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The Union Cavalry Comes of Age: Hartwood Church to Brandy Station, 1863

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Is it fun to read about the cavaliers in Gray? Sure. Was the Union cavalry really as inept and pathetic as we have been led to believe? Not a chance, at least according to historian of the blue horse Eric Wittenberg, who sets up and knocks apart just about every falsehood, half-truth and myth that has popped over over the last century and fifty odd years.

Wittenberg explains how the Union arm evolved, and explains the careers of a wide variety of officers, including prominent ppersonalities like Alfred Pleasonton, George Stoneman, John Buford, Wesley Merritt, and William W. Averell, and many lesser known commanders. He also explains how these officers, in camp and in battle, developed the Federal horse arm into a force to be reckoned with--and one that eventually ran circles around the Southern horsemen. One of the high points of the Union cavalry experience was at Brandy Station during the opening phase of the Gettsburg Campaign, and as one might expect, the author expends substantial ink writing about it. Although he does not appear to add anything new here, he does explain it from a different perspective, and that is refreshing. Brandy Station made it clear the blue horse was coming of age, but the author makes a good case it was sooner and stronger than most have heretofore acknowledged.

Wittenberg's writing is solid (not brilliant, but workmanlike and thorough). Based upon a wide variety of firsthand and secondary sources, the book adds something worthwhile to the voluminous literature, which one cannot is hardpressed to say about most of the books published these days. Much of this value is that the author explains why the Union cavalry improved in leadership and ability, and how its role evolved from 1861 to 1863, and then again to the end of the war. Though not a big fan of Brassey line, this title is one of their better releases. Recommended.

Union Cavalry Comes of Age: Hartwood Church to Brandy Station, 1863 is a detailed examination of the evolution or "coming of age" of the Union cavalry during the American Civil War. Conventional historical wisdom states that the Union cavalry was not an effective force until after the Battle of Gettysburg. Furthermore, the Confederacy has often been portrayed as possessing the "natural" cavalrymen, while the Union supposedly had to turn merchants and mechanics into horsemen. The author, Eric J. Wittenberg, argues that, on the contrary, the Union possessed skilled and knowledgeable cavalrymen from the beginning of the war. The relative ineffectiveness of the Union cavalry in the Eastern Theater during the first two years of the war, he argues, should be attributed to poor organizational decisions by the early commanders of the Army of the Potomac. Wittenberg believes that it was the distribution of the Union cavalry in separate regiments and brigades, rather than the unified structure used by the Army of Northern Virginia, that led to its ineffectiveness.

Wittenberg has established a solid reputation as the author or editor of several other works on the Union cavalry during the Civil War, including most importantly: Protecting the Flanks: The Battles for Brinkerhoff's Ridge and East Cavalry Field, Battle of Gettysburg, July 2-3, 1863 (Ironclad Publishing, 2002) and Gettysburg's Forgotten Cavalry Actions (Thomas Publications, 1998, and winner of the 1998 Bachelder-Coddington Literary Award). Union Cavalry Comes of Age is organized into nine chapters, which offer a chronological history of the Union cavalry from the formation of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, in February 1863 to the Battle of Brandy Station in June 1863. Wittenberg also focuses on the careers of several Union prominent cavalry officers, including George Stoneman, William W. Averell, Alfred Pleasonton, John Buford, and Wesley Merritt.

Wittenberg has produced a well-written and researched volume that goes a long way toward dispelling myths regarding the Union cavalry. The volume includes more than 1000 endnotes, a 21-page bibliography, and five appendixes containing the orders of battle for cavalry forces at Fredericksburg, Kelly's Ford, Stoneman's Raid, Alsop's Field, and Brandy Station. I highly recommend this volume to those individuals interested in the Civil War and/or horse cavalry.

If you are a Cavalry afficianado, or simply want to expand your knowledge of the American Civil War, you must have this book. Equisitely researched and documented, Eric shows his intimate familiarity with the Union cavalry during the war. Many sections of the book fill in gaps previously unaddressed by any other work.
The year 1863 was inarguably the most important watershed era for Union Cavalry, which began to improve to a point at which they began to surpass their Confederate counterparts in leadership, ability, and cohesiveness. The Union horsemen's prowess, beginning in 1863, as a unified fighting arm drastically contrasts with their use as couriers and body guards for the infantry during the first two years of the war. Eric wonderfully explains both how and why the changes began and developed in this work.
This book needs to be consulted along with any other work on Union Cavalry in the Civil War, and deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone interested in gaining well-rounded knowledge not only of the cavalry, but of both armies' operations in the first half of 1863.

Learning to ride could be the sub title of this book. The Union Cavalry had many handicaps at the start of the American Civil War and that was only one of them. Trapped by official disapproval and high command's indifference the cavalry had real problems. This is the story of the journey from ugly stepchild to equal on the field of battle. At the start of the war, official Union policy refused to raise volunteer cavalry regiments. The existing Regular U.S. Army Cavalry would be able to perform all the duties required and the government had no need to incur the additional expenses. Late to the field, badly trained and saddled with a tactical doctrine that guaranteed failure the cavalry endured and learned. In 1863, the Cavalry fought the Cavaliers of the Army of Northern Virginia to a stand still at Brandy Station. This is the story of the two years of abuse and misused that plagued them. Even more, it is the story of the AOP's Cavalry growing and developing their role in the winning of the war. This is first of a series of excellent book on the Union Cavalry by Eric J. Wittenberg. This book builds a solid foundation that will help the reader understand the real price of victory in 1865.

This is a well written and exhaustively researched book covering an important period of time for the Union Cavalry.
I have but one minor complaint. I am probably the only person on the planet who would take exception to the phrase; "Keenan`s Charge." My great grandfather, Major, later Colonel and Bvt. Brig. General Pennock Huey, was the officer who, when surprised by Jackson`s troops, gave the order to "Draw sabres and charge", which was repeated by Major Keenan who was killed in the "Charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry" at Chancellorsville. Due to the vainglorious imagination and outright lies of Gen. Alfred Pleasonton and his later testimony at hearings on the conduct of the war, Keenan was credited with having been ORDERED to charge Jackson`s troops when, in fact, the entire action was an unfortunate accident from which the only method of extrication was to "charge".
Mr. Wittenberg gets it right in his text but still refers to the incident as "Keenan`s Charge". Fact is, as I was told by my grandfather, HIS father never referred to it as ANYONE`S charge; just the "Charge of the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry." The phrase: "Keenan`s Charge", as well as the two execrable songs of the same title, should be consigned to the ash can of history.

J.W.Huey III