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The United States and the Origins of the Cold War

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This book is a classic history of the origins of the Cold War. It must be seen in terms of the debates when it was written. The first interpretations of the Cold War told a story of an aggressive, expansionist Soviet Union subverting democracy in Eastern Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, revisionists began to tell a different story about American economic expansion ("imperialism") as a cause of the Cold War.

In this book, Gaddis presents a narrative that takes both sides of this debate seriously. He does not write in an "academic" style but aims instead at the general reader. This is the essential post-revisionist history of the Cold War, though he and many others have updated the history after the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s.

It's a good read, and I highly recommend it despite its age.

While the idea that numerous factors such as economics, world events, and local politics affect United States policy decisions, such as in the case of the Cold War, is a common idea today it was decidedly uncommon line of argument in 1973 when a then new scholar, John Lewis Gaddis, proposed it as his main argument for his now classic The United States and the Origins of the Cold War: 1941-1947. While Gaddis' book is now somewhat out of date, especially with the number of Soviet documents that came to light during the 1990's, it still remains an important work for historians and lay readers alike.

What is so interesting about Gaddis' book is that it was one of the first post-revisionist works that looked at US policy towards the Soviet Union from numerous dimensions. Gaddis incorporates revisionist theories of economics; although he points out they are too limited to explain the Cold War, while at the same time putting them in context by describing how US leaders truly believed they would help bring lasting peace (page 20). Yet Gaddis goes far beyond revisionist theory in his argument clearly showing how not only personality quirks, bureaucracy, and other forces helped shaped US policy. An excellent example by Gaddis is his demonstration of the effect of religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church which was strongly anti-communist, on local US politics (page 52-53). In specific he describes how some politicians, especially Republicans, took advantage of Catholic, especially Polish Catholic, distaste for the Russians and Communism (page 146). Gaddis also points out how individuals and policy missteps also helped generate the Cold War. Gaddis describes how President Truman, who initially decided to follow Roosevelt's approach to negotiation with the Soviets, was influenced by W. Averell Harriman and others to adopt a tougher stance with the Russians over Poland and the Yalta Agreements (page 204-206). The resulting conflict between Truman, and his new get tough approach, and Molotov set the stage for an American reversal in cooperation with the Soviets leading to escalating tensions on both sides (page 356).

Gaddis does not definitively answer if the Cold War could have been avoided, to be fair one would have to be suspect of such a answer, but does suggest that better relations could have come from the US opening a second front in 1943, provided more generous loan terms, or been more open about its atomic monopoly. Then again as Gaddis points out these options were most likely not possible with the political climate in the United States. That being said Gaddis does a fine job showing how Truman was able to guide American attitudes towards a more hostile confrontational approach to the Soviet Union and this suggest that if politicians had so whished the converse would have been true (page 146). Regardless Gaddis work, even if outdated, is insightful, well written, and holds value for students of the Cold War today.

Gaddis eloquently addresses the causes of the Cold War. Gaddis discusses the policy of the Truman administration and how a "get tough" policy led to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Actually the Cold War started when the Soviets supposedly assasinated General Sikorsky. And before they supposedly did that because of the certain fact Sikorsky didn't like the USSR for their mass murder of thousands of Polish officers, they set up an alternative Polish regime to combat Poland's true one that was in exile in Cairo in 1943. The reason for that was because the authentic Governemnt of Poland would likely pick Sikorsky as the leader of Poland after the war and he could have become president. And if he did there would definitely be NO Communism in Poland, now that would take away the USSR's direct land bridge to East Germany where they always poised themselves to take over the Indusrial Rhineland(Oh my god if I though like Chomsky I would say that the USSR was one big greedy corporation that really according to its game plan wanted to absord West German buisiness prospects that the US Marshall plan created into it's own realm.)

The USSR's placement of Soviet style regimes in Eastern Europe that imprisoned millions is the real cause for the "get tough" policy. Not to mention the Soviet placing 2 million men in Eastern Europe in a posture to attack the West mainly through the Fulda Gap against 1 American Division along the Frankfurt to Rhineland highway. The USSR's intrest in the Industrial Complex has to be looked into it may provide the only explanation for why they murdered so many just so they could keep intact their land bridge to Rhineland.