insight without the problems of the so called "relational theories" of truth to being. He offers a theory that considers truth to be a primitive monadic property in reality. It is not relational but an actual property that is non-intrinsic and primitive, thus not analysable and sui generis. Neither is it a form of deflationsim that holds there is no property. This book is certainly worth of the attention of those who are interested in general ontology and epistemology. At this point, I am not thoroughly convinced of his proposed theory of truth yet it certainly has challenged my understanding of the correspondence theory of truth. All in all, this is a fine work worthy of reading.