Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Hardcover)

~ (Author) "IN THE FIRST sentence of one of the greatest works of modern political science, Robert Dahl posed a question of profound importance for democratic theory..." (more)
Key Phrases: differential campaign spending, incumbent party tenure, cumulative income growth, President Bush, United States, National Election Study (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From The Washington Post

Reviewed by Dan Balz

The most important issue rarely mentioned on the campaign trail this year is the gap between rich and poor in America. It is important for two reasons: The gap has been growing, and the choice between John McCain and Barack Obama likely will affect whether it narrows or expands.

That is the conclusion of Unequal Democracy, a provocative new book by Princeton professor Larry M. Bartels, one of the country's leading political scientists. His most significant finding is that there is a partisan pattern to the size of the gap between the rich and the poor. Over the past half-century, he concludes, Republican presidents have allowed income inequality to expand, while Democratic presidents generally have not.

Lest anyone think this book is a partisan hit job by a left-wing academic, Bartels goes to great pains in his introduction to preempt the counterattack he expects from critics on the right. "I began the project as an unusually apolitical political scientist," he writes, noting that the last time he voted was in 1984, "and that was for Ronald Reagan." He adds that in doing this work, "I was quite surprised to discover how often and how profoundly partisan differences in ideologies and values have shaped key policy decisions and economic outcomes. I have done my best to follow my evidence where it led me."

In Bartels's analysis, the period from the late 1940s to the early '70s was one of "rapid and remarkably egalitarian" growth in real incomes: Every group, from the richest to the poorest, experienced growth of between 2.4 percent and 2.7 percent per year. Since 1974, the pattern has skewed significantly toward the rich. Overall income growth has slowed, and it has slowed far more for those at the bottom than at the top.

Bartels acknowledges that there can be many explanations for growing income inequality, from globalization and structural changes in the U.S. economy to technological and demographic shifts. But he argues that it is wrong to assume there is no cause-and-effect relationship between government policies and income distribution. In fact, he asserts, "economic inequality is, in substantial part, a political phenomenon."

Bartels comes to this conclusion by examining what happened to income inequality from President Truman to President George W. Bush. "Under Democratic presidents," he writes, "poor families did slightly better than richer families (at least in proportional terms), producing a modest net decrease in income inequality; under Republican presidents, rich families did vastly better than poorer families, producing a considerable net increase in income inequality."

He concludes that the income gap increased under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan and both Bushes, while it declined under four of the five Democratic presidents who have served during this period -- all except Jimmy Carter. That pattern, he asserts, "seems hard to attribute to a mere coincidence in the timing of Democratic and Republican administrations." Rather, Democratic and Republican presidents have pursued different economic policies, with Democrats generally focused more on raising employment and output growth, which disproportionately benefit poor and middle-class families. Republicans have worried more about containing inflation, which has "negligible" effects on real income growth near the bottom of the income distribution but "substantial effects at the top," Bartels says. On tax policy, Republican presidents, especially since Reagan, have pushed tax cuts that have disproportionately helped the wealthiest Americans.

Bartels uses the election of 2000 to illustrate, with a hypothetical example, how much difference presidential leadership realistically may make in the distribution of income in America. In Bush's first four years, families in the top 95th percentile of income received a 2-percent cumulative increase in real income. Middle-income families saw a decline of 1 percent, while poorer families saw a decline of 3 percent. Based on historical data for Democratic presidents, Bartels estimates that if Al Gore had been elected instead of Bush, the working poor would have seen an increase of about 6 percent, while the wealthy would have seen essentially no gain.

Why don't voters hold Republican presidential candidates accountable for what appears to be such a clear pattern? Bartels doesn't buy the hypothesis that lower-income Americans vote against their own economic interests because they put more stock in social and cultural issues when they pick a president. He was one of the first to challenge that idea when it was advanced in Thomas Frank's book What's the Matter with Kansas four years ago. Bartels argues that, nationally, the white working class has become more loyal to Democratic presidential candidates, not less. He contends that Republican gains have come mainly among middle- and upper-income voters, and that the overall shift away from the Democrats is almost entirely attributable to the partisan transformation of the South over the past 40 years or so.

One of Bartels's most intriguing conclusions is that the political timing of economic growth has influenced voters, and that this has helped Republicans, despite their overall pattern of increasing the gap between rich and poor. Republicans presidents, he concludes, have often generated significant economic growth rates in presidential election years, while Democratic presidents have not. If only election years are counted, families at every income level "turn out to have fared much better under Republican presidents than under Democrats," he writes. "Whether through political skill or pure good luck, Republican presidents have been remarkably successful in targeting income growth to coincide with presidential elections."

No political party or administration can be held responsible for the global economic changes that affect income inequality, Bartels acknowledges. But, he goes on to say, "It certainly seems fair -- and perhaps even useful -- to hold political parties accountable for the profound impact of their policies on the way those structural changes shape the economic fortunes of wealthy, middle-class and poor American families."

Copyright 2008, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

Review

"I call the first fact the Great Partisan Growth Divide. Simply put, the United States economy has grown faster, on average, under Democratic presidents than under Republicans." --Alan S. Blinder, The New York Times, August 31st, 2008

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 344 pages
• Publisher: Princeton University Press (April 7, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0691136637
• ISBN-13: 978-0691136639
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.4 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (17 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #84,557 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

26 of 29 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars New provocative evidence, June 1, 2008

By	Timothy J. Bartik (Kalamazoo, MI USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Larry Bartels's book is one of the most important written works on economic inequality issues over the last 25 years. Anyone discussing economic inequality in the U.S. will have to deal with Bartels's arguments and evidence, even if you disagree with his findings and how he interprets those findings.

Among the evidence and arguments of Bartels's books are the following:

*** Since World War II, Democratic Presidents have been associated with modestly progressive patterns of real per family income growth, that is the income growth during Democratic Presidents' terms has been somewhat higher for lower income families than for upper income families. Republican Presidents have been associated with highly regressive patterns of real per family income growth, that is income growth has been much higher for upper income families than for other families. However, all income groups have on average gained more under Democratic Presidents.

*** The Democratic Presidents' better performance has been concentrated during the second year of Presidential terms. Republican Presidents have done better during the 4th year of Presidential terms, that is the election year. This may help explain Presidential election results, as voters appear to respond more to election year economic performance than the economic performance of prior years.

*** Economic issues still are key for working class voters in the U.S.

*** Political leaders appear to be much more responsive to upper class and middle class voters in their state than to lower class voters. However, even more of voting behavior is explained by the ideology of a politician's political party. This is true both for the Democrats, who have ignored most voters' opposition to estate taxes, and for Republicans, who have ignored most voters' support for higher minimum wages.

Bartels's work is only a start. He really does not have even close to a complete theory about WHY economic growth for different income families has the correlations he finds with Presidential political party. We would need to know more about this to more completely judge the relative economic performance under different political parties.

In addition, his book raises the issue of how we can improve the quality of the political debate in the U.S. over issues of economic inequality. There is considerable resistance in the U.S. to openly discussing these issues. Politicians who discuss these issues risk being accused of promoting "class warfare". As Bartels points out, there is some tendency to want to assume that somehow the income distribution is determined by unchanging economic laws that are impervious to political influence. Bartels presents new evidence that in fact the income distribution can be influenced by public policy to a very large extent. But the question is, how do we make this understanding part of the mainstream political debate?

18 of 21 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Get Real About Inequality and Its Political Consequences/Causes, May 24, 2008

By	Historied (UK and USA) - See all my reviews

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This is a quite amazing book for its wealth of fascinating and often counter intuitive information, particularly income distribution stats and political survey information. There is definitely a form of political delusion at work in the USA, based on voters so consistently voting against their own interests. For example voters favoring abolition of the estate tax when it only affects the top 2% of tax payers or favoring the Bush 2001 tax cuts without knowing anything much about them. More interestingly he shows how, while increasing political knowledge (measured by simple questions on who is what position in US politics) increases Democrats awareness of economic inequality; the same increasing political knowledge makes Republicans LESS knowledgeable or more in denial that inequality has increased, let alone whether it is a problem. He also nails the idea that the blue collar have shifted against their interests. Republican voting is still largely a matter of the better off supporting them, especially the less well educated and religious better off The Democrats lost power because of the defection of the South that now merely reflects the national picture (rather than hugely Democratic as before Civil Rights circa 1964) and the growth of reasonably well off, non college educated, religious voters who vote on economic AND values grounds, though still against their economic interests. Since 1948 economic growth has been on average significantly higher and unemployment lower for all social groups under Democrat presidents; inflation has been only slightly higher. And income equality much better under Democrats. Ultimately I suppose a worrying and somewhat pessimistic book, but a necessary tough tonic before thinking of solutions. Voters tend to vote on the economy in election year and the Republicans have done better in election years and voters don't seem to remember the other years when things were much worse. I hope both Presidential Candidates read it but doubt it will have the necessary impact. That will take a gutsy new FDR to put the country back together again after a collapse like the 1930s. Interestingly my conservative friends go into huge denial about this book: they can't even consider it; it is so threatening to their world view. I am open to doubt about its data and arguments, but the author provides plentiful source and precise survey question detail so intelligent engagement with the book is really easy, whether you agree or not with his fundamental premises. The author hasn't voted since 1984 he says and then voted Reagan, so this is not another move on.org book for the choir. The evidence drove him to his conclusions rather than the other way round. I wish there were more books this insightful.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Insightful!, September 5, 2008

By	Loyd E. Eskildson "Pragmatist" (Phoenix, AZ.) - See all my reviews (TOP 100 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

"Unequal Democracy" presents the results of a six-year exploration of the political causes and consequences of economic inequality in America. It was inspired by the substantial escalation of this inequality in recent years. Total income going to the top 0.1% of income earners has more than tripled, from 3.2% in the late 1950s to 10.9% in 2005; that going to the top 1% rose from 10.2% to 21.8%. Further, this widening is accelerating. Despite this trend, 80% believe that though you may start out poor, if you work hard you can make lots of money - more than any other developed nation. This belief undermines motivation for change.

Bartels believes that the most significant domestic policy initiative of the past decade has been a massive government-engineered transfer of additional wealth from the lower and middle classes to the rich via substantial reduction in federal income taxes for the rich.

Economists have found little evidence that large disparities promote growth, or that progressive tax rates retard growth by discouraging economic effort.

Meanwhile, political campaigns have become dramatically more expensive, increasing the reliance of elected officials on those who can afford to help finance their re-election bids. At the same time, membership in labor groups, a previously countervailing force, has substantially declined.

On average over the past half century, real incomes of middle-class families grew 2X under Democrats vs. Republicans, and working poor families grew 6X faster under Democrats - even after allowing for differences in economic circumstances.

So why do those with lower incomes vote for Republicans? Bartels tells us that contrary to the theme of "What Happened to Kansas," moral values do not trump economics as a basis for lower-income voting behavior. Bartels offers evidence that the contradiction is explained by confusion generated by mixing "working class" (defined often as those w/o a college education) with lower-income. The working class has a lot of relatively high earners that are influenced by the moral values issues.

Bartels then contends that Republican success in presidential races is due to voters' overemphasis on election-year economic growth, vs. the superior longer-term performance of Democratic presidents, but lesser achievement during the last year of their terms.

Finally, its on to the estate ("death") tax. Actions to reduce and eliminate it during the early Bush II years represent about 15% of the impact of the overall tax reduction package. Bartels asserts that there is enormous misunderstanding about this tax regarding the wideness of its applicability. As a result, it is a wonder that it still exists.

Bottom Line: "Unequal Democracy" presents a carefully documented set of conclusions about an important and timely topic; its only drawback is that sometimes the statistics get too deep.