Customer Reviews

Ulysses S. Grant: The Unlikely Hero (Eminent Lives)

5 star:		(7)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(6)
1 star:		(6)

 

 

This is a tiny book that one can easily read in a few hours, apparently intended for those (90%) of the current US population for whom the name of Ulysses Grant is unrecognizable. And as usual for a British author writing about American history, many of the facts are wrong and he feels compelled to compare Grant and his other American examples to British figures like Churchill, Wellington and Montgomery.

That being said, this would be a reasonable book to give a 8th grader to hopefully interest him in American history. The writing is crisp and the prose flows easily.

Author Korda essentially relies on two (count 'em, TWO) sources for most of his work; the highly controversial McFeely with its many errors and the 1928 work by Woodward. It does not seem as though Korda read Grant's superb autobiography, but he presents a very sympathetic portrait of Grant that might inspire further interest in his subject.

The best parts of the book are the author's depiction of Grant's childhood, his personal bravery, rock-solid marriage, liberal attitudes (at a time when the Republicans were liberal and the Democrats conservative), and the close of his life when he wrote his autobiography. It is well-known that Grant was an abject business failure, putting the interests of others over his own, and showing a great deal of undeserved trust and loyalty. Although Grant was an extreme example of a military man unable to function as a civilian businessman, one should remember that others such as Patton, Eisenhower, Pershing, Lee etc, were never so tested. An uncommonly brave man, Grant saw and understood the tragedies of war and in spite of personal feelings was able to do his duty to the best of his abilities.

Author Korda mentions one of Grant's problems that has been overlooked by almost all historians and needs reinforcement. Grant suffered frequently from debilitating migraine headaches, even almost missing Appromattox as a result. Grant needed his wife or Rawlins when he was incapacitated by a headache, and they kept him isolated in a darkened tent or room until the headache ran its course. Literally all of these episodes were recorded as Grant being drunk or sleeping off a hangover. The incidence of Grant's drinking was probably a small fraction of what was reported, if at all. It must be remembered that at the time, drinking was not considered as bad as having a mental disorder (like having frequent migraine headaches) and Grant himself apparently used drunkenness as a reason for his incapacitation rather than mentioning his headaches.

As far as judging Grant as a military commander or President, this book is simply inadaquate in scope to support the author's conclusions. Nonetheless, he does not miss a reasoned and defensible scholarly analysis by far. Grant did very well in the Civil War, displaying excellent strategic and tactical sense, and a firm understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of his opponents. At Belmont he was only forced to withdraw when his green troops fell away to plunder the Confederate camp, and his campaigns against Fort Donelson and Vicksburg did not offer much opportunity for criticism. He avoided defeat at Shiloh, won easily at Chattanooga, and was the Federal General to finally bring Lee to bay.

Historians have severely criticized his long casualty list in the 1864 campaign against Lee, but it must be remembered that Meade was in tactical command of the Army of the Potomac, not Grant. An often overlooked item was Grant's elimination of prisoner exchanges. Those exchanges worked to the disadvantage of the Federals due to their numerical superiority. Grant's decision was also more humane; as he said, otherwise the only way to deny the Confederates its soldiers would be to kill them (thus raising battle deaths on both sides.)

As President, Grant was a calming influence, and he did forestall another war with England over Canada. This is an episode overlooked by historians, but Palmerston had once thought of offering Canada to the US in return for recognizing the Confederacy and Canada was definitely in play. Following the Civil War there was a great deal resentment against England for aiding the Confederacy and meddling in US internal affairs, and war over Canada could have easily resulted. Yes, financial scandals rocked Grant's terms of office, but there were also many positive things that Grant contributed. Unfortunately, scandals are much more popular among writers wishing to sell books. A modern reader must surely understand that.

There are many mistakes in the book that are jarring. George B. McClellan is repeatedly given as McClennan and the author makes statements such as; "No American ex-president had ever fallen so low, and except for Harding and Nixon, none would ever again." Well, sorry to say, Harding died in office and would never become an ex-president. Also saying that "...MacArthur can be thought of as a latter-day McClellan,..." is simply ludicrous. And finally, is it required for a writer to include a criticism of Bush "(...a sentiment that might usefully have been followed 133 years later by President George W. Bush)" to get good reviews from the media? Ok, I get it!! You hate Bush! Now can we please produce a scholarly historical work of times and personnel before the 21th century without making negative comments about Bush?

I finished the little book conflicted over this author's reasonable and sympathetic presentation of a much-loved American hero of the 19th century but containing his condescending British Empire attitude and contemporary political opinions. In short, the author lost my good offices at the end. I can readily see why this book is rated from 1 to 5 stars. It all depends on the reader, so I compromised with three.

I had looked forward to gaining new insights into Grant, particularly about his two presidential terms, from this book. Unfortunately, the book reads, as another reviewer said, like a high school term paper. In my opinion, it should have received a low mark. First, there are factual errors. For example, the author is confused as to which General Smith served under General Butler and in suggesting that Sheridan's ride around Lee's army was part and parcel with his scorched-earth campaign in the Shenandoah valley. These do not give me much confidence regarding the quality of scholarship for the rest of the book.

Secondly, I don't think that the book does a good job of supporting many of its conclusions. For example, while admittedly more a matter of opinion, the book characterizes Grant's military strategy as one of attrition, largely ignoring both the political subtexts and the actual elements of Grant's strategy to bring the war to conclusion. There is a rather naïve discussion of General Butler's political standing and none as to why it was politically expedient to leave him in his command during the 1864 election, a decision with tremendous and disastrous impact on the campaign against Richmond and the army of Northern Virginia. There is no discussion of Bank's efforts in Texas, or of the initial failures of Hunter's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley although all of these were elements of or affected Grant's strategic vision. There is no discussion as to why Grant chose to move on Lee's right rather than his left - certainly an issue that would give the reader an insight into Grant's ability to integrate both military and political variables into his campaign strategy.

All in all a jejune, disappointing book not worth the candle.

I was given the uncorrected proof of this book to read.
It's an easy read and one can get through it in a day.
Some of the info is not surprising and others are general mistakes.
Some of his comparisons of Grant to present figures is interesting and some are not at all understandable.
Sometimes you wonder where Mr. Korda is coming from with his information.
Some of the things he has Grant doing while President seems to be added to the story to shock people.
Careful study can find the action he gave Grant was actually done by Lincoln which he mentions briefly.
His notations of Grant being innocent of alot of the corruption in his administration is true.
Grant had a great admirable quality which was loyalty.
But it was loyalty to a fault. What I mean by this is, if you were his friend, you could do no wrong. He was blinded by the friendship and could not believe that a friend or family member could be corrupt or try to stab him in the back.
His statements of Grant hating Custer during the war is not true as well.
Custer was one of his best cavalry commanders who won victories for him.
He didn't hate Custer for taking the surrender table from the McClean home after the surrender because General Sheridan bought the table from McClean and gave it to Custer as a gift to Mrs. Custer.
Grant knew this and wasn't upset over a legit purchase.
He distain for Custer didn't come until 1875 when Custer testified against the Indian Ring which also named Grant's corrupt friends and family, his brother Orville, of scamming the soldiers, civilians, and Indians who did business with post sutlers.
If tyou wish to read the best book on Grant, purchase his own autobiography.

I lost interest in the book, and thought it lost all credibility, when three times on one page (p.62) the book referred to a General McClennan, instead of McClellan. Inexcusable for a major publisher.

This is a pop biography not up to basic historical standards. It is a quick overview with as much attention to suggested modern parallels (often in movies) as to the historical situation of the topic. The authoer often makes sweeping generalizations which are unsubstantiated (even countered by some historians). From reading other Grant bios one can see places where Korda simply misses some things.
The book is nicely written and engaging. It will provde you a brief overview of Grant, but don't take it as authoritative.

Military history is often a tragedy the first time around and a farce when it repeats, as this perceptive book makes abundantly clear in outlining and assessing the career of America's greatest general.

Fans of Robert E. Lee may well argue about the "greatest", the blunt fact is that Grant understood Lee better than Lee understood Grant. Korda makes the point again and again that Grant, except on rare occasions, was able to correctly assess battlefield conditions and quickly exploit every indication of weakness.

Grant was bitterly criticized as a butcher, similar to Gen. George "Blood and Guts" Patton in World War II. Veterans of Patton's armies have told me Patton's success was based on "his guts, our blood". But I've yet to meet anyone who regrets having served with Patton. The same is true of Grant; good soldiers always praise a general who wins, dead soldiers don't complain.

Grant understood that victory meant killing enough soldiers to make the Confederate states quit. He understood the war was won at Gettysburg; just as Gen. Dwight Eisenhower knew World War II was won in Normandy. The tragic legacy of Grant is that too many generals since then have copied his "butcher" qualities without understanding his tactical brilliance; thus the appalling slaughter of World War I.

Grant was the perfect American success story; literally a "barefoot" buy who rose to command the armies of the nation and then serve two terms in the White House. He was also the "perfect" American because of his absolute trust in the essential goodness, decency and honesty of others; politicians and business people took cynical and unlimited advantage of these qualities, which left his administration mired in the deep stink of scandal.

In war, Gen. Grant faced one massive task -- victory. Everything was directed to one goal. In peace, President Grant as a politician faced a thousand simultaneous large and petty challenges, something he was never able to handle. His astounding successes were two great single-minded challenges; the war, and writing his autobiography as he was dying of cancer. Facing these two great challenges, he succeeded brilliantly.

The contrast with today's politicians could not be more dramatic. Grant was instinctively drawn to the sound of the guns fired in anger; too many of today's politicians, who blithely send others to war which they cleverly avoid themselves, have never hear a shot fired in anger let alone a voice raised in anger in the White House.

This book, and the story of Grant, is vividly relevant in today's politics. Everyone who reads it will understand at least some of the fundamentals of success, of America's greatest general and the current military incompetence that has led to another quagmire.

This is one of two brief biographies of Grant (1822-1885) I recently read, the other written by Josiah Bunting III which is part of Times Books' "The American Presidents" series, with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. serving as general editor. Although both Korda and Bunting cover much of the same material, there are significant differences between their respective approaches to the18th president of the United States.

For example, Bunting clearly disagrees with, indeed resents the fact that Grant is generally remembered "as a general, not a president, [which] explains in part the condescension - there is no better word for it -- from which pundits and historians have tended to write of him." Bunting asserts that if judged by the consequences of Grant's common sense, judgment, and intuition, his presidency, "so far from being one of the nation's worst, may yet be seen as one of the best."

Korda indicates no inclination to view Grant's presidency as "one of the best." He duly acknowledges the problems which awaited Grant after he was elected to his first term in 1869. "What did Grant's reputation as a president in, however, (and continues to do so today whenever journalists and historians are drawing up lists of the best presidents vs. the worst ones), was the depression of 1873, which ushered in a long period of unemployment and distress, made politically more damaging by accusations that the president's wealthy friends were making money out of it." Given that the United States was growing too fast, in too many different directions at once, and the inevitable consequence was corruption and an unstable economy, "it would have taken a more astute man than Grant to slow things down or clean them up."

This last observation by Korda is consistent with a contemporary assessment of Grant by the Edinburgh Review, one which Brooks Simpson quotes in his own study (Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction 1861-1868), and which Bunting also cites: "To bind up the wounds left by the war, to restore concord to the still distracted Union, to ensure real freedom to the Southern Negro, and full justice to the southern white; these are indeed tasks which might tax the powers of Washington himself or a greater than Washington, if such a man is to be found."

In his Epilogue, Korda explains that he wrote this book because, from time to time, "it is necessary to remind Americans about Grant, first of all because his is a kind of real-life Horatio Alger story, exactly the one that foreigners have always wanted to believe about American life...and that Americans want to believe about themselves." Yes, his presidency was severely flawed but as a general, Grant "defined for all time the American way of winning a war": It must have an essentially moral base to earn and sustain the full support of the American people, it must take full advantage of its great industrial strength and depth of manpower, and it must apply aggressively - without hesitation -- all of its resources to achieve the ultimate military objective, total victory.

However, Korda suggests that any politician contemplating the use of military force should first consider lessons which Grant learned from failed Reconstruction initiatives in the South: "armies of occupation are no substitute for political thought, and that generals are not be necessarily the right people to institute basic political reforms or to reconstruct society."

It remains for others much better qualified than I am to comment on the relevance of that statement to America's current military involvement in various parts of the world. However, I greatly appreciate Korda's attempt to provide a balanced view of Grant in terms of his character, talents, and values...all of which served him so well on the battlefield but which proved insufficient to the political challenges which he encountered later as the 18th president of the United States.

Those who share my high regard for this volume are urged to check out Bunting's biography as well as Grant's Personal Memoirs.

This is one of the weakest Presidential biographies I have ever encountered. It reads, at times, like a high school or college research paper, loaded with personal opinion from the author when it is facts I was seeking. Constant references comparing Grant to Napolean, Ike, FDR, and various 20th century leaders is annoying. I noticed two "between the lines" references comparing the current US president disfavorably with Grant. One example of the references that drove me crazy;(page 121) "The line the Clinton people threw at George Bush pere in the 1992 election campaign might have been aimed with equal effect at Grant: "It's the economy, stupid."" George Bush "pere"? Good thing I had high school french.

The only redeeming quality is that the book is short, and if you wanted a quick read on President Grant this is the one. However, be prepared to experience a book chock full of cute and annoying associations.

Michael Korda's biography of Ulysses S. Grant is remarkably spare, a mere 158 pages in a compact 6 x 9 page format no less.

But in those few pages, Korda paints a picture of greatness. Perhaps it is to the lasting credit of Grant that his life could be painted in broad strokes with only selected details.

Grant was a youth with few outstanding qualities aside from horsemanship. A mediocre student, he attends West Point, fights in the war with Mexico and is essentially cashiered from the Army.

He spends years in obscurity until the Civil War where his true and natural calling as a leader of men and great armies becomes evident.

He becomes President not so much from poiitical ambition, but from a desire for a job. Korda makes it clear that while not one of the very greatest Presidents, Grant deserves more credit than he has gotten.

Grant comes across as a great man, a great American, from a time when natural genius could flourish, rather than be buried in our credential happy society. A very worthwhile read.

Jerry

Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), says Michael Korda, was an "unlikely hero."

He was, writes Korda, "thin-skinned, sensitive, and burdened with the inferiority complex of a boy who had been brought up by harsh and distant parents, made fun of at school, been passed over for promotion in the army, failed at every attempt to make money or improve his situation, and eventually settled into life as a clerk in his father's store and the town drunk until the Civil War came along and saved him."

The author portrays Grant as one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest, of American military leaders. And while Grant was one of our weaker presidents, says Korda, he succeeded in keeping the nation at peace during troubled times.

The book discusses Grant's years at West Point, his service in the Mexican War, his marriage to Julia Dent, and the birth of their four children: Frederick, Ulysses Junior, Nellie, and Jesse.

Grant was born on April 27, 1822, in Point Pleasant, Ohio. In May 1860, after the dismal failure of numerous business enterprises, he moved to Galena, Illinois, and accepted a clerkship in his father's leather store. He died on July 23, 1885, at Mt. McGregor, New York, only a week or so before completing his monumental Memoirs.

Of course, the main reason we are still fascinated with Grant today is because of his military genius in the horrific conflict of the Civil War. Korda points out that nearly 625,000 Americans were killed in the Civil War, compared to 400,000 in World War II and 58,000 in Vietnam.

Korda follows Grant from Fort Henry (on the Tennessee River), Fort Donelson (on the Cumberland River), Shiloh (Pittsburg Landing), Vicksburg, Chattanooga (Missionary Ridge), Cold Harbor, the siege of Petersburg, and his pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia to Appomattox Court House, the venue of Gen. Robert E. Lee's surrender.

Grant saw clearly (as did Lincoln) that the only way to win the war was to keep pounding away relentlessly and doggedly at the enemy. On Feb. 16, 1862, he sent a stern missive to Gen. S. B. Buckner, commander of Fort Donelson (near Dover, Tennessee): "No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

On May 11, 1864, in "the Wilderness" near Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia, Grant sent a dispatch to Washington: "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

And on Aug. 1, 1864, writing from City Point, Virginia, Grant sent this dispatch to Gen. Henry W. Halleck: "Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also."

Although Grant's presidency was embroiled in scandal, Korda insists that Grant was honest to a fault, but too naive and trusting of others. Grant emerges as a decent, honorable, and likable man. And Korda's concise biography of Grant should appeal even to those who are not Civil War buffs.

A final point should be emphasized. Korda's assessment of Grant is constantly compared to the leaders of World War II and to the present war in the Middle East ("Operation Iraqi Freedom"). The latter comparison is inferred rather than explicit, but Korda's meaning is unmistakable.

Grant left some important words of wisdom for us today, imploring us to resist the arrogant encroachments of a theocratic fundamentalism: "Leave the matter of religion to the family altar, the church, and the private school, supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the church and the state forever separate."

Ulysses S. Grant: The Unlikely Hero launches the Eminent Lives Series from HarperCollins. Forthcoming volumes include studies of Alexander the Great, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de Tocqueville, William Shakespeare, Ludwig van Beethoven, and Sigmund Freud.

Roy E. Perry of Nolensville (rperry1778@aol.com) is an advertising copywriter at a Nashville publishing house.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Michael Korda, who served in the British armed forces, is editor-in-chief of Simon & Schuster and the author of Charmed Lives, Another Life, Horse People, and several best-selling novels. He lives with his wife, Margaret, in upstate New York.