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The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima

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A good modern history of the battle of Tsushima has yet to be written, I would recommend KAIGUN as a great place to start for the early history of the Japanese Navy. Co-Author David Evans was my college professor, his death is a great loss to Japanese Naval historiography. I agree with reviewers who note the lack of detail and accuracy (I thought the ALEXANDER III had a few survivors?), in general terms, the author does tells us important facts about the superior Japanese shells and the flawed dispositions of the Russian squadron prior to the battle. I wonder if the Russians would have made it if they did not have a lighted hospital ship (with the Admiral's girlfriend onboard) following the squadron as it tried to slip through the straits. If the fleet had slipped through to Vladivostok intact the course of Japanese and Russian history might have changed. I sense that Admiral Rozhestvensky almost wanted a clash of fleets, despite his comprehension of the inferiority of his squadron. The book is really a command history of the Squadron and the Russian Naval Bueracracy. One is left with a good sense of the personality of Rozhestvensky (I think this makes the book worth the purchase, as I learned alot I did not know). One is left feeling sympathy for him, but the book does mention that he botched his pre-battle deployment, a deployment he had months to plan for and coordinate. This probably ruined what little chance the Russians had. But the Russians shooting was not good enough, and too few of their hits did critical damage. I always thought the focal point of any Tsushima account should be the heroic struggle of the Borodino class battleships. Their fate was a terrible one, as anyone who views pictures of the damage to the surviving ORYEL can testify. I would like to visit the monument to the ALEXANDER III in St. Petersburg. The losing Admirals in history's decisive naval battles make for interesting reading. I would recommend XERXES AT SALAMIS by Peter Green, THE GALLEYS AT LEPANTO by Jack Beeching, THE DEFEAT OF THE SPANISH ARMADA by Howarth, TRAFALGAR, COUNTDOWN TO BATTLE by Alan Schom and GRAF SPEE'S RAIDERS by Yates.

The Tsar's Last Armada is an interesting Russian-oriented account of the fateful voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Pacific Ocean in 1904-1905, where it was destroyed at the Battle of Tsushima. Not many books are written about the Russo-Japanese War and this well written book is a welcome addition to the small circle on English language books on that subject. The author, currently a Russian native now turned US professor at Mount Holyoke College, has expertly mined Russian archives and diaries for a treasure trove on information about the epic voyage. The narrative of the voyage itself revolves more around personalities, rather than military or technical details. Overall, The Tsar's Last Armada is an excellent book on the subject, but other books should be consulted to provide the Japanese perspective.

The Tsar's Last Armada consists of three main sections: covering predeployment activities, the voyage of the fleet to Asian waters and the final Battle of Tsushima. There are two significant structural weaknesses in the book: use of maps and dates. Only four large scale, poor quality maps are provided to show the route of the fleet and there are no maps to depict the tactical dispositions or movements in the Battle of Tsushima. Furthermore, the author's use of old-style Russian dates is confusing and readers must remember to add 13 days to any date given. Although the author has added a section on photographs, only a few are relevant to the cast of characters or the Russian Fleet and the reader might wonder why he bothered. Nevertheless, these technical glitches are annoying but only detract slightly from an otherwise well written book.

The main focus in Pleshakov's account is the commander of the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron (the first squadron was destroyed at Port Arthur), Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky. At times, the reader will sympathize with the admiral who was assigned this near-impossible task, to take a fleet of warships 16,000 miles around the world to fight a strong enemy fleet. Rozhestvensky was a strict disciplinarian and he tried to mold a motley collection of warships into a fighting force, without much help from his subordinates or the Russian Naval Ministry. On the other hand, at other times Rozhestvensky appears to have been a completely paranoid fool, particularly in the Dogger Bank incident where he ordered his warships to open fire on what he thought were Japanese torpedo boats; instead, he sank a British fishing trawler and caused a major international incident with England. Later, Rozhestvensky's orders resulted in the breaking of the Europe-Africa underwater cable at Tangiers and he almost provoked a military confrontation with Portugal. His sailors also rioted in Crete and caused trouble everywhere they landed. In probably never occurred to the Russians to bring a few diplomats along on the mission, in order to arrange better cooperation. Rozhestvensky's decisions at Tsushima - ordering first column, then line, then back to column - only served to disorganize his fleet and make it easy for the Japanese to slaughter. Perhaps the best that one can say about Rozhestvensky is that he was Russia's best admiral in 1905, but that was not good enough.

Military readers may be disappointed by the fairly short shrift given to technical details in this account, which focuses more on people than ships. The fact that the voyage was delayed until the four Borodino class battleships could be completed and that they sailed without "shakedown" cruises, should have been mentioned to help explain the untried nature of the four best Russian warships. Nor are logistic issues addressed in any real detail, although it would have been interesting to read how the Russian Naval Ministry planned and paid for coaling operations; nothing like this had ever been tried before. The Battle of Tsushima itself is covered in less than 50 pages and total casualties for each side are not mentioned. On the other hand, readers will learn more about the Russian sub-commanders, Nebogatov and Enkvist, than standard accounts offer. In particular, Nebogatov's surrender of several elderly Russian battleships without firing a shot is very indicative of the low quality of Russian naval leadership at this time.

The best thing about The Tsar's Last Voyage is the valuable lesson it teaches about knowing when to quit. With the fall of Port Arthur five months before Rozhestvensky's fleet reached the Pacific, the Russians lost their best naval base and the main reason for sending the fleet. Indeed, Rozhestvensky expected the fleet to be recalled, but the Tsar was obstinate. After the fall of Port Arthur, continuing the mission was virtual suicide, but the Russian High Command became irrevocably committed to a course of action despite changing battlefield realities. While recalling the fleet would have been embarrassing, allowing it to proceed to its virtual annihilation was humiliating. Thus, this book provides interesting insights into the Tsar's pig-headedness that would ultimately lead to war, disaster and revolution.

I read this book primarily as a travelogue learning more about the coasts of Western Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean, Southern Asia than I had ever before known. But that is not the book's primary focus. It can be read on several levels, one of which is surely as a travelogue. But it is also a story of startling mismanagement. The Russian Admiral, who is the book's principal figure, is opposed to the mission from the start,because the Russian naval fleet is outmoded, but Nicholas II , driven by revenge, and his advisers press on with the war armada. One of the most interesting facts is that the Russian armada was actually composed of 4 armadas which by circuitous routes joined together for the final devastating defeat near
Shanghai. The book is loaded with fine detail about the sailors' and officers' lives on board and at ports of call, which were mainly coal refueling stops; with details about the Russian, British, and Japanese spy network;about the fall of Port Arthur to the Japanese; and with details about the numerous cables between St. Petersburg and the doomed fleet. A fine and rather easy read for anyone interested in this forgotten page of history.

The eponymous Armada spent the better part of a year sailing from the Baltic Sea to the shores of Korea (via the Cape of Good Hope) to confront the Imperial Japanese Navy. 'Twas all for naught. The Japanese sunk the Armada's four primary capital ships in a matter of hours and mopped up the remainder of the fleet in quick succession. This excellent book tells that story from the Russian point of view. Led by a ferociously competant admiral, the coal-fueled Russian task force accomplished an incredible logistical feat only to have their mission end in disaster at the bottom of the Tsushima Straits. The author (a Russian) admits that he didn't use Japanese sources because of the language barrier. But, that being said, he still could have included a bit more information on the composition of Togo's fleet. However, the book is especially strong in detailing St. Petersberg's Vietnamesque micromanagement of the campaign. Overall, this is a wonderful, poignant book about a doomed fleet and the man who led it.

It was refreshing to finally see something published on the Russian ADM Rozhestvensky. I would've rated the book with the highest rating had it contained the following: l. Britain laid down HMS Dreadnaught about 3 months after Tsushima, whilst awaiting the results of that battle, e.g. all big guns verses mixed main batteries. Tsushima proved it was the big gun which carried the day. HMS Dreadnaught was launched in 1906, consequently battleships built prior to 1906 are referred to as PRE-DREADNAUGHTS. 2. ADM Rozhestvensky should be credited for having conducted HISTORY's only all steel, coal engine powered, battleship fleet voyage of l8,000 miles. 3. Tsushima was history's ONLY decisive steel battleship fleet action ever fought.

This book is a pretty good book for a first time non-technical reader. My main problems with the book is that the author does know what the various ships were. For example, the U.S.S. Raleigh and the U.S.S. Cincinnati are listed as a battleships (pg 388/390), where they were only protected cruisers (sort of a light cruiser to our present way of thinking. Another example is "Admiral Seniavin" is listed as a cruiser (pg 390) when it was a coast defense battleship. Etc, etc.

Also there are many instances where ships (example "Shinano Maru") are listed as cruisers when they were actually only armed merchant cruisers (Merchant ships with a few guns are mounted).

All of the Russian ships the author has listed as torpedo boats were classified at the time as destroyers. The pictures showing the torpedo boats on the 10th page of the pictures show German ships, not Russian as would be expected.

Also there was no track of the fleets during the actual battle itself, which would have been expected.

In general I was disappointed about this book because it was the first book on the subject I've seen published by a Russian, and I was expected more insight and content.

The subject matter, the oddysey of the Russian fleet in their voyage around half the globe, is a feat that ranks up there with Xenophon's "Anabasis" and Mao's "Long March", thus a reader that is new to the subject and isn't very demanding about naval details will find this book entertaining, despite it being a flawed book.

Overall it's a disappointment that a Russian author cannot do better, and it doesn't do justice to admiral Rozhestventski. Most of the accounts of the battle in history books dismiss the Russian as incompetent, corrupt, demoralized and unlucky doomed to die in a fight against a highly motivated and skilled Japanese foe who enjoyed all the advantages, specially technical.

Though that impression is accurate, it doesn't give credit to Rozhestventski, wich in my humble opinion ranks as one of the greatest naval commanders in History, and whose epitaph, along with the others in the Russian fleet that tried their best to do their duty could very well be:
"We the willing, led by the unknowing, are doing the impossible for the ungrateful, we have done so much, for so long, with so little, that we are now qualified to do anything"

Without doubt, the best book on this subject is one written by a German between the world wars, Frank Thiess (english translation "The Voyage of the Forgotten Men(Tsushima), Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1937" it's included in the bibliography, so we have to conclude that Pleshakov either hasn't read it, or he's shameless enough to make a buck with a shoddy book that doesn't offer anything new, same for some spicy anecdotes.

Another reviewer said that Thiess is ,perhaps, too romantic. Though I concede that he waxes poetic at times, he did justice to Rozhestventski, Pleshakov doesn't give him the credit this unsung Russian hero deserves, falling for the "Mad Dog" cliche, wich is a shame. Readers would be very mistaken if they came away with the impression that he was a martinet with a mean temper. Under the ordeal he had to endure, a lesser man would have commited suicide or give in to drinking.

The good thing about Pleshakov book is that it shows Rozhestventski's more human side (wich complements Thiess slightly idealized portrait), his weaknesses and flaws. His profanity, fits of rage, womanizing, and exhaustion and desperation in the last part of the ill-fated voyage. Having a mistress in the hospital ship of the fleet helps to understand how he could endure so much for so long, he would have gone nuts without some sort of stress relief.

If Rozhestventski was the hero, Nebogatov is the villain who surrendered the remnants of the Russian fleet. Though this book shows an even more damning picture of him trying to weasel his way out and dodging responsibility in the trial after the battle, that's not a balanced portrayal as it must be noted that his decision to surrender was the only wise, logical and sane order the fleet ever received, avoiding a futile slaughter, sacrificing his personal honor to save his men. Nebogatov is on a higher moral level than the true cowardice and incompetence shown by General Stössel who surrendered the garrison of Port Arthur. Sometimes it takes more courage to live than to die.

Finally, it must be noted that Japan could have won all the battles and still lose the war, had the Russian fleet slipped past Togo, Russia could have prolonged the war long enough to bankrupt Japan and force them to sue for peace. What almost every account fails to mention, due to the ease of their victory and the hopelessness of Russian gamble, doomed to failure from the outset, it's that every battle: Port Arthur, Mukden, Tsushima; was an "all or nothing" gamble for the Japanese. In the long term, Tsushima was an empty victory that only fueled Japan's imperialism wich ultimately led to its doom with WWII

Constantine Pleshakov's new book `The Tsar's Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima' is a compelling account of the voyage undertaken by a Russian Fleet half way around the world which ended in its total annihilation at the hands of the Japanese during the Battle of Tsushima. The book concentrates more on the actual events leading up to the decision to send the Russian fleet on this journey, the voyage itself and the personalities involved. Some previous reviews have made mention of the lack of detail on the actual battle itself, however the book's titles gives you a fair idea of the content and I think it was a story told well, full of interest and drama.

In the introduction the author makes it very clear that the story is told from a Western viewpoint:
"The Russian and British archives that I have used allow one to tell the story of Tsushima with some hope of being objective and complete, yet, I know that my research is deficient. I do not read Japanese, and without Japanese archival evidence it is not possible to write anything truly comprehensive about the war. So this is the story of Tsushima told from a Western perspective, as it was seen through Russian, British, French, and German eyes - nothing more, but also, hopefully, nothing less."

Overall I found the story interesting and although I too would have liked more on the Battle of Tsushima there was enough to complete the story. The book has filled me with an urge to learn more of this decisive engagement and I will look around for another book to complete my education. The narrative was well presented and held my interest throughout the journey. Towards the end of the book I felt quite sorry for Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky who appeared to have done the best he could under most trying circumstances.

This is decent account and I think accomplishes what the author set out to do, to tell the story "of the Russian squadron's long, difficult journey and fast, horrible defeat." One compliant that could be leveled at the author would be the standard of the maps provided. I am sure anyone who enjoys stories of mans determination and perseverance against adversity will enjoy this book. However you will need to look further for a more comprehensive account of the Battle of Tsushima.

Pleshakov's book is a brilliant narration of Russian navy's 18,000mile odyssey to Sea of Japan where it was routed by admiral Togo's superbly equipped and trained Japanese fleet. Reasons leading up to Tsushima is not difficult to seek. It was Russian imperialism colliding head-on with Japanese nationalism.

Tsar Nicholas II ,the last among Romanov monarchs, loathed Japanese. Hostility increased leaps and bounds when tsar came under the baneful influence of his wily ,abrasive cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany. German Kaiser frequently spoke about `Yellow Peril' , the threat posed by Japan to Russia's interests in the Far East. Truth was German ruler wanted to deflect Russian expansion eastwards so former could have free hand in Europe.Tsar obliged as both shared contempt for Japanese.

In the Far East China and Japan vyed for influence over Korea. This led to war and Chinese forces were defeated and hostilities terminated by Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17,1895. However European powers[Germany,France,Russia] combined to deprive Tokyo the fruits of victory. From this point onwards Japan viewed its northern neighbour with suspicion.

Meanwhile, Moscow secured China's permission to lay a railroad cutting across Manchuria linking Vladivostok in the Russia's Far East. This formed the eastern most branch of great Trans Siberian railroad. Since China's northern border with Russia curled upwards the railroad across Manchuria helped latter to save time and distance. Distance shrank by about 600 miles. Subsequently, Russians built another line linking Harbin [on the Moscow -Vladivostok route] to Port Arthur located on the tip of Liaotung peninsula. Because Russia was desperately in search of a warm water port. Vladivostok her principal port in the Far East remained ice-locked most of the year.

As the years passéd by, situation took an ominous turn when some Russian timber companies acquired logging interests in Korea across river Yalu. War became inevitable as neutrality of Korea was at stake and Tokyo reacted violently. On Feb 8,1904 Japanese torpedo boats launched a surprise assault at Russian naval squadron that lay at anchor at Port Arthur. Further vice admiral Togo's fleet mounted a naval blockade preventing the egress of Russian navy into the open sea..Tsar decided to raise the siege by sending Russian Baltic fleet under the command of admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky.

It is unfair to dismiss this mission as foolhardy.Baltic fleet voyage to Far East must be deemed as an extraordinary feat of human endurance and nautical skill, for it almost circumnavigated the globe. And mind you,
Russian fleet was an assortment of defunct,obsolete vessels manned by ill trained crews.

Further it was plagued by everything from crew mutiny, fuelling problems and disastrous brush with British at Dogger Bank. By the time fleet neared its destination , the mission lost its purpose. Port Arthur garrison surrendered to general Nogi's forces.Only thing for Rozhestvensky to do was get to the safety of Vladivostok. But Japanese navy dashed his hopes at Tsushima.

The book is not devoid of shortcomings. Firstly, Japanese victory had far-reaching consequences, for it stimulated nationalist aspirations in Asia and Africa which lay under the heel of `white man'. It exploded the myth of European invincibility. In my country, where freedom struggle against the British was in full swing, Swaraj party under Bala Gangadhar Tilak derived immense hope,confidence in continuing the struggle. Facts unfortunately overlooked by the author. Equally uncalled for is author's occasional usage 4-letter expletives. A book of this stature should eschew such coarse vulgar language.

Nevertheless a well-researched and well-written study. Devoid of academic jargons , the text is couched in a simple prose. A racy stuff which kept me turning page after page till I finished reading it.

I have to say, I have recently discovered Constantine Pleshakov, and have since purchased every book of his I can find. This man has a real talent for telling a story, and being historically acurate at the same time. I have yet to find an author who can take a subject as obscure as the the voyage of the Russian fleet to the Sea of Japan, and turn it into a story that almost makes you feel as if you are reading a novel.

I will agree with a previous reviewer, that this book is told exclusively from the Russian side. But the subject matter is not so much the war, but the voyage of the fleet getting there. There is almost no content concerning the land war in Asia, so if you are looking for an overall story about the Russo-Japanese war, keep looking. If you are looking for an entertaining read about a real historical event, then DO purchase this book. I could hardly set it down.

I also recommend Mr. Pleshakov's "Stalin's Folly" also written in the same manner.