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U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience

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"U.S. Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience" was published in 2003 to provide historical perspective to the United States in light of the British experience in invading Iraq during World War I and its policy in Iraq in the aftermath of that conflict. While the question may now seem to be beside the point, I believe this book is still valuable background in understanding Iraq, evaluating U.S. policy and administration in Iraq since 2003, and also understanding Iraq going forward from 2009.

This volume is quite short and is more a booklet than a book. The main topics discussed in some detail in the book's four main sections include the Shia revolt in 1920, the dangers of relying on tribal leaders for stability, the manner in which state formation institutionalized Sunni rule and Shia marginalization, the permanence of the "Kurdish issue" (yes, the Kurdish leader even then was named Barzani), what went right and what went wrong in British administration, the British use of air power, and the experience of developing a new national military.

The conclusion lays out the following points as lessons learned:

- A significant period of foreign rule will lead to unnecessary unrest (Paul Bremer is a case study in historical ignorance in this regard)
- Encourage decentralization (not sure I agree with this, and the post-2003 experience has not borne this out)
- Break the nexus between minority rule and the cycle of instability and repression by making sure all elements of the society are included in government (the U.S. did properly follow this advice)
- The Iraqi people should choose their own leaders, a lesson from the resentment of Britain's foisting of Faisal on them (after a delay, the U.S. has done this post-2005)
- Beware of the short-term benefits of building security based on tribal sheikhs who under the British abused their power and whose undue power led to instability (this has indeed helped the U.S. enormously in fighting al-Qaeda, but the Awakening/Sahwa system could yet come unglued and fulfill this warning)
- The military: bar the Iraqi military from meddling in politics, form a professional officer core and ensure political neutrality (this has been partially achieved; the military has been kept out of politics, but politics has not been kept out of the security services, especially in the provinces)

For all that went wrong under British administration in Iraq, the book points out some things they did right. The relative quiet after the 1920 rebellion was due to the fact that the British did institute good discipline among its forces and largely ensured that they didn't commit abuses or bother the population. Their use of air power was also quite efficient at minimizing the British "footprint," minimizing costs and maintaining stability.

There are a couple of lessons that do shine through from this period which are still very relevant in 2009 going forward:
One, among the Shia, the memory of the 1920 rebellion and how it turned the British against them has been instrumental in persuading most that they needed to work with U.S.-led foreign forces. The main exception here are the Sadrists, who have their own idiosyncratic, tormented history, but most both religious and secular have focused on engagement with the political system and the establishment of legitimate institutional rule.

Two, among the Sunnis, the historical background is helpful for outsiders in understanding their worldview. They have ruled Iraq for centuries; first under the Ottomans, then under the British, then under the Baath. Sunni identity and pan-Arab ideology have become fused to give Sunni Iraqis a strong commitment to central power and - among many - a sympathy for the symbols of the old regime that go beyond material self-interest. Sunnis didn't just lose financial privileges when the Baath fell; many lost who they were. And it is precisely due to this identification that many Shia have been so reluctant to trust letting Sunnis with even a whiff of a Baathist past into government.