'During the 20th century,' this book contends, 'aggressive Presidents and supine Congresses have transformed the President's constitutional authority to defend the nation against attack into a virtually unlimited power to initiate undeclared war and military hostilities.' New theories therefore are needed to guide Congress, President, and courts in future struggles over the distribution of the war powers. White House spokesmen since the Truman administration have reiterated a constitutional theory that confers inherent power on the President to dispatch and commit armed forces without congressional approval or consultation. This tendency was not reversed by congressional attempts to limit presidential warmaking following the Vietnam War; it was encouraged by the Federal courts' position in Vietnam cases that only 'prolonged, irreconcilable legislative-executive conflict should serve as an invitation to judicial intervention in war-powers controversies.' A major feature of the book is a thorough analysis of all the legal challenges to the President's conduct of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam cases are examined in light of British constitutional history, the framing, of the American Constitution, and judicial decisions from 1800 through the Korean War. This analysis furnishes the basis for the author's contention that the Supreme Court has led the nation into the 'twilight zone of concurrent power'--encouraging 'the legislature and the executive to fuse their separate powers of war and defense into a national war power whose only standard is the extraconstitutional one of success on the battlefield.' In the modern era of guerrilla wars, national liberation movements, and police actions, the author recognizes the inadequacy of traditional distinctions between defensive and offensive wars upon which the Framers of the American Constitution divided the congressional war powers from the office of commander in Chief. Keynes concludes that, although the courts can play a limited role in restraining presidential power to conduct undeclared war, only Congress can effectively limit the President's conduct by insisting on a prior consensus regarding military intervention.
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
Review
This book deals with a great issue of constitutional government--how to allocate the power to make war. Only Congress can declare war, but formally declared wars are rare. The interesting questions under our Constitution concern how it allocates the power to engage in undeclared hostilities, or to authorize military or diplomatic measures that may lead to war. As Edward Keynes's subtitle suggests, these issues are in the Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power . . . The book is well written and interesting. The summary of the litigation sparked by the war in Vietnam is valuable. --Judge Abraham D. Sofia, American Historical Review
This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)
Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly
This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)
Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly
This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)
Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly
This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. --Kenneth Paul Nuger, American Political Science Review (APSR)
Keynes raises anew the questions suggested by the Vietnam conflict and an intelligent book which avoids hyperbole and the polemic thrust of much earlier writing. . . . The volume makes excellent use of brad-based literature and can serve as an extensive bibliographical source. Indeed, it might even be regarded as a basic primer in American constitutional theory which includes extensive elaboration of war powers concerns. --Elliot E. Slotnick, Social Science Quarterly
About the Author
Edward Keynes is the author, co-author, or co-editor of eight other books on American politics and constitutional law, including The Court vs. Congress: Prayer, Busing, and Abortion (Duke, 1989). He has been a consultant to the U.S. House of Representatives and the General Assembly of Pennsylvania. Mr. Keynes is Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University and has been visiting professor at the universities of Cologne, Kiel, and Marburg. A University of Wisconsin Ph.D., he has been a Fullbright and an Alexander von Humboldt fellow.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
OUTSTANDING, straightforward, thoughtful, and thorough,
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This review is from: Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (Paperback)
This book focuses on the ever-evolving zone of parallel and overlapping control between the executive and legislative branches over the emergency or war powers of the federal government. It's a slippery topic, but Keynes's history is solid, and his analysis is clear and rigorous. The book draws its title from a phrase used by Justice Robert Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer case of 1952: between the powers exercised by the President on the basis of exclusive executive authority, and those exercised by Congress on the basis of exclusive legislative authority, there is a "zone of twilight" in which the two branches have concurrent authority, or in which the specific authority is unclear.Highly recommended for anyone curious about the authority by which our current commander-in-chief has declared a state of emergency, suspended the rights of habeas corpus for thousands of non-citizens, and invented strange military tribunals to try potential suspects in what looks like it might be a never-ending war against terrorism.
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