Customer Reviews

The Truth about Syria

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This book is in the style of academic books on the former Soviet Union or Nazi Germany--the anatomy of a dictatorship. Rubin details early Syrian politics, the rise to power as sole dictator of Hafez al-Assad and then the transfer of power to his son Bashar al-Assad. For those wishing to understand the internal dynamics of Syria this appears to be quite a good guide. I would urge caution, however, in reading the chapter on relations with Israel. Rubin writes with certainty and conviction, and some persuasion, that Ba'athist Syria is incapable of making peace with Israel. But he writes that Israel offered to return all of the Golan to Syria in exchange for peace and Assad turned Israel down. This is not true. Rabin made the offer provided that Syria was willing to offer full peace in exchange. But Peres broke off talks in the early spring of 1996 because Syria refused to condemn a terrorist attack and Barak wanted to adjust the border when his final offer was made to Assad by Clinton in March 2000. Dennis Ross blamed Assad's rejection of the offer on Assad's focus on assuring a smooth succession before his impending death from cancer. So Rubin's thesis regarding Israeli-Syrian peace has yet to be fully tested, contrary to what he writes. But I still urge those interested in Syria and Middle East peace to read this book.

I don't think we can ever claim that this type of book writing is objective. There may be objective dates and events, but one look at the title "The Truth About..." is enough to suggest that this book is the result of the author's experience of the region. His language is not academic and is filled with expressions that shout "this is my opinion". Therefore, it is pointless to make a judgement about his book based on his ethnic background.

In controversial topics like the one this book tackles, it's important to read as many books as possible from different authors, both academic and non-academic. I think that Barry Rubin has written an easy-read account of various events in Syrian and Middle Eastern recent history with this book.

What I got out of the book was that Syria has been a rogue state with very self-destructive internal policies. For decades, the regime has been run by elite that have focused on meddling into neighboring countries' affairs instead of addressing their own peoples' plights. Furthermore, this has been- possibly on purpose- largely ignored by the West especially by the US. I would argue that, with this book, Barry Rubin has attempted to call on to Western (particularly) American foreign policymakers to take a more effective and pro-active stance against Syria, instead of running after imaginary missions (a.k.a search for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq).

I think the gist of the book is that the West has failed to identify the reasons why Palestine and Israel have not settled there differences for so long. And one real reason is interference from Syria.

Professor Rubin's book does for Syria what John Gunther did many years for USSR. Shorn of topical references, this is an "Inside Assad's Syria" and can give many people insights into what the regime is about, how it works and what it is like. It is, if you will, a "user's guide."

That doesn't mean that every prognostication or evaluation in the book is precisely right, but it does mean you will come away with the understanding that a regime such as Syria is very different from the sort of political reality that you might know as a person living in a free society with post modern industrial values.

I would have liked to see more history and detail about the workings of the regime and relation to Hezbollah and Iran, suppression of dissidents and prospects for political change, and less dwelling on prognostications that are apt to be mistaken in the nature of things, but this is still a must-read book.

When you come to a place like Syria or want to understand such a regime, everyone must understand "You are not in Kansas Dorothy" - words don't have the same meaning, concepts like democracy don't mean the same thing either.

Revealing insights into the dynamics of the Assad dictatorship that has been running Syria for the last 40 years, useful background given the current protests against the regime.

Rubin's first major point is that the Assad's greatest success has been the rebranding of their ruling minority Alawite Nusayri faction (12% of the pop) as quasi Shias and their emphasis on defining Syria as an Arab state at the forefront of non-existent pan-Arab unity. The irony here is that, at least formerly, the Alawaite sect was regarded as heretic as they not only celebrate the 9th century prophet Nusayri (Mohammed is supposed to the be final prophet) they also consider him to be a manifestation of God and don't perform salah - daily prayers.

Example after example shows that the goal of the regime is to keep the Assads in power - all else is secondary. Loyalty is considered far more important than merit or competence and The Assads, like Saddam Hussein did in neighbouring Iraq, have made sure to install their kinsmen in key positions of power. Any dissent from the majority Sunnis who dominate the business class is kept in line by mukabarat security forces. Newspapers are licensed by the State and can only publish that which is favorable to the regime.

A quote listed on pp207 should be kept in mind. In an interview in Der Spiegel in August 2005, son Bassar Assad said: "If any Syrians are involved (in the Hariri assassination), it means I'm involved." During the At the beginning of this month representatives of the Special Tribunal For Lebanon investigating the Rafiq Hariri assassination served indictments on 4 members of Syria's proxy Hezbollah, and then flew to Damascus to serve more.

The Syrians have always regarded Lebanon as part of greater Syria. During the 30 year Syrian occupation of Lebanon which ended in April of 2006 (Ch 4) Syrian intelligence Chief Ghazi Kanaan maintained a network of informers and wiretaps and acted as co-sponsor along with Iran for the paramilitary Hiz b'Allah. He could and did order assassinations, controlling all important aspects of Lebanese political life, including judiciarial appointments and decisions as well as political ones, including illegal extension of Lebanese Prime Minister Lahoud's term of office as he was favorable to Damascus . Kanaan was found dead in his office in Damascus shortly after the Hariri assassination, an apparent suicide that was brushed under the carpet, though Rubin is skeptical and believes Assad had Kanaan murdered so that he could be blamed for the death of Hariri if need be, without Kanaan pointing the finger at others.

Rubin also asserts that the Assads have done well playing off external regional politics. During the Iraqi sanctions of the 90s they subverted UN policy by surreptitiously laundering Iraqi oil, taking a substantial cut for the State, while pretending to be part of the US coalition. They also managed to serve as a base and supplier for Iraqi insurgents operating against US and the pro-democracy government of Iraq, without incurring the wrath of the United States.(1) WIth regard to the Arab/Israeli dispute to a large degree it has been Syrian sponsorship of proxy terrorist organizations (Hiz b'Allah, Fatah) that has kept the conflict going, including the sponsorship of elements (PFLP and PLA) of Fatah against each other. It was interesting to note that originally Hafiz Assad had claimed that the PLO, set up by Egypt, was a Zionist front (pp39), and he and Arafat did not get long. Assad had picked his friend Yousif al-Urabi to be the new Fatah leader - he was killed by Arafat's supporters and Arafat was thrown into a Syrian prison. One should not forget that it was Syria who dictated the withdrawal of Arafat and his militants from Lebanon in December of '83. (pp89). And, as has been a common tactic in the Arab world, anti-Israel rhetoric has been indoctrinated into the general public and is used as an excuse to stave off meaningful reform that might undermine the entrenched power elite.

The book also spends time looking at tensions between Syria and it's other Arab neighbours, including its intense rivalry with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Jordan is viewed as historic Syria and the legitimacy of King's Hussein was considered questionable. Bashar and Abdallah are contemporaries, but the governing styles are different and the a relationship hasn't gelled, not that I would advise Abdallah to put any trust in Bashar. The secular nature of Ba'ath and Syria's alliance with Shia Iran plays poorly in Saudi Riyadh and aside from a failed UAR alliance in the 1960s where Egypt viewed Syria contemptuously as a very junior partner, the Assads have portrayed the Egyptian leadership of traitors to the Arab cause.

It's current to the time of publication (2006), and though the content is good, at times Rubin repeats the same point in more or less the same way. To me this indicates a problem with editing not writing. Not a big deal as Rubin makes more cogent points in each chapter than many writers make in an entire book. The 2nd problem is that the index is incomplete - for example I tried to find a passage about Adbdallah II of Jordan that I had read, but it didn't show in the index - I used Amazon's "look inside the book" feature instead. Again I feel the problems lie with the editors at Palgrave and not the author. I also had problem with some dead links in web references - in most cases I was able to google quotations in the text and come up with an alternate source. This is a problem across the publishing industry for which a solution is needed.

Obviously, given that he is a Zionist, Rubin's arguments would likely be rejected by those who need it most. Even so it is a useful guide. Inshallah the people of Syria wil replace this government soon and seek a new path, but not only will they have to replace the regime they will also need to break the patterns.

I found it a worthwhile read.

In this book, Barry Rubin has made a good case for pursuing a different policy towards Syria.

As he explains, Syria is a dictatorship that is the source of two wars right now. It is the main sponsor of a terrorist insurgency in Iraq, making it for all practical purposes at war with the United States. And it has "played a central role in inciting and inflaming the Arab-Israeli conflict." On top of that, it has dominated Lebanon for thirty years.

In response to Syria's transgressions, has the US frozen Syrian assets in the United States, or prohibited American businesses from investing in Syria, or reduced our diplomatic contacts, or even restricted the travel of Syrian diplomats on US soil? As Rubin points out, we haven't.

The author shows that Syria acts in such a belligerent manner in large part because it simply does not take our threats seriously. And that Bashar Assad "prefers conflict over peace, tyranny to reform, and demagoguery that pleases its citizens rather than services that benefit them." Rubin explains that Bashar preferences are "rational responses to the situation of Syria's regime."

In any case, American policy towards Syria has made matters worse. Although Syrian sponsorship of terrorism has been unceasing, even in 2006, James Baker was "still bragging - at the moment when Damascus's terrorism-sponsoring activities were at a record high - about how his frequent visits to Damascus supposedly weaned Syria away from supporting terrorism." Several American "experts" on Syria can also be counted on to justify Syrian claims and apologize for the regime's actions.

Rubin says that we will get nothing out of negotiations with Syria. After all, the Syrians have far-reaching totalitarian and goals that are the opposite of the goals of Western democratic states. We can't offer Syria what it wants without further destabilizing the region. Meanwhile, the Syrians think they are winning and act like it, they believe their enemies to be weak and easily outfoxed, they profit from their militancy, and they have been consistently deceitful with any promises. Here is Rubin's list of ten things that America wants but Syria does not:

1) A peaceful situation in the region
2) An end to terrorism and punishment for state sponsors of covert violence against their neighbors
3) A calm Lebanon-Israel border with no attacks in either direction
4) A strong Lebanon with a strong, independent central government
5) A peace treaty ending the conflict between the Arabs and Israel
6) A United States that is popular in the Arab world because it brokered successful peace agreements
7) A stop to Iran's nuclear program and a moderate democratic government there
8) A moderate democratic state in Iraq, with an end to the communal strife there
9) Real democracy in all Arabic-speaking states
10) A democratic Syria, which focuses on development rather than war and subversion.

The author concludes that Syria is actually rather weak and is dependent largely on "oil income and European commerce." And that the way to deal with it is "not by propitiating aggressors and begging them to make a deal on their terms, but rather by pressuring and deterring them." And that means neither appeasement nor regime change, but "tough diplomacy backed up by strength and staying power."

I agree. And I highly recommend this interesting book.

Barry Rubin is one of the outstanding experts on the political realities of the Middle East. In this work he focuses on Syria, and provides a clear and convincing picture of its recent history, and overall role in the 'Middle East'. As Rubin sees it Syria a relatively weak country has had major influence on Middle East politics recently, rolling back the clock and moving the Arab world towards the kind of situation it had between the nineteen- fifties and nineteen- eighties.
As Rubin sees it Syria has played a key role in fueling the insurgency in Iraq against American troops. It has defied the Western belief that concessions made to it will bring it to greater moderation. In fact Rubin shows that only when it is weakened and faced with greater strength does Syria respond with moderation. The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, and Syria's backing down from confrontation with Turkey are two conspicuous examples of this.
Rubin speaks about the Assads, father and son, the role of the non- Muslim Alawite minority in ruling in Syria. He shows the truth of the old perception that tyrannical regimes remain in power through forcing attention to external problems and crises.
Rubin is especially instructive in showing how a relatively weak Syria has influenced stronger Middle Eastern countries to follow its diplomatic line.
This is a most highly recommended study for all those who would deepen their knowledge not only about Syria, but about the critical processes of Middle Eastern diplomacy and politics.

This is an outstanding examination of a near prefect tyranny. The author does not deal in idealistic hopes and dreams of starry eyed journalists and amateur diplomats (re Hillary Clinton) but the brutal Machiavellian realities of a murderous ruling clique. It is obvious from reading this work that any hope for change from the Assad government is silly, silly as in the tours by groveling US congressmen and diplomats to that country. This is a must read for anyone who wants to understand the Middle East. I can also recommend Barry Rubin's books Hating America and The Long Road to Freedom.

With everything going on at this very moment in Syria, of course this book is going to be out of date. However, for understanding the flavor and the mentality this is a great book. It is not academic- which is why it is so easy and nice to read. Overall, worth the time and money, it will help give a background and understanding of EXACTLY what is going on today in Syria.

This is a great work about Syria and a must if you want to understand more about the Middle East.This book is a no holds barred kind of account in which the author just tells it like it is.The book gives you a very good look of a regimen that feeds off the fear of his people and just wants to consolidate his power without regard for any consequences.The book is easy to read and understand since the author writes in a simple and easy manner without compromising substance or importance.Just a great book for anyone interested in the Midddle East.

good book on syria. lots of historical information. gets a little repetitive towards the end. the writer has a little bit of sarcastic irony in his writing which i like.