Customer Reviews

The Two O'Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel

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Retired Air Force Colonel Walter Boyne's book on the 1973 War reveals much new information. Perhaps the most important of which is the fact that the world came to the brink of nuclear war not once but twice during the conflict. Boyne begins by exploring how Israel was ill-prepared for the well-planned and well-executed Arab surprise attack on October 6, 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish year. Following the stunning initial gains by the Egyptians in the Sinai, and the Syrians in the Golan, Israeli political leaders began to discuss what was known as the "Sampson Option." That is, if Israel was going to be destroyed, it was going to take down its enemies with it. Israel had no way of knowing that it was not the Arab goal to destroy the state. Sadat's aim was simply to capture territory on the east bank of the Suez Canal, an objective he achieved in three days. Meanwhile, the Syrians had also made impressive gains, but failed to press their advantage, for reasons that are unclear. This, coupled with the Egyptian army's halt in the Sinai allowed Israel to regroup and press the offensive in the North. Egypt foolishly decided to press to the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai, and its armor was torn to shreds in the largest tank battles since World War Two. The war may have shifted to Israel's advantage, but supplies were running critically low, with only a few days ammunition left. The US, led by Henry Kissinger, decided to airlift supplies into Israel, allowing Israel to continue its offensive operations, crossing the Suez Canal, and choking off the Egyptian forces, while pushing back the Syrians, along with their Iraqi and Jordanian allies. Yet the massive airlift barely was able to begin, since no European country would allow the US an airbase to transfer its supplies, fearing the wrath of the Arab oil weapon. Finally, Portugal, in need of arms for its own wars, allowed the US a base in the Atlantic. The airlift was on, and it landed a huge number of supplies in a round the clock effort. With Israel advancing, the Soviets advocated inserting a unilateral force in the region, leading the US to place its armed forces on high alert, known as Def Con 3. The panicked Soviets quickly backed down from their demands, but nuclear tensions reached their highest point in years. Boyne's own Air Force background shines in his explanation of all events related to the air war and the airlift; He also has an impressive understanding of events in the diplomatic arena. Overall, this an excellent book, well-written impeccably researched, and a gripping read.

It was with some discomfort that I read Mr. Henning's review. I have heard this statement before, ie "The FACT is most of the weapons sent were replacements for those taken out or un-used additions to what was available and in use. Most never saw action." (His emphasis) Apparently that is the official Israeli position. Now, I can understand why the State of Israel would want to promote this idea, after all, no one surrounded by possible future enemies in another war wants to admit a weakness. The trouble is, that statement is just plain nonsense. I was there. I was a US Air Force C-141 pilot at the time and flew a load of supplies from Charleston to Lajes, then was detached from my crew and used to augment other crews on the round trip to Lod. As a result I flew multiple round trips without ever returning to the States, thereby making many more trips to Israel than most. I remember what we were carrying and how much we were carrying. I remember the frantic atmosphere and the sense of desperation among the people at Lod. (I also remember the lovely El Al stewardesses who met every flight and gave every crew member a dozen red roses!) I remember the post mission recap where it was disclosed that the time from arrival at Lod until the ammunition was expended was eight hours. And I remember the FACT (my emphasis) that the vast majority of the Arab tanks destroyed were destroyed by Maverick and Tow anti tank missles, missles which were almost nonexistant in the prewar Israeli inventory.
I haven't really thought much about Operation Nickle Grass in the thirty years since but was amazed when I recently became aware of this apparent attempt to minimize the impact of this airlift. It is just not true and, frankly, is a bit irritating and insulting.

When a surprise attack caught Israel off guard on the Jews' holiest day, their situation became so desperate that they strongly considered their nuclear option as their only chance. Their only other choice was fast and massive aid from the US. With only four days of ammo left the Israelis were saved by the most massive airlift in history, bigger than the Berlin airlift.

Yet the Europeans, except for Portugal, refused to even let the US stop there to refuel- for fear of the Arab oil embargo, which they suffered anyway.

This was Kissenger's high point as he faced this problem while Viet Nam was winding down and Nixon was psychologically deteriorating from the Watergate affair. Russia was pushing troop involvement in their Arab allies and Kissinger pushed the US to a Def Con III nuclear alert, forcing the Soviets to back off.

Israeli leaders were bickering and finger pointing and lacked the cohesive focus that led them to such an overwhelming victory in 1967. Yet with the last minute support from the US the Israelis were able to commit their sparse remaining ammo and turn the impending defeat into another victory; even if it was a more humble success. The Arabs proved that Israel was not invincible and Sadat's leadership in the Arab world was established.

This story clarifies how fragile Israel's existence is and how important the support of the US is to it's survival. Only 25 years after the holocaust the Europeans were perfectly willing to let Israel be annihilated to protect their precious oil flow. It also provides a rare view into international diplomacy and how poor communication can take us to the brink of global catastrophe.

Boyne's narrative is clear and balanced. This is an excellent companion book to Michael Oren's wonderful "Six Days of War" about the 1967 Middle East war.

I read this book right after Oren's "6 Day War", which was spectacular in its coverage of the 1967 conflict, so much of this might be clouded by that juxtaposition. This book was an easy read but there were a couple of things that left me wanting more.

One minor but annoying aspect was that there was a serious lack of maps (and lack of detail on the maps that did exist). I'm not a historian, so when the author spends 3 pages detailing an offensive designed to take or defend a certain town or area, I'd like to see a map with that town on it. Also, it would be nice to have an index of maps so I don't have to flip pages looking for them. These concerns are minor, of course.

The author's coverage of the imminence of nuclear war became almost comical. I counted at least 10 times he wrote that a certain event "would lead the world to the brink of nuclear conflict" or something very similar, in very dramatic fashion. Then he devoted no more than 3 pages to the actual nuclear standoff in such a passing fashion that I found it hard to believe that was all there was to it. To me, the nuclear threat is one of the more interesting aspects to this war, and it became filler.

The only other criticism I would offer is that the book does not do a comprehensive job of detailing the end of the war or the aftermath, both of which are critical to understanding why that region is the way it is today. He does spend a considerable number of pages describing the Israeli defiance of the cease-fire, but not nearly enough time discussing how Kissenger finally got them to recognize it.

These are all minor criticisms of a book that's certainly worth the read. I was concerned that too much attention was going to be paid to the airlift itself, but thankfully this was nicely balanced.

This is a very interesting, well written account and in depth study of events not only surrounding the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but indeed covering much of what occurred on the battlefields of this conflict which was launched against the Jewish state during the most Holy period of it's calendar by Egypt, Syria and contingents from other Arab nations.

Much mention is made during this study of the failures of Israeli intelligence and the alleged `arrogance' of Israeli forces which prevented Israel from being totally prepared for the Arab onslaught, but I feel that some matters have not been given the attention that they deserve in relation to these issues.

The Sunday Times Insight Team in it's own study of the Yom Kippur War, reveals that shortly before the shooting began, the US told Israeli leaders (who were clearly aware of the Arab military build up and the potential of such an attack) in no uncertain terms that if Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against the assembled Arab forces, then the US would feel unable to supply fresh equipment which would surely be needed during the conflict's course.

The Sunday Times book includes the quote of US diplomatic sources that "...if Israel refrained from a pre-emptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, then America would feel morally obliged to help..."

-To make such a pivotal & formidable diplomatic statement and then blame Israel for allowing the Arab advance to occur sticks in my throat somewhat.

I cannot also agree with the comments about the Egypt & Syrian forces together with the other Arab contingents only intending to reach a certain boundary and then stop. I personally find this approach to be in ignorance of the Arab/Islamic mindset which existed not only at the time, but prior to the conflict and even to this day. At the time concerned no Arab national entity even acknowledged the mere right of the Jewish state to exist. This in itself should speak volumes.

I am also uncomfortable with the emphasis placed upon the assumption that without the US assistance, Israel would not have survived. Indeed, if as sections of the book imply, the Arab forces had only intended advancing to a predetermined area, then this possibility should not have even entered the equation.

Maybe Israel would have struggled to survive by conventional means and may have needed the nuclear option. This we will never know, but there seems to be some disregard of the parallel Russian airlift to the Arab nations and the massive military support provided by the Russians without which the Arabs would not have been able to pursue such an agenda in the first instance. To make assumptions and allegations about Israel in the midst of what seems to have been a political/diplomatic chess game of immense proportions seems unfair. Others might disagree.

Having said that, this is still an excellent study of the conflict. The examination of the intense diplomatic process in itself is commendable, as is the detail included in so many other areas. History will indeed show that the US was indeed the only nation not prepared to see the Jewish state `go under' at this crucial time in history, for which immense and eternal credit should be paid to the US for it's help and assistance. Being British and having served in the British military at the time concerned, this does not make me proud of my own nation's stance.

Despite having taken issue with some of the matters in this book I still highly recommend this as a valuable study to those interested in the Middle East. I highly recommend to interested parties another book on this conflict by Chaim Herzog entitled "War of Atonement" and also Chaim Herzog's "The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East". Thank you.

This is my fourth book I read on this war, and I actually learned a great deal more of the political battles in this book than in the previous books. There are a number of books which describe what happens militarily, but little which cover the politics of the war. This book fits the bill and describes how the American, Russian, Israeli, and Arabs had individual battles and combined this almost resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. Israeli generals and politicians were very divided and this almost resulted in the end of the Third Temple. Breshnev used language in letters to Nixon which resulted in US forces going on Def Com 3 alert. Arab leaders started the war with modest goals and came close to conquering Israel. The author does a good job of detailing all these little crisises.
This is a good solid read about the Yom Kippur War and the airlift which saved Israel. This is a good addition to your history library.

I bet this book was written under the working title "Operation Nickel Grass," the name of the American military operation to airlift supplies to Israel which arose virtually miraculously. Boyne describes this operation, which had to deliver goods "yesterday," very well and it made me, as an American, very proud. The vast majority of the book is about the rest of the Yom Kippur War and what led up to it; thus, I suspect, the title change. Boyne succeeds in presenting a very complex story, including explanations of Soviet instigations and diplomatic failures, and Henry Kissinger's diplomatic successes (both foreign and domestic). But the editing is a grave disappointment. A summary 25 year history of the region prior to the Yom Kippur war is placed as an appendix at the back of the book rather than as a prologue at the beginning, where the history belongs. Moshe Dayan, famous for having only ONE eye and a patch where his other eye had been, is described as having, during a perilous period, downcast "eyes." On one page a date about 2300 years ago is described as "B.C.E." (which means "before the common era" and is used by people who do not ascribe to the divinity of Jesus), while another date about 1950 years ago is described as "A.D." (which is Latin for "year of our Lord"); whereas "C.E." ("common era") is what is consistent with the use of B.C.E. Like many books about wars and battles, this book does not have nearly enough maps. Worst of all, the maps are positioned in all the wrong places. For example, a map showing Syrian thrusts at the very beginning of the war is placed near the end of book where the winding down of the war is described. So, I recommend the book, but keep in mind the editorial foul-ups.

Walter Boyne has struck gold again! He has expertly re-told the largely forgotten tale of the American aerial epic that sustained Israel during its time of greatest peril. This book fills a very visible gap in addressing the history of conflict in the Middle East. Col. Boyne expertly weaves and recreates the battlefield situation, international politics, and internal Arab-Israeli politics to illustrate the difficulties in establishing the largest airborne airlift since the Berlin Blockade. He skillfully intertwines the efforts of the lone, heretofore, unknown hero's with the actions of such renown personalities as Henry Kissinger and Golda Meir into a concise story that shows how close Israel came to defeat and how the American airlift staved off total disaster.

Col. Boyne's greatest contribution is pointing out how the efforts of a largely unknown USAF TALCE Commander established an efficient distribution system that eliminated chaos and increased efficiency. These actions ensured that ammunition and material supplies were offloaded from airlift aircraft and sent to the battlefield with minimum delay. Once again, Col. Boyne shows that it isn't necessarily the actions of the famous that ensures victory on the battlefield but it is usually the exploits of the unknown "little-people" that make the necessary sacrifices that determine the survival of nations.

...

The Yom Kippur war was a disaster for Isreal, a traumatic event that proved the hubris of the IDF and IAF as well as the folly of fixed line defense(alla Maginot line style). This book details the international cold war aspect of the war. It compiles good information about the respective militaries involved in the conflict and gives briefs on man yof the key Israeli and Arab actors. The most intriguing aspect of this read is its focus on the air left which it claims 'Saved Israel'. I've known American volunteers who went to Israel and helped unload the planes so the arms could be brought to the front as quickly as possible. The reader must decide how central a role the air lift played in the outcome of the war. The authors knowledge of military hardware is extensive and insightful. This book does not have the personal feel that Harzogs 'War of Atonement' does, nor is this book an in dept study of the military strategy and thoughts prior to and during the war. The author does touch on the controversial subject of Israels nuclear program and the questionable application of it.

Probably that is the most interesting new knowledge brought to fore in this book is its emphasis on the 'brink' of nuclear war between the super powers, something that other authors including Sharon and Adan have not discussed in thier respective autobiographies that detail the conflict.

this book is worth a read.

While the title of this piece talks about "the airlift that saved Israel" this book really comprises one of the best overall analyses of the 1973 Yom Kippur War that one is likely to find. Walter Boyne is best known for his writings on aviation topics (and there is plenty of that here) but where this book really shines is in its discussion of the personal and political dynamics of the war. Even for the reader who is familiar with the events of the 1973 War this piece is likely to be an eye-opener. More than any book I have yet come across, Walter Boyne explains what was going on in Kremlin circles, infighting within the Israeli military and cabinet, and how Watergate affected the US response to events. Boyne explains with clarity what the Arab objectives in the war really were, and with such explanations many issues that may have seemed puzzling in fact make sense.

Highlights of the book (there are many) include Boyne's explanation of how Henry Kissinger usurped presidential power by in fact causing the US military to go to Defcon 3, why this occurred, and how the Kremlin reacted to it. Throughout the book, Boyne provides the reader with insightful analysis of Soviet politics, and how Brezhnev used the crisis to cement his position as the sole power in the Politburo.

None of the above takes away from the story of the US airlift to Israel, without which the Israelis would have faced disaster or, alternatively, having to resort to atomic weapons. One area I would have liked to see Boyne focus on more was how the possible Israeli "nuclear option" factored into these events.

This piece is written with clarity and insight. While full of information, it is an easy read that is in fact hard to put down. Highly recommended. RJB.