Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia [Mass Market Paperback]

Brendan Simms (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: August 11, 2003

For most of 1992-1995, Britain stood aside while an internationally recognised state was attacked by externally-sponsored rebels bent on a campaign of territorial aggression and ethnic cleansing. It was her unfinest hour since 1938. Based on interviews with many of the chief participants, parliamentary debates, and a wide range of sources, Brendan Simm's brilliant study traces the roots of British policy and the highly sophisticated way in which the government sought to minimise the crisis and defuse popular and American pressure for action. We all continue to live with the results of these shameful actions to this day.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"This is the best sort of polemical book: hard-hitting, well researched and stimulating, with a preference for analysis over sensation."

About the Author

Brendan Simms is director of studies in history at Peterhouse and the Newton Sheehy Lecturer in International Relations at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge.

Product Details

• Mass Market Paperback: 496 pages
• Publisher: Penguin Global (August 11, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0140289836
• ISBN-13: 978-0140289831
• Product Dimensions: 7.7 x 5 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.1 ounces
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,585,181 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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9 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Britain's Unfinest Hour, December 11, 2003

By 

Julian Bassett (London, UK) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (Mass Market Paperback)

The years of Conservative rule in the 1990s were in some ways unhappy times for Britain. The Major administrations appeared to lack any sense of purpose, and there were serious policy failures: the disastrous membership of the European exchange rate mechanism, the hugely misconceived rail privatisation.

And there was Bosnia. The Governments headed by John Major, with Douglas Hurd as Foreign Secretary, constructed a policy on the break-up of Yugoslavia which, stripped of diplomatic frippery, amounted to appeasement; and on a scale not seen since Neville Chamberlain's return from Nazi Germany in 1938. Instead of recognising the true and essentially simple nature of the conflict - the wave of Serbian expansionism following Slobodan Milosevic's stoking of Serbian nationalism - the official British line was that the conflict was too complicated to resolve, and the best the West could do was apply a half hearted humanitarian mission. Worse still, Britain doggedly prevented any other country from taking the war to the Serbs. This was a shameful period in British history. Even the French come out better.

In Unfinest Hour, Brendan Simms deconstructs the British official position, and while the book can hardly be described as entertaining (especially if you are British), it is utterly compelling, and presents a lucidly-argued case. In the exhilarating last chapter, the log-jam at last breaks, apparently due to a series of co-incidences: pressure in the U.S. (well done Americans!) causes Clinton to arm-twist the British; and a new British general in Bosnia, with a firmer grip than his predecessor, takes advantage of an absence of his French boss and authorises a devastating air strike. The Bosnian Serb cause collapses, and along with it the credibility of the entire British posture on Bosnia. It is fair to record that not all British politicians went along with the government's line; Margaret Thatcher emerges with credit, as does the Northern Ireland Unionist leader David Trimble, unlike his predecessor. Interestingly, the nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland remained silent on the issue - perhaps they did not want to draw attention to their own side's record on ethnic cleansing. Unfinest Hour is not always an easy read: here and there the subject matter can be a little dense and hard going (the acronym VOPP - Vance-Owen Peace Plan - kept reverberating around my head), but this is a trivial criticism.

Unfinest Hour is a fine book, by a justifiably angry man. Keep on trucking Dr Simms.

1 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Failure of Historic Proportions, November 21, 2008

By 

Elliott Bignell (Sargans, Switzerland) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (Hardcover)

It's taken me a long time to get around to reading this book, so I have the advantage of a little more hindsight than was available when it was written. It has largely stood this test, and is liable to provoke the reader to some degree of anger. Simms himself clearly experiences great disgust at the conduct of the Major government during the years covered, which comes across as all the more telling for his measured prose.

The facts of the matter are that Europe experienced a security crisis of proportions unprecedented since the Second World War; that this crisis led to scenes also unwitnessed since that time, such as the creation of concentration camps, shelling of civilian populations and large-scale massacres and expulsions of populations on ethnic grounds; that the balance of responsibility is on the side of Serbian nationalists and the then government of Serbia; that for several years no effective action was taken to end the conflict; that when military action was finally taken it achieved its aims in a matter of weeks as the Serbs essentially folded.

Setting aside the usual US nationalist claptrap that one sees online about the US having to do everything, it comes across very strongly in the book that this was a British rather than a European failure. "Failure", however, is not the proper word, since our conduct appears to have been deliberate. The French for some time also obstructed action, but it was later French alignment with Washington which seems to have left Britain isolated and finally got us on board. Moreover, superficially it appears to be not merely a British failure but a Conservative failure, as British policy reversed abruptly with the election of Blair's government in 1997, making Britain a policy driver in the campaign over Kossovo, while the "liberal" Clinton Administration were convinced much earlier. Simms, however, provides more than merely superficial details, and the failure seems to have taken in more than just the government. The climate of wilful defeatism in dealing with the Serbs sucked in all the major press organs, the diplomatic service and involved elements of British military command as well.

How could we have got it so wrong? The reasons seem to be partly honourable and partly perfidious. It was genuinely believed that the Serbs would prove an invincible guerilla foe, but a case was confabulated to fit this preconception where required. It was genuinely believed that air power could not provide a decisive victory. It was genuinely believed that huge casualties of British troops could be expected. It was to some extent genuinely believed that all sides in the conflict were guilty. On the other hand, the British were motivated by pro-Serbian sympathies, by smouldering resentment of the USA going back to Suez, and by remember-the-Blitz terrors of a resurgent, unified Germany dominating Europe. The legitimate government of Bosnia were portrayed as "Muslim" or as no better than the Serb militias. One thing that Simms makes quite clear, however, is that the policy of obstruction seems to have been unquestionably intentional. The British government did not merely fear to act; they actively obstructed any prospect of anyone else acting.

The US role appears more honourable, but if I have one criticism of Simms it is that he comes across as congenitally pro-US and I think that this colours his judgement. In terms of short-term benefit, the US seems to have got it right. The Serbs folded when bombed. What Simms does not address is whether strategic bombing of a weaker adversary turned out to be right in the way that a stopped clock turns out to be right now and again. 20-odd other crises were going on at this time, but the US insisted on fixing this one. That's not a dishonourable choice, but it reflects an agenda of the US's own, including the Administration's domestic political need to get Bosnia off the front page and its strategic agenda of extending NATO influence eastwards.

At any event, the British projection of the consequences of this kind of action was utterly wrong, and the US projection was right, at least in the short-term. Since then we have seen an ethnic cleansing precipitated by further bombing in Kossovo, a reverse-cleansing in return and possible Russian retaliation in the form of recognition of South Ossetia. We may be seeing slow-burn negative consequences of the determination to bomb, but at the time of writing all we can say is that the benefits appear to be equivocal. What is not equivocal is that the concentration camps are no longer to be seen, that war criminals have been seized or are being pursued, and that the war is quiescent or finished.

Simms makes a strong case. This episode is by no means over, so I recommend you read his account.

1 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant book, February 19, 2007

By 

Harris "Harris" (USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (Mass Market Paperback)

Excellent overview of the treacharous position of the British government towards Bosnia during agression on this country.

Highly recommended and great research material for anyone interested in international affairs and politics.