Customer Reviews

Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Students of the American Civil War have long pondered the root causes of the illustrious successes of the Army of Northern Virginia in comparison to the miserable failures of the Army of Tennessee. For some, the answer is as simple as Robert E. Lee vs. Braxton Bragg (the comparison between the two is so compelling as to almost stifle further analysis). Fortunately, Dr. McMurry has delved into the subject with academic discipline and presented his results in this concise, convincing study - which, since its publication, has become a standard reference for later ACW histories from the academic community. Superior leadership - from the commanding general on down through the command structure, including experience, discipline and motivation of the regimental and company officers and their soldiers - was certainly a very large factor, but by no means the only important factor. The infrastructure of war (railroads, supply lines, communications) in the west was inferior for troop movements in a large area which was primarily still wilderness. Key areas in the west (Tennessee, Kentucky) were indefensible due to the existence of penetrating rivers - exploited by Federal naval gunboat superiority. Federal efforts in the west were much more organized, supplied and led (at least later in the war) than their Confederate counterparts. Dr. McMurry applies the academic method in presenting the appropriate statistics to support his conclusions. The final analysis by McMurry is persuasive: the South adopted a strategy of trading land for time in the west (where the war could not be won, but was eventually lost) for an opportunity to try and win the war in the east (where relative advantages and the best opportunities existed). This strategy seems to have been the South's best chance for victory in a war heavily weighted against them (in terms of military resources) from the outset. There is also a very interesting appendix which presents McMurry's views on the "Lee bashing" fad - initiated by Thomas Connelly, of late supported by Alan Nolan in his ridiculous "Lee Considered". Again, the disciplined academic view is the most persuasive in these arguments.

Richard McMurry takes a look at the two largest armies in the Confederacy in what is, as the title indicates, an extended essay. The Army of Northern Virginia, ably led by Robert E. Lee, was able to compile a large number of impressive victories during the war. The Army of Tennessee, led by various men of less than stellar ability, was only able to win at Chickamauga, and even that victory proved barren strategically. The author considers various factors that affected the two, including geography, logistical concerns, leadership on all levels (particularly among lower level officers), pre-war militia systems in Virginia and Tennessee, and even the Federals who faced each army. He concludes that in every case, the Army of Northern Virginia benefited from these factors while the Army of Tennessee was negatively affected. I have seen it stated in several places that McMurry is saying that the men of the Army of Northern Virginia were better than the men of the Army of Tennessee. I did not get this sense from my reading of the book. Instead, McMurry is stressing that the men in leadership positions in each army were very different. The vast majority of the men who had graduated from military schools such as West Point, VMI, and the Citadel were concentrated in the Army of Northern Virginia to that army's immense benefit. The Army of Tennessee started out with many men who were untrained in the art of war, and that army's problems were exacerbated as casualties started to deprive it of even the small number of leaders who had that previous military experience. In other words, McMurry believes the raw material was there to work with, but the Army of Tennessee did not have experienced men available in large enough numbers to work with this raw material.

The last chapter of the book discusses the views of historians Thomas Connelly and Albert Castel on Robert E. Lee and also looks at the ways in which the Confederate government, specifically Jefferson Davis, could have prosecuted the war. McMurry sides with Castel in defending Lee from Connelly's attacks, and stresses that the Confederates were right to try to win the war in the east. With that said, the author believes the war was eventually won in the west by the Federals. I found it somewhat odd that McMurry would quote Connelly's entirely negative opinions on the western generals and agree with them while at the same time defending Lee from the same negative opinions. In a way, this did make sense, as it fits McMurry's own views on the generals of each theater. Perhaps Connelly is just a negative historian in general, however. Reading this book has increased my interest in Connelly's two volume history of the Army of Tennessee, and that set has moved much higher up my reading list as a result.

Overall, I enjoyed McMurry's short work, finishing it over one weekend in just three sittings. It really is startling to see how many trained military men ended up in the Army of Northern Virginia for various reasons at the expense of other Confederate armies. Likewise, it was illuminating to see all of the other advantages, intentional or otherwise, which were routinely provided to the Confederacy's largest army. This particular book is directed at students of these two largest Confederate armies and of Confederate grand strategy during the Civil War. I definitely recommend it to any student of the war.

The title definately underscores how masterful Mr. McMurray has been in detailing the main differences between the Army of Northern Virginia and The Army of Tennessee. From the basics of command on through key strategy and deployment, both armies are beautifully dissected by McMurray's research, mirrored with an easy to understand style of writing.

This book not only discusses how important the upper command structures were to both armies but how the various infrastructures such as railroads, food supply, communication and weapons production differed from east to west.

This book can be summed up as an impressive literary study of the two great armies. It sheds light on the many differences as well as similarities and gives the reader new insight into the complex study of military history.

I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in an intense study of both armies.

Well done Mr. McMurray!

Mr. McMurry's purpose in writing this book was to try and explain why the Army of Northern Virginia was so successful, and why the Army of Tennessee so awful. Although I did not agree with some of his conclusions, he does provide some compelling evidence to support his arguments.

I found this book to be very informative, and an easy read. I recommend it for anyone looking to better understand how the South fought the war, why the two great rebel armies had such different levels of success on the battlefield, and possibly why they did not have the ability to win the war.

Richard M. McMurry's "Two Great Rebel Armies" addresses the differences between the Army of Northern Virginia (and its successes) and the Army of Tennessee (and its failures). McMurry argues that not only did the Army of Northern Virginia have a better upper-level command structure (a point with which few historians would disagree), but also that the basic "building blocks" that comprised the armies - the men themselves and their company and regimental organizations and officers - were of higher quality in the Army of Northern Virginia. McMurry primarily concentrates on the differences in quality of the common soldiers and small unit organizations of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee. McMurry argues that West Point or military school educations, militia backgrounds, and prior military experience were seen in a larger percentage of the officers and NCO's comprising Lee's army compared with the Army of Tennessee. These factors would, according to McMurry, make the Army of Northern Virginia the more militarily effective force and thus help explain its success relative to the Army of Tennessee. By inference, he also suggests that because the units sent to Virginia were for the most part organized earlier than those that were made part of the Army of Tennessee, those men with the most experience, training and enthusiasm would be more likely to end up with the first-formed units and therefore would be sent to the Army of Northern Virginia. Thus Lee's army was successful; the Army of Tennessee was not. McMurry's "Two Great Rebel Armies," while raising some very interesting perspectives for further investigation, operates however, from something of a false premise with respect to his central theme. A statistical analysis of the battle results (which McMurry did not bother to perform) of both the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Northern Virginia clearly shows that they were very comparable from the standpoint of the important "measures of merit" relating to tactical battlefield performance - at least up until John Bell Hood took the reins of the Army of Tennessee in July, 1864. Additional statistical analysis indeed shows, as McMurry claims, that the Army of Northern Virginia possessed a larger percentage of officers with prior military experience and/or educations, and that the average regiment sent to Virginia was organized several months prior to the average regiment in the Army of Tennessee. McMurry infers from this information that the Army of Northern Virginia was made up of better basic "material" than the Army of Tennessee (the best qualified and most enthusiastic volunteers would have presumably joined the first units sent to the theater of war) and this helps explain why the Army of Northern Virginia was a "winner" and the Army of Tennessee a "loser." As noted earlier, the distinction of winner or loser is not discernible from the battle statistics comparisons, so McMurry is basing his categorizations on very subjective arguments, although these classifications have generally been accepted by past historians. In fact, there seems to be little correlation of tactical battlefield performance statistics with the final declaration of the "winner" or "loser" of a Civil War battle. Additionally, the author makes some serious mistakes in trying to drive home the distinction of winner and loser with respect to the Army of Northern Virginia and Army of Tennessee. For example, McMurry claims that the Army of Northern Virginia *never* [emphasis added] waged a major campaign in which its strength exceeded that of its enemy, while the western forces enjoyed that advantage on at least six crucial occasions (the association of the Army of Tennessee with at least a couple of these battles is tenuous, at best). McMurry can easily be shown to be wrong on both assertions. Despite these flaws however, "Two Great Rebel Armies" clearly breaks new ground in the age-old debate on the comparative merits of Confederacy's two main armies - the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee.

I'm not a student of the Civil War, so I cannot comment on the merit of McMurry's main points, but as a student of the Old South I thoroughly enjoyed this book. McMurry's analysis of the two armies is very well organized and easy to read. Simply, it's a page turner. This book is at once both highly focused on a single topic and illuminate of larger Civil War issues. I really enjoyed this book and will read it every so often in the years to come. I recommend McMurry's book without reserve.

"Two Great Rebel Armies" by Richard McMurray is an excellent comparison between the two main Confederate armies and why one was overall very successful (Army of Northern Virginia) and why the other one suffered many defeats(Army of Tennessee).

Among the factors considered include:

1. Proximity to Richmond and Washington ensured that the Army of Northern Virginia would receive much more attention from the Confederate government.

2. The Army of Tennessee had a much greater land mass to defend.

3. The rivers in Virginia flowed east to west (making it easier for Confederate lateral movements and harder for Union movements going north to south) while the rivers in the west generally flowed north to south and made it much easier for the Union to use its superior navy to transport troops and supplies.

4. Overall caliber of the Confederate generals in the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of Tennessee.

5. Overall Northern leadership was more successful in the west than in the east (until Grant came to Virginia and brought some of his generals like Sheridan with him).

McMurray makes compelling cases for the Confederate success in the east (yes, Lee did surrender, but he did win many more battles than the western army did) and failure in the west (Chickamauga was the only major victory).

The narrative flows freely and is a smooth read (I believe the book was under 200 pages), and can be easily read in 2-3 sittings.

A good read on the only book I know of that makes such a comparison.

Read and enjoy. Recommended!

I thoroughly enjoyed this essay comparing the Army of Northern Virginia with the Army of Tennessee. The author discusses the differences in origin, leadership, logistics, geography, officers and men. In a final chapter the author gives a good summary of the debate over Robert E. Lee and the socalled "western concentration bloc" that argues that Lee squandered men in fruitless battles in the East while letting the Confederate defense of the West wither. This is a great book to focus one's thoughts -- a well balanced beginning, not an end!

To be concise--this is one of the best books on the Civil War. It is accurate, informative and very easy to read.