Customer Reviews

In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington

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3 star:		(8)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

Edit of 22 Sep 08 to recognize that Rubin did not bail out Mexico, he bailed out Wall Street, and Paulson is about to rip the heart out of every American taxpayer in the boldest and most insane national treasury rip-off anyone on this planet could conceive of....we don't need a Wall Street bail-out, we need a complete recall of both the Executive and the Legislative leaderships--a fresh start. These pigs have destroyed the nation--see my new book, free online from 24 Sep, ELECTION 2008: Lipstick on the Pig.

Edit of 21 Dec 07 to recommend update and reissuance in collaboration with John Bogle, author of The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism: How the Financial System Underminded Social Ideals, Damaged Trust in the Markets, Robbed Investors of Trillions - and What to Do About It and a few others whose books are linked below.

Rubin is self-effacing and not at all, in any way, claiming personal credit for how well it went as America experienced one of its greatest economic booms, despite some rather scary international threats to our economic security. I believe this will be a classic reference for years to come.

1) Early on, and then throughout the book, Rubin does a fine job of documenting and explaining why markets, which are relatively autonomous beasts, and at least as important as governments and government policies, in setting the economic security environment.

2) A corollary to the above, but all the more important because it dovetails precisely with Henry Kissinger's caution ("Does America Need a Foreign Policy"), is Rubin's detailed articulation of how U.S. politics and US policy mechanisms are not now well-suited to coping with the new risks of the global economy. The speed and reach of the marketplace is now such that the industrial-era government bureaucracies and 1970's information technology stovepipes are completely inadequate--however well-intentioned a President might be, the current structure and current approaches to establishing economic strategies and policies are NOT OKAY.

3) Rubin is quite excellent in explaining in a very understandable manner how specific fiscal policies toward other states (e.g. Mexico) can be directly related to consequences in terms of illegal immigration (surging if Mexico is allowed to collapse), illegal drugs and crime, and trade.

4) Especially helpful in this book is its emphasis on the importance of educating the American public as a pre-requisite to the politics of making the right economic decisions for America. Rubin quotes Clinton as saying that one of his (President Clinton's) greatest lessons learned from his two-term Presidency was the need to do the public education (political strategy) before the public politics and deal-making. Senator David Boren (today President of the University of Oklahoma) and Mr. David Gergen have made this point earlier ("Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century"), but Rubin's focus merits strong emphasis, because in combination, our mediocre policy structure and our mediocre public understanding combine to create not one but two devastating Achilles' heels for US economic security policy-making.

5) Rubin excels at documenting the direct relationship between poverty and inner-city distress and poor education of important segments of America's population, and its economic well-being. He extends this analysis internationally, focusing on how vital it is to extend the fruits of prosperity across all nations and peoples, if the US is itself to have sustainable economic stability and prosperity.

6) The book is a case study in decision-making, a manual of how to and how not to approach problems for which, as he notes with frequency, there are no certain outcomes. I was very impressed by his acute sensitivity to the fact that most subordinates are incapable of speaking utter truth to their bosses--they pull their punches. This is equally true, as he explicitly notes, of Chief Executive Officers invited to meet with the President. Rubin appears gifted in his ability to draw out the concerns and negatives from all subordinates, with a special kindness extended by him to the most junior or front-line subordinates, a kindness that is repaid in full with honest opinion.

7) I noticed some very strong observations from Rubin on the inability of the Department of State and of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide him with core information that he needed on Indonesia, among other fiscal hot spots. Lee Kuan Yew from Singapore turned out to be much more useful to him in understanding the context and possibilities. From this Rubin draws the lesson that the Department of State needs to get smarter about economics, and that a new kind of Foreign Service Officer is needed, one that is not just following political matters, but economic matters. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that State needs to migrate from the old POL-MIL mind-set, to a new POL-ECON mindset. CIA must of course get much better at understanding demography, public health, economics, and infrastructure issues down to the province and township letters, something that will require them to finally take Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) much more seriously, and to become competent in 29+ languages.

8) "Rubin's Rules", actually prepared by his staff as a going-away gift when he departed Treasury, are listed on page 251, with an 11th rule on page 252, and are alone worth the price of the book. They will not be repeated here, they are precious.

9) Rubin is critical of the private sector for having over-invested in Third World ventures without doing the due diligence related to risk assessment, and he ventures into some discussion of the importance of defining and communicating best practices, codes and standards for debt management, bankruptcy, deposit insurance, and bank supervision. I could not help but reflect on how much more important the ISO might become if it also becomes central to economic security and stability by contributing a standards process that helps reduce and mitigate risk for all.

10) There are many other gems in this book, from his review of "deficit economics" (and why it is an idiot idea writ large), to how Monica Lewinsky cost the US taxpayer much more than the cost of the impeachment proceedings, to the need to always review old assumptions, to the dangerous reliance by Wall Street on models (as with Long-Term Capital Management failure), to the need to redefine GDP calculations (in addition to deducting negative investments like prisons and health care that others have recommended, Rubin suggests that the presence or absence of positive investments related to environmental sustainability need to be included).

This is a solid serious book about core economic security issues. I venture to say that no one could run for President, or be an effective President, without absorbing all that Robert E. Rubin has to teach us. His assistant author, Jacob Weisberg, is to be congratulated for helping bring this extraordinary work to the marketplace. We all benefit.

See also with reviews:
Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolution
Off the Books: The Underground Economy of the Urban Poor
The Working Poor: Invisible in America
The Global Class War: How America's Bipartisan Elite Lost Our Future - and What It Will Take to Win It Back
Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions
Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency
Al On America

As other reviewers have mentioned, Rubin spends much of this book detailing the struggles of dealing with the "global economy" with his pals, Greenspan and Summers. Rubin also makes it clear that he feels current economic policy is undisciplined and unsound.

While these issues make up the bulk of the book and are surely why it was written, I was most engaged by Rubin's philosophies on keeping work pressures in perspective ("if you can keep your head while those around you are losing theirs...") and on the imminent threat posed by the developed world's continued apathy toward the impoverished.

Will you enjoy this book more if you agree with Rubin's ideas about economic policy? Yes. Can you find in this book interesting takeways that will give pause for thought if you don't? Yes.

Robert Rubin, in recounting his years on Wall Street and years in the White House has provided an excellent description of the politics of money, no matter where you are. Rubin recounts his 26 years at Goldman Sachs and describes how the company rose to great stature. He then goes on to describe some of the difficulties that they encountered. In large part, because of politics, not the Washington politics, but office politics. This part of the story was fascinating and Rubin even manages to make something like arbitrage somewhat understandable to the average reader.

The real meat of the story comes when he moves to Washington to work in the Clinton administration. Rubin describes the problems that he and the administration faced in trying to deal with specific financial crises around the world and the difficulty of solving those crises in a political environment that is filled with ad hominem attacks. His central theme is that of an internationalist, the United States must work to promote solid economic systems around the world because it is in our best interests to do so. If we simply sit by and let things happen, the repurcussions will come back to haunt us.

There are several examples that Rubin utilizes to make his point, from Mexico to Russia to Indonesia, he highlights the various economic problems that he encountered as secretary of the treasury. The descriptions he provides of the solutions point to the fact that not all nations can simply pick themselves up by their own bootstraps and make it on their own. Sometimes assistance is necessary. In making this case, he also makes a strong case for both the IMF and the World Bank.

When I received this book, I had to wonder how interesting the job of the Treasury Secretary could be, especially compared to the Secretary of State, or National Security Advisor, but Rubin makes the role of the Treasury Secretary stand out as more than the person who signs the dollar bills. His insights into economics, both supply side and Keynesian is the most readable that I have seen. The explanations and difficulties are covered and even though there is a bias, he is not unwilling to admit that there are flaws.

In addition to the clear writing and explanations, Rubin keeps to the topic he is addressing, his role as Treasury secretary or manager of a major company. He mentions problems that the Clinton administration went through, but only in the context of how it affected his job, which was minimal. When addressing the issues of working at Goldman Sachs or Citigroup, he stays on those issues and doesn't go off into major tangents. Finally, he does show that he has a sense of humor and others in the government have one too.

When I started reading this book, I couldn't put it down. This is a fascinating insight into the world of finance.

As someone who's had the chance to walk through the storied trading floors of the arbitrage division of Goldman Sachs in Manhattan, I was excited to read this book about someone who began his amazing career there. Anyone interested in investing, domestic and international finance and economics, and politics should read this book. Why?

Mr. Rubin was vital in the formation of Clintonomics--a set of policies that stressed the importance of deficit reduction. Although politically vilified for "raising taxes," Mr. Rubin's platform of deficit reduction was associated with remarkable productivity and economic growth in the 1990's. Mr. Rubin's account is especially timely and thought provoking considering the recent deficits incurred by the U.S. government, the historically low interest rates that are nevertheless present in America, and the 12 billion dollar bet on foreigns currencies recently placed by Berkshire Hathaway.

As someone who has visited and invested (with very mixed results!) in developing countries, I was also interested in Mr. Rubin's accounts of how and why he, Clinton, and others at institutions like the IMF created multi-billion dollar rescue loans to these nations. The conflicts of interest between investors, the borrowers, and the loaners is fascinating to contemplate. It is also instructive to consider why some rescue packages (designed for Indonesia) failed while others (designed for Mexico) succeeded. While recounting these stories Mr. Rubin does an admirable job explaining why lowering tarrifs and expanding global trade with emerging markets is a win-win situation for all parties involved.

For an even better explanation of the underlying principles of international finance read "Economics in One Easy Lesson" by Hazlett. It sounds like a children's book, but the clarity of explanation of complex ideas in this book is amazing.

Probabilistic decision making is a tool that is the corollary to the premise that nothing in the world requiring a decision is certain. Rubin states that, "Probabilistic thinking isn't just an intellectual construct for me, but a habit and a discipline deeply rooted in my psyche." Warren Buffett and Charles Munger of Berkshire Hathaway fame have long preached this discipline too. Its application is mentioned over and over again in Rubin's approaches to various economic crises faced by him at the National Economic Council and Treasury.

The methodology is widely taught and is available to all of us in such books as "Probabalistic Thinking" by Richard Jeffrey. A very burden-lightening idea for all of us, stated repeatedly by Rubin, is that given unavoidable uncertainty, not all decisions will turn out to be right, but that probabilistic decision making is the best way he knows to maximize the number of correct choices.

There are many detailed, but non-technical, non-mathematical, discussions of such issues as "bail-ins" (e.g., IMF loans) for countries in deep economic crisis in the '90s (Mexico, Russia, Maylasia), floating currency exchange rates vs. tied-to-the-dollar rates (China) and the part they play in economic crises, and the issue of "moral hazard" (that huge infusions of outside money into failing economies might just encourage more bad behavior by the recipients).

Both Republicans and Democrats can enjoy this read. Democrat Rubin's strong position on a balanced budget, reduced deficits and consequent reduced debt interest payments prompted George Will, the conservative columnist of the Washington Post, to comment in a January 2004 piece that "Rubinomics is more Republican than Republicans have recently behaved."

Rubin expresses great admiration for then-President Clinton's thought processes, quick intellect, and his actively pursuing divergent views, i.e., he thinks Clinton's decision process was right on. He indicates that Clinton's political genius was a great overlay to the technical insights Rubin and others, such as Alan Greenspan, brought into discussions. Illustrative specifics abound. At the same time, Rubin clearly abhors Clinton's personal shortcomings, such as the Lewinsky matter.

This may not be first rate literature, but it is most definitely very well written for such works. It is a fascinating read and very informative. Much of the thinking processes advocated are useful for individuals in their daily lives as they try to make the best possible decisions in the absence of complete information and in the face of considerable uncertainty.

My decision to read this book was based on an editorial I read many months ago in the Wall Street Journal. I remember the Journal's editors announcing that they thought "Rubin was probably correct" about some policy regarding interest rates and the deficit. Frankly, I didn't much understand the admission at the time but made a mental note. One day I wanted to make some time and understand this issue.

Needless to say, I was excited to have that opportunity sooner rather than later. I saw Mr. Rubin's book mentioned in the Financial Times, recalled the editorial, and immediately bought the book. In short, I was pleasantly surprised. Not only do I now understand the relationship between America's deficit and interest rates, but I have a whole new appreciation for topics such as arbitrage, probabilistic thinking, political uncertainties, bailouts of other countries, the interconnectedness of economies in a globalized world, and for Mr. Rubin himself.

The book is one part autobiography, one part business and political memoir, and one part economic instruction (101 level, for people like me). We learn about Mr. Rubin's upbringing, the fortuitous circumstances that took him to Harvard and later Goldman Sachs, the challemges of building an arbitrage department, and of course the challenges of the Clinton years and serving as the Secretary of Treasury. No doubt Mr. Rubin has lived a good and interesting life, and I enjoyed following his account and many observations.

One nice aspect of this book is that I don't feel like I am reading a highly biased or revisionist spin on history. Sadly, the same cannot be said of other characters from the Clinton administration (e.g., R. Holbrook). I have read enough about the Clinton administration to feel that the author is giving a pretty fair account of events and people. I also appreciate his taking the time to make slightly complex ideas very clear and simple, such as arbitrage or the relationship between deficits and interest rates. Finally, when reading his accounts of international financial crises, I felt the tensions of a very difficult decision. Mr. Rubin has convinced me that the choices we face when dealing with international economic crises are never as simple as the media pundits would have us believe. These are very complex issues with good arguments on both sides--and our leaders must make decisions. I like to think I have a greater appreciation for just how difficult these decisions must be.

I can't claim this book was as interesting as a good mystery or a John Fowles novel, but compared to other nonfiction this is a very enjoyable and fairly well-written book. I feel like I have learned something about economics, business, politics, and the author. I am left with the sense that talking with Rubin about these issues, over a cup of coffee, would be very rewarding. He has an interesting mind. I guess this book is worthwhile for that fact alone--it has made Mr. Rubin's interesting thoughts available in a very readable style.

As one who had supported most of the Clinton administration's economic policies, I picked up Rubin's book hoping for greater insight and analysis behind the policy decisions. The analysis wasn't quite as rigorous as I had hoped, though I fully realize now that the book's targeted to a general reading audience (for instance, Rubin's probabilistic decision making would be rather obvious to anyone who's taken an intro stats class in college and given some thought to its real-life applicability).

The book is at its best when Rubin provides details of negotiations with foreign officials during international financial crises. Here, we see a clear and objective critique of economic conditions and policies, along with how Rubin and others applied probabilistic decision making in weighing economic and political factors such as the international markets and the media reaction at home. On the other hand, these objective qualities are a bit lost when Rubin recounts interactions with close working colleagues. His rosy account of his years at Goldman Sachs resembles Lisa Endlich's PR-flavored book on the company, where all senior managers are kind and wise and where all junior staff have a say in matters. From my friends who have interviewed with, worked for, and/or quit investment banks, I know that the working environment is much more akin to that depicted in Michael Lewis's Liar's Poker. Rubin's description of the White House as a workplace is equally idealized and is rather reminiscent of NBC's West Wing.

These flaws inevitably lead to sections that read like your generic business school application essay, espousing blandly recited topics such as good management and teamwork. However, the book does get much better as it goes along, especially in the chapters dealing with international finance. And it still stands head and shoulders above most autobiographical accounts from the business world. In short, if you're a huge fan of the Clinton administration, you will love this book. If you're of political extremes, whether it's anti-globalization or loyal Rush Limbaugh listener, this book's not for you. For those in between, this will be an informative and enjoyable book but with some shortcomings in terms of objectivity.

This book is like taking a graduate course work in economics taught not by your traditional economist, but by a practitioner who makes sense of everything based on his first hand experience at the top level in both Government and the private sector.

As an eminently smart and powerful fellow, Rubin has probably more detractors than supporters even within academia. Indeed, Nobel prized winning economists such as Stiglitz don't take it nicely to being outsmarted by common mortals (not so common if you look at the whole persona). The truth of the matter is that "In an Uncertain World..." is a far better book than Stiglitz rampaging book on the same subject "The Roaring Nineties." I'll let you read my review on this book for further details.

If you ran a database query of the smartest people on Wall Street and Washington, at the top cross section stands one remarkable individual, Robert Rubin. The book reflects the quality of the man's intellect and judgment.

Additionally, Rubin had great courage. Contrary to O' Neil and Snow the two Secretaries of the Treasury during Bush first term, who have been just salesmen for Bush tax cuts; Rubin shaped the fiscal policies during the Clinton administration. Rubin was not shy to oppose Clinton's views on unrestrained government spending. Rubin convinced Clinton of the benefits to generate a Budget Surplus to pay down Government debt before it would spiral out of control with the upcoming retirement of the Baby Boomers early in the next century.

Rubin also knew that the real boss was not Clinton but the Bond market. He knew that profligate government spending, continuing rise in Budget Deficits, and a rise in Government bond issuance would be punished by the Bond market with sharp increase in long term interest rates. This in turn, would curtail capital investment, productivity, economic growth, and employment. He also knew that the reverse was true too. An improvement in the U.S. fiscal position would be rewarded by the Bond market with lower long term interest rates, resulting in faster sustainable economic growth and higher employment.

In essence, Rubin is a Keynesian with a twist. He recognizes that Budget deficits can have a healthy expansionary impact during a recession. However, his concern is related to structural deficits (as opposed to cyclical deficits). In other words, when a country's fiscal position is chronically in the red, even in good times, you run into a vicious cycle. Government borrowings (increasing demand for money) will boost the price of money (interest rate) over time. As a result, interest rates rise, private investments decline, productivity drops, and GDP growth slows down. Because of the lower growth, Deficits rise further, so does government borrowings, and the beat goes on.

When Rubin looks at the U.S. fiscal position over the medium term, it gets really worrisome. Indeed, Rubin addresses the issue of the Baby Boomers upcoming retirement in the second decade of this century and thereafter. Here, Rubin correctly looks at the U.S. fiscal position as a pension fund. In other words, both will have to meet large claims associated with retirees. Thus, they should build right now enormous reserves (accumulated surpluses) to withstand these huge upcoming costs.

Rubin put the country's money exactly where his mouth is. Indeed, when he joined the Clinton administration, he inherited a huge structural deficit from 12 years of the Reagan era. Within eight years, he turned the U.S. fiscal position with "surpluses as far as the eye can see" to get ready for the Baby Boomer retirement. As we know, the Bush administration after three tax cuts, two of them unnecessary and irresponsible, did an abrupt return to the Reagan era, the sequel. Sequels are always worst than the original. This is no exception. And, that is because now we are virtually out of time before being flooded with the tsunami of Baby Boomers retirement costs. At the end of the Reagan era, we had over twenty years to shore up our fiscal position, now we have less than ten years. The swing in the fiscal position between the end of the Clinton/Rubin era and the first term of Bush is a staggering $10 trillion. When Clinton left the office, the Surpluses over the next ten years were estimated at over $5 trillion. Now, under Bush watch, the fiscal position has swung to Deficits over the next ten years of $5 trillion. Rubin thinks this swing has dire consequences, including downward pressure on the value of the dollar which will eventually erode the confidence of foreign investors. In turn, this will make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to finance its current account deficit.

He notes that the Budget Deficit and the Current Account Deficit are close twins. The Budget Deficit decreases domestic savings, and increases the gap between domestic savings and investments. This gap is financed by foreign direct investment which is equal to the Current Account Deficit.

The book covers a lot more ground on his several decades of experience in investment banking and risk arbitrage at Goldman Sachs. It covers also very intriguing aspects about Washington. If you are interested in politics and economics, you will love this book.

Rubin begins in media res-on the evening after he was sworn in as Treasury Secretary-with a gripping story of how the Clinton administration handled the Mexican currency crisis. His memoir has three phases: his twenty six years spent at Goldman Sachs that culminated in a co-Chairman role, his six years serving under the Clinton administration, and his return to private life as a sort of consigliere at Citigroup. Most of the book, of course, recalls the Clinton years (i.e., 1992-99, where he went from head of the National Economic Council to Treasury Secretary) and they consist largely as a series of budgetary battles, public relations trials, and averted currency crises.

Rubin likes to "tell" almost as much as he likes to "show," so the themes aren't all that hard to find. First, clearly this is a treatise on, and justification of, the importance of probabilistic decision-making in an increasingly complex, interdependent world. And with nary a number, he repeatedly demonstrates a key weakness of traditional market models: they are not able to incorporate the potentially devastating impacts of certain events which are extremely unlikely to occur, but nevertheless are possible (e.g., what if the U.S. government defaulted on its debt?).

Second, politics is yucky business. Here is where I was most fascinated. Rubin manages to paint his political life as much more difficult and challenging than any of his private sector roles. This is virtually a unanimous verdict, as I read it, stretching from the expected (e.g., government strains to serve multiple, conflicting objectives while business ultimately gets to serve only the profit master) to the counter-intuitive (e.g., he apparently had a better work-life balance at Goldman). On important questions-in this book and in his speaking-he likes to divide the issue into a "substantive" piece and a "political" piece, tackling them separately.

Third, this is a modern day Aesop's fable, specifically the one where "nice guys finish first." By finishing first I mean to say that he amassed $100+ million along the way (not in the book, but elsewhere documented) and ended up at Citigroup without direct line responsibility! But seriously, you can see why even Rubin's critics respected him. He is possessed of humility ("anyone who has done well will acknowledge the enormous role played by chance"), candor ("I had no interest in becoming polished at television appearances, nor I suspect the capability to do that"), wisdom, and unbelievably good manners. For example, he was clearly wounded by ad hominem attacks during the 1995 budget fight (in particular, Newt Gingrich has a reoccurring nemesis role, calling Rubin "untrustworthy" on television), but when it comes to personal retorts, Rubin can only manage to praise Gingrich for his understanding of the dimensions of the Mexican crisis.

Finally, experience has led Rubin to believe that it is almost impossible to help ordinary voters understand the complexities of fiscal and foreign policy. He illustrates this expertly when he reviews his role in the debate around Bush's tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, where he dishearteningly cannot find a succinct way to warn of the long-term consequences of a structural deficit in the face of politically resonant messages that attach to tax cuts and spending increasing. He does find a terrific analogy in global warming: no one person experiences current suffering, but there is a small chance that inaction will hurt everybody gravely at some future time.

I wanted to give five stars, having really looked forward to this book. But as a literary work, the book does not reach the greatness of the man. It is ironic that Rubin, who excels at self-deprecating candor, reveals so little that is particularly new or insightful considering that he ran one of the most mysterious, successful organizations (Goldman) ever created; held a catbird seat in the Clinton administration; and is uniquely qualified to opine on the lessons of the raging bull market of the 1990s. The virtue of humility, alas, often makes his achievements appear all too easily-won. His favorite management technique appears to be taking interview notes on a legal pad (it is really endearing the first couple or few times but eventually...).

Perhaps because they are especially memorable, he spends too much time introspecting on his transitions; e.g., virtually all of Chapter Eleven is about him stepping down from Treasury and figuring out where to go next. Oh the agony, but you can skip this chapter and I'll summarize: it's a lot like your last job change, but Sandy Weil is trying to sell you instead of some slimy headhunter. Also, I don't think you should buy the book for the "Rubin Doctrine." These principles are sort of like the Ten Commandments (Number 9: never let your rhetoric commit you to something you cannot deliver...translation: don't make promises you can't keep). You will recognize them, as they are important clichés. It's not so much you need to read them, as politicians need to follow them.

I was disappointed by the lengthy and expected discussion of the rise and precipitous fall of the stock market. Forget the Monica Lewinski admission, the real scandal in this book is that Rubin adds virtually nothing to the stock market discussion beyond the familiar refrain of pent up imbalances that inevitably had to unwind (to his credit, he pretty much confesses as such). He cites the usual culprits, including profitless dotcoms and myopic investors. If you are looking information which is helpful to investing, you won't find much here. But Rubin totally redeems himself in Chapter Thirteen, to my mind easily the best chapter in the book, where he expertly explains both the politics and substance of fiscal policy. This Chapter is worth the price of the book

I would recommend this book as probably the best politico-economic book I've read. Robert Rubin, as Secretary of the Treasury and head of the National Economic Council during the Clinton years, was at the center of some of the most exciting times of the last few generations: the first balanced budget in thirty years; a run-up in the stock market that made millionaires out of average people; and a thriving economy. But not everything was wonderful. The Republican Party started a revolution of their own in 1994 when they swept control of Congress for the first time in forty years and the Asian economic crisis of 1998 threatened a global economic meltdown. In the center of it all was Robert Rubin.

Educated at Harvard, Rubin became an arbitrageur at Goldman Sachs in the 1960s and rose to co-ceo of the company before leaving for Washington during the Clinton years. His theme for life was that that there are no certainties. He called his philosophy probabilistic thinking. He explained it this way: "Success came by evaluating all the information available to try to judge the odds of various outcomes and the possible gains or losses associated with each." It was a philosophy that enabled him to succeed in both public and private endeavors.

His book is highly interesting but may be a difficult read for someone without any knowledge of economics. For those familiar with economic terms and concepts the book will be both enlightening and educational. While we may live in an uncertain world this book is a certain success.