U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran [Hardcover]

Mark Gasiorowski (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 1991

Mark Gasiorowski here examines the cliency relationship that existed between the United States and Iran during the reign of the late shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and assesses the effects of this relationship on Iran's domestic politics. Gasiorowski argues that by bolstering the shah's repressive regime in the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S.-Iran cliency relationship indirectly helped bring about the Iranian revolution.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 264 pages
• Publisher: Cornell Univ Pr; 1St Edition edition (May 1991)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801424127
• ISBN-13: 978-0801424120
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.2 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 11.2 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #3,332,214 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Best historical overview of 1953 coup available, December 14, 2004

By 

Joseph Havermann "pythag3" (Columbia, Missouri) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Hardcover)

Mark Gasiorowski is a scholar of modern Iranian history who is widely regarded -- accurately, in all likelihood -- as the foremost expert on the US/UK coup ousting Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq and the National Front from power and installing the Shah as dictator. (Of course the Shah's control over the Iranian state was tenuous at first, but he consolidated his power over the years while receiving Western support.) Gasiorowski is best known for his groundbreaking article "The 1953 Coup in Iran," and this book is filled with useful, supplemental information, based largely on interviews he conducted with former CIA agents involved with the coup or who had experience in Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution.

Gasiorowski's approach is critical, though in my view, not nearly critical enough. One is left with the distinct impression that the relationships he has formed over the years with former CIA agents have tainted his scholarly objectivity; he wants to be critical, but limits himself to arguments that endorse a hands-off approach to American interventionism as the more pragmatic way to pursue the goals of elite policymakers. Gasiorowski views client states as a legitimate feature of the international system and suggests that cliency can actually encourage democracy (citing W. Germany as an example). This seems to ignore the fact that in a cliency relationship, the policies and form of government in client-state B depends heavily on the whims of policymakers in patron-state A. If policymakers in patron state A perceive it to be in their self-interest to promote a military regime, they will promote a military regime; if, on the other hand, they believe the stabilizing features of a multiparty legislature outweigh the threats posed by policies that contradict their economic and strategic interests, they will support a multiparty legislature. The cliency relationship is fundamentally undemocratic.

Also troubling is the dismissive and misleading critique of left-wing critics who emphasize the importance of economic incentives behind the 1953 coup. To be sure, there are many people on the left (e.g., William Blum) who ingore the strategic thinking of Cold War policymakers, but anyone with a familiarity with the declassified history must acknowledge the important role of support for private enterprise in shaping American foreign policy. Support for American corporations is casually listed as a foreign policy goal alongside containment of Soviet influence. In fact, the position of American policymakers towards Iran largely reflected the position of American oil executives: at first they pressed the British to accept a fifty-fifty resolution to the oil crisis, and then sought to undermine Mossadeq politically after he nationalized Iranian oil. Gasiorowski insists that American policymakers were exclusively interested in fighting Soviet influence. From what I can tell, this view comes largely from his interviews with people who were responsible for implementing policy on the ground, rather than the people in charge of creating that policy -- all of whom have a vested interest in framing their actions in terms of ideological opposition to the Soviet Union, rather than crass self-interest, anyway.

Nevertheless, Gasiorowski's book is thorough, easy to read, well-organized, and includes important information based on original research. It deserves four stars.