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46 of 46 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Excellent Look into the Dynamics of Carrier Warfare, December 10, 2007
This review is from: USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific, 1942 (Duel) (Paperback)
The epic duel in the Pacific Ocean in 1942 between the carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Kido Butai (Mobile Force) and the carriers of the United States Navy makes for dramatic history and this story is told with great verve and insight by Commander (ret.) Mark Stille. USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers is the sixth volume in Osprey's new Duel series and readers need not fear that this is a repackaging of material from other Campaign and New Vanguard series titles. Rather, this volume provides a fresh look at four carrier vs. carrier battles (Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz) in 1942, fought when the odds were fairly even and in the context of two rival weapon systems. Both the graphics and text were highly engaging and I would strongly recommend this volume for readers interested in the Second World War in the Pacific.
The initial section on design and development focuses on carrier doctrine, carrier design and carrier construction programs for both the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Herein, the author notes that the U.S. carriers were aided by earlier introduction of air-search radar, heavier anti-aircraft armament, better damage control and larger air wings. On the other hand, the Japanese opted for smaller aircraft with longer range, but otherwise the author views their carriers as generally inferior technically to their main U.S. counterparts. Color plan forms of the USS Enterprise and the IJN Zuikaku are included. The Strategic Situation section outlines the U.S. Navy's vulnerabilities after Pearl Harbor and the effort to mass a sufficient number of carriers to oppose the Kido Butai at a favorable moment. In the technical specifications section, the author details the U.S. Lexington and Yorktown class carriers, as well as the F-4F Wildcat fighter, the SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bomber, the TBD-1 Devastator and TBF-1 Avenger torpedo bombers for the U.S.N., and the 6 fleet and 4 light carriers for the IJN.
The well-written section on combatants discusses each sides' command personnel, naval aviators and anti-aircraft gunnery. Here the author notes that the U.S.N. was actually more selective in pre-war pilot training than the IJN, which found 90 percent of its aircrew from the enlisted ranks. Only 22 percent of U.S. naval aviators in 1942 had more than two year's flying experience. The author provides full-page plates on Vice-Admiral Nagumo and Rear-Admiral Fletcher, and a half-page each on aviators Lieutenant Richard Best (Dauntless pilot from USS Enterprise who bombed Akagi at Midway) and Lieutenant Tomonaga Joichi (Kate pilot from Hiryu who almost torpedoed Yorktown).
The 18-page section on combat sequentially covers the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. Although the Japanese made costly mistakes in the first two battles, he notes that they increased the size of their fighter wings and added radar to their carriers, which enhanced their performance in the last two battles. This section also has a color battle scene, depicting Ensign George Gay floating in the water, watching the destruction of Akagi, Kaga and Soryu. The real meat in this volume is the 5-page section on statistics and analysis, which lays out the results of these four battles. While Midway was a clear U.S. victory and Eastern Solomons was a draw, the author views Coral Sea and Santa Cruz as costly Japanese tactical victories. He notes that of the 6 U.S. carriers committed in the Pacific in 1942, 4 were sunk, versus 6 of 10 for the Japanese (plus nearly every one of the survivors was damaged in 1942 - a tough year on carriers). The author makes several key points: (a) the Japanese had superior offensive anti-ship capabilities based upon their superior Type 91 air-launched torpedo -"in every 1942 battle, once an American carrier was torpedoed, it was eventually sunk," (b) the USN had persistent problems coordinating multi-carrier air group attacks in 1942 and Midway was the lucky exception, (c) the Japanese improved their air-search techniques after Midway and were not surprised again and (d) the U.S. continued operating single-carrier task forces throughout 1942 - which weakened their offensive and defensive capabilities - but was gradually moving toward multi-carrier task forces. The author concludes that both sides learned a great deal from these four carrier battles, but only the USN had the resources to build and train large carrier strike groups. Japan struggled to replace its losses from 1942, but was forced to convert merchant ships into carriers and its pilot training program could only produce a trickle of trained pilots. On the other hand, the U.S. mass-produced both the excellent Essex-class carriers and thousands of new pilots. The result was that the one carrier battle after 1942 - the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 - was a decisive victory for the USN, which finally resolved the carrier vs. carrier duel for control of the Pacific.
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23 of 26 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Clear, Concise, Insightful, March 19, 2008
This review is from: USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific, 1942 (Duel) (Paperback)
Before 1942, US naval doctrine was dominated by the battleship. After Japan's Pearl Harbor air raid, the US Navy was forced to rely primarily on carrier operations.
Mark Stille's "USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific 1942" is a concise, clearly written analysis of these naval forces and their operations.
In "Design and Development", Cmdr Stille presents the carrier doctrine, design, and construction used by the US Navy and IJN. Both navies realized that destroying the enemy's aircraft carriers was the first goal, before the enemy battle fleet could be attacked.
The US Navy maintained that their entire air group must be launched at one time, and designed its carriers with this goal in mind. US Navy carriers had to be fast enough to keep up with the fleet and large enough to handle powerful four squadron air groups. The defensive armor was deemed not as important as having numerous, effective anti-aircraft guns.
Cmdr. Stille, also author of USN Cruiser vs IJN Cruiser: Guadacanal 1942 (Duel), explains that the IJN required aircraft and ships that were designed for very long- range operations.
Unlike the US Navy, the IJN concentrated carriers for mutual protection and for mass concentration of air groups. "In general, Japanese carrier design stressed speed and aircraft capacity."
The IJN circumvented the Washington Naval Treaty, "during the 1930s, by creating a shadow fleet of merchant ships and auxiliaries designed to be easily converted into carriers during the war."
In "The Strategic Situation", the author successfully makes the case how Japan, during the first six months of the war was "able to focus massive amounts of airpower on a single objective, combined with its extremely high quality aircraft and air crews."
The author states, "the Americans began a series of carrier raids against Japanese held islands to keep the Japanese off balance and to show them that they alone could not dictate the place and timing of combat across the vast Pacific theatre."
In "The Combatants", we learn that both navies began the war with many senior aviators, but no fleet commanders with aviation experience. Out of necessity, these carrier task force commanders were given much independence to successfully carry out their operations.
Cmdr Stille also discusses the difference in training programs for the two navies. The US Navy was able to train a huge force of flyers by accepting college graduates for flight training and making them reserve officers upon graduation.
After basic flight training, Japanese pilots spent a year learning combat flying after reaching their combat squadrons. Once the war began, it was hard to find time for training large numbers of replacements, resulting in many poor combat pilots.
The author correctly states, "While the Japanese struggled to rebuild their carrier force and train new air crews, the US Navy had essentially reinvented itself by 1944. A new generation of aircraft manned by well- trained pilots, combined with improvements in shipboard air defenses made US fast carrier task forces largely immune to conventional air attack. The effectiveness of this defensive capability forced the Japanese to rely on night attacks and eventually on Kamikaze or suicide aircraft."
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14 of 15 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Osprey's USN-IJN Carriers 'Duel' Scores a Direct Hit!, June 27, 2008
This review is from: USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers: The Pacific, 1942 (Duel) (Paperback)
Thus far my exposure to Osprey 'Duel' titles has been minimal; two titles. I rate my experience as one miss (P-51 vs. FW 190) and one hit (Firefly vs. Tiger). Mark Stille's volume on U. S. and Japanese carriers however is definitely another hit and stands as an example of what the series can/should be.
Stille reviews the history and development of U.S. and Japanese carriers from their early beginnings, culminating in the four crucial engagements in 1942. His book is almost a primer on the subject, clearly and concisely examining each part of the equation - philosophy/doctrine, ship design, aircraft design, training, etc. - before bringing all the elements together in his descriptions of those aforementioned battles. (I would have liked a bit more on U.S./Japanese attack tactics but that's just me).
Other would-be 'Duel' authors should peruse Stille's book before setting pen to paper. The book reads wonderfully well, distilling down such a huge topic into an 80-page paperback. The photographs, charts, graphs and maps - some of which made especially for this volume - are all quite useful in helping the reader understand the subject.
Bottom line: a super job, well worth the $17.95 price tag. I only hope other 'Duel' titles are as good. Highly recommended.
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