Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers (Modern War Studies) [Hardcover]

David M. Barrett (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: June 1993 | Series: Modern War Studies

This detailed look at Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam advisory system views LBJ's conduct of Vietnam policy with a fresh eye.

--This text refers to the Paperback edition.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Barrett's in-depth study of the relationship between President Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam War advisers concentrates on three distinct periods of the war: the first half of 1965, when the president and his advisers faced the prospect of South Vietnam's collapse; the spring and summer of 1967, when the pull-back-or-escalate debate was at its hottest; and the winter and spring of 1968, which included the Tet Offensive and LBJ's announcement that he would not run for reelection. Barrett analyzes the interaction among the president and cabinet members, White House staffers, military leaders, diplomats and government elders such as Averell Harriman and Dean Acheson on the question of Vietnam policy, bringing into sharp focus what the author calls Johnson's operating style, an odd combination of openness to wide-ranging views and a strong penchant for secrecy. Barrett argues that in these conferences the president was not the temperamental twister portrayed often, but on the contrary, was a polite listener. The study clarifies LBJ's performance as war president and demonstrates that "assertions that there must have been an irrational advisory process surrounding Johnson do not meet the test of evidence." Barrett teaches political science at Villanova.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Utilizing many recently declassified documents, Barrett (history, Villanova Univ.) details Johnson's decision-making from 1965, when he set upon a path to escalate the war in Vietnam, to his resolution not to run for reelection after 1968's Tet Offensive. Barrett's fresh analysis involves the role of Johnson's advisers, men such as George Ball, Robert McNamara, McGeorge and William Bundy, Clark Clifford, and Dean Rusk, as well as generals Westmoreland, Wheeler, and Taylor. Barrett challenges the traditional interpretation of the hawkish president, concluding that 1965's escalation was not a foregone conclusion, and sheds light on the rational decision-making that was Johnson's downfall. This important book on the Vietnam War follows a recent surge of monographs and memoirs on Johnson and his foreign policy and biographies of his advisers. Highly recommended for all academic and large public libraries.
- Boyd Chidress, Auburn Univ. Lib., Ala.
Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 264 pages
• Publisher: Univ Pr of Kansas (June 1993)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0700606122
• ISBN-13: 978-0700606122
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,138,372 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Interesting view on vietnam, April 22, 2000

By A Customer

This review is from: Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisors (Paperback)

David Barrett's book is simple to understand. He gives you the facts of what influenced johnson to take the actions he did. I found it very informative.

0 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Disappointing academic exercise, January 27, 2011

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scholarboy "esspostfacto" (NYC) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisors (Paperback)

Although this book purports to be an analysis of Johnson's decision making process, it is really a hodgepodge of history and analysis lumped together, without clearly demarcating either approach. It is an unfortunate reminder of the dictum that, too often, political science is really "history without the history". Anyone interested in this topic, and the truly gruesome history of how we got involved in Vietnam can do much better. I strongly recommend "Choosing War" by Frederik Logevall, an intensely studied analysis of the period from Johnson's accession to his decision, 18 months later, to Americanize the war.