Customer Reviews

Uncertain Glory: Lee's Generalship Re-Examined

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Mr Hallsey is too generous is his review of this book. McKenzie would have us believe this is a serious treatment of a serious issue. Wrong! McKenzie fails miserably to support his assertions with probably this and probably that chapter after chapter. To re-examine Lee's career, we really do not need a play-by-play of every battle. A direct approach to Lee's faults and detailed evidence of such would have served the purpose. Instead the reader is given a flimsy statement and referred to footnotes. One footnote citation is not even listed with the footnotes - I had to check the bibliography to find the full title of that reference. Lee's victories at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville are taken from him by this faux historian while he fawns over the immortal Jackson. Historical context is ignored or twisted in McKenzie's stories of Confederate Command failures and the retention of Lee in command over his own proposed resignations. Additionally, the book has inexcusable typos - the aftermath of the Seven Days left the armies EAST of Richmond, not west. The publisher, Hippocrene Books, should be ashamed of itself to put out this shoddy product at such an outrageous price.

Comical is the best word to describe John D. McKenzie's book Uncertain Glory. It should be considered a work of creative fiction and not a serious history book. The research is shallow, the review is cursory and assumptions are never fully developed. The accuracy in the book is also in question since on page 254 Mr. McKenzie has the battle of the crater taking place on "July 30, 1964." This book could have been a remarkable treatise had any serious time been spend exploring artillery placement, troop deployment and southern economic conditions. It would have also been useful to use the opinions of modern military experts to bolster his position. Having studied the Civil War seriously for many years, I find the book to be bankrupt of any serious historical fact (that has not already been discussed) is not worth serious academic consideration.

This volume takes on a critical orientation toward the generalship of Robert E. Lee during the Civil War. This is an issue that provokes strong arguments on both sides. McKenzie's book takes a rather simplistic perspective, but it raises useful points.

First off, one cannot ignore the typos (e.g., an interesting spelling of Pennsylvania). The book appears to have been rather poorly copy edited. Second, the writing style is adequate, but certainly not compelling.

Third, analysis of battles is sometimes a bit confusing and not as clear as it could be.

But, fourth, there is an argument herein that needs to be taken seriously. For instance, one of the most useful things that the author does is enumerate Confederate and Union casualties (and the ratio of casualties to total forces present). From the Seven Days through Gettysburg, if one examines the "butcher's bill," Lee bled his army badly. His forces suffered about as many casualties as did Union forces. If the author's figures are accurate, from the Seven Days through Gettysburg, somewhere around 76,000 Confederate casualties and 80,000 Union casualties had occurred. Given that the Confederate forces had fewer troops and a much smaller manpower pool to call upon to replace casualties, this suggests a real problem. Did Lee misuse his smaller forces? McKenzie certainly argues so. On the other hand, Lee's defenders would context this explanation. Nonetheless, the cold numbers game raises interesting questions.

Again, the arguments tend to be rather simplistic in this volume, but they do raise useful and interesting questions about Lee's generalship.

While perhaps not an exhaustive treatment of Lee's Generalship, this book is an invaluable resource to anyone wishing to read about Lee's tenure with the Confederacy. The book is detailed, and well sourced, backed up with statistics. It lacks the grand element of a work like Freeman's, but also avoids the Lost Cause mythology so prevalent in most works about Lee. It manages to argue its point, while maintaining a style accessible to someone not overly familiar with the history of the American Civil War. It's certainly worth reading, and it also doubles as a fairly decent, condensed history of the Civil War.

I agree with the criticisms submitted. The book is an analysis of Lee's generalship. It suffers from the absence of Lee's personal account. As a result, a lot of conjecturing and second guessing occurs. The first hand research documenting and supporting his arguments is not as rigorous.

Having said that I still think it is worthwhile reading. It does offer an alternative view of Lee's leadership. His theme is not a new one. Even Burke Davis had remarked on the apotheosis of Lee after the war. The book examines Lee's field decisions and style of command. By emphasizing the difference between strategic and tactical issues as well as examining patterns of Lee's tactical decisions, it increased my appreciation of some of the nuances in troop placement and topography. For amateur history buffs of the civil war, it is a worthwhile read especally since my local library has a copy. Would I buy it? probably not the hardcover edition.

No one will ever accuse John D. McKenzie of writing a crowd pleaser. This is a very poorly written piece of literature. However, books like this are healthy and McKenzie's effort needs to be applauded.

Most books on the Civil War were written by Southerners. As such they attempt to explain away the obvious, like why the Confederacy failed so very miserably. The general theme in traditional Southern writing is that the best of breed was in the South. The South was on superior moral high ground and had the best, most intelligent people. But this position presents a bit of a conundrum: If Southerners were so superior, why did they start this fight in the first place when by their own admission the North had more of everything?

McKenzie's book represents the start of a good trend in Civil War literature. Both sides fought hard, both had incredible successes and both had amazing blunders. Gods did not fight this war, men did. And all of the men engaged, even Robert E. Lee, should justifiably be the subject of re-examination as he is in this work.

This is a book well worth reading. It probes. In the process, it asks some very interesting questions.

Southern historians, the author feels, have had it all their way, denigrating Union leadership and enshrining Lee in a mythos of superb generalship he doesn't deserve.
In this trenchant analysis of the Confederate defeat, McKenzie's criticisms of Southern arrogance, disorganization, corruption, military errors, and dubious ideology are difficult to refute, but considering the 5:2 manpower and 10:1 industrial advantages of the North, his belief that a defensive strategy and greater Southern dedication might have prevailed is less persuasive.
With bibliography, a good index, and wonderfully clear action-maps which lack only scale to be perfect, McKenzie's work is recommended as a highly readable, if tendentious catalyst for further discussion.

(The "score" rating is an ineradicable feature of the page. This reviewer does not willingly "score" books.)