Tsebelis: Nested Games (Cloth): Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice & Political Economy) [Hardcover]

TSEBELIS (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 1, 1992 | ISBN-10: 0520067320 | ISBN-13: 978-0520067325

Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions.

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Editorial Reviews

From the Inside Flap

"The notion of nested games greatly expands the domain of formal analysis while also rendering game theory more capable of reflecting political reality."--David Cameron, Yale University --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

From the Back Cover

The notion of nested games greatly expands the domain of formal analysis while also rendering game theory more capable of reflecting political reality. (David Cameron, Yale University) --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 288 pages
• Publisher: University of California Press (July 1, 1992)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0520067320
• ISBN-13: 978-0520067325
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,161,900 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A must for anyone serious about comparative politics, July 19, 2000

By A Customer

This review is from: Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) (Paperback)

This is one of the books where it all started... Comparative Politics scholars treating their subject matter with the soundness and analytical rigor only found, before, in the realm of American Politics. And yet, the book is remarkably accessible. So much that any modestly committed undergraduate should be able to follow most of the argument. The chapters on the UK and France seem especially persuasive.

Formally oriented scholars may feel tempted to dismiss the material as not formal enough. Doing so is missing the point of the book, though. This book is, above all, an *invitation* to do Comparative Politics in a manner consistent with the *Science* in Political Science. Still, more experienced --and demanding-- readers, will not be disappointed by Tsebelis's journal articles.

5.0 out of 5 stars Why we need institutions, September 9, 2010

By 

Enjolras (Springfield, MA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)   

This review is from: Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) (Paperback)

Prof. Tsebelis' Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) is something rare in political science texts: it is both accessible to novices in political science and makes significant contributions to the literature. As a novice in the field, I really appreciate how Tsebelis manages to explain his methodology and not entangle the reader in too much math or logic. As for the substance, Tsebelis makes a powerful case for the fact that institutions must be considered in rational choice analysis. Institutions create constraints and rules that "nest" game theory analysis in non-obvious ways. Perhaps the best thing I can say about the book is that it makes several interesting, realistic, and non-obvious points (which can't be said for some of the rest of the literature).

2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars RATIONAL CHOICE: EMANCIPATING THE FREE MAN?, May 1, 2007

By 

Faruk Ekmekci - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) (Paperback)

In his book Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics George Tsebelis sets out to solve the puzzle why `rational' human beings frequently make seemingly `suboptimal' choices. Moreover, like all other rational choice analyses, Tsebelis' work aims to "provide a systematic way to deal with complicated political phenomenon," (p. 17). Yet whereas Tsebelis does a good job in convincingly accounting for the first puzzle, his general arguments for the rational choice analysis are hardly helpful. In other words, his work is a contribution to the rational choice literature yet not to comparative politics.

Tsebelis argues that cases of apparently suboptimal choices are in fact cases of disagreement between `the actor' and `the observer': "while the observer focuses attention on only one game, the actor is involved in a whole network of games" - what he calls nested games (pp. 6-7). What appears suboptimal from the perspective of only one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is considered. Besides the multiplicity of the games, the differences in the long- and short-term utilities lead actors and observers to reach at different equilibria for the same games. "The choice of long-term instead of short-term interests is the most important characteristic of human behavior," (p. 162); yet most observers miss this point and equivocally base their analyses on the short-term equilibrium which is drived from the calculations of short-term utilities. In that respect, Tsebelis' arguments on the importance of iterations, strategic thinking, and multiple games deserves appreciation, for it expands the scope of our understanding seemingly `irrational' or `unselfish' decisions.

However, like most other rational choice analyses, George Tsebelis' arguments for the importance of rational choice models in comparative politics hardly convince the reader, because they are afflicted with the same ailment: they become helpful when we are almost done! The problem with rational choice analyses is that we need to give them too much before we start benefiting from them. Tsebelis admits that rational choice is a better approach to situations in which "actors' identity and goals are established and the rules of the interaction are precise and known to the interacting agent"; and rational choice explanations become less applicable "as the actors' goals become fuzzy, or as the rules of the interaction become more fluid and imprecise." (pp. 32-33). In real life, we hardly have precise answers to the questions about the identity and goals of the actors. As political scientist, our main problem is not so much to solve the political equations as to first establish them. Yet what rational chioce analyses say is, "give me the equation and I'll give you the answer". And our answer is "we don't have it yet!'. Thus, rational choice explanations hardly help us in solving our primary problems in answering such questions as `who are the actor?', `what are their exact goals?', `which are the effective institutions?', `what are the rules of the games?' and so on. It would be nice if rational choice steps in a bit earlier.