Customer Reviews

The Undetected Enemy: French and American Miscalculations at Dien Bien Phu, 1953 (Texas A & M University Military History Series)

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First of all, the reader must notice that this book does not actually cover the battle of Dien Bien Phu, since it is focused only on the last 40 days of 1953, starting with Operation Castor on November 20 and ending with General Navarre's first doubts about his ambitious plan. The main theme of the book is how the French military leadership (Navarre and Cogny) lost track (as the title implies) of three whole Viet Minh divisions (304, 308 and 312 plus the powerful 351 Heavy Division) after they succesfully established the Dien Bien Phu "airhead". Intitally they were sure that the French garrison would have to face only the 316 Division (and probably only parts of it) which was detected by air while moving to the western Tonking, but later, despite ample evidence of the enemy troops dispositions, they didn't alter their plans. They didn't launch also spoiling attacks elsewhere to disrupt enemy movements. The real reasons behind the Dien Bien Phu adventure was rather to protect the franco-phile Thais of the region, than to cover Laos. The book contains many documents of that period, complete with their official numbers, codes and short-writing style and some maps and black and white photos. It has also some useful information about the US attitude toward the French plans and the completely distorted operational and strategic view that the French Generals had at the time. I wish only, Mr Nordell had extended his analysis to the battle itself, adding a few more pages. A nice addition to the Dien Bien Phu list of titles.

A carefully well developed book on DBP. Not from the battle side but from the politcal side. Dr Nordell crafts a wonderfull bridge as seen by the actually plans and US observations. Great attenion to details.

A must read on DBP, it brings together may open ideas that others have.