5.0 out of 5 stars
Reading Plato, February 19, 2012
This review is from: The Unity of Plato's 'Gorgias': Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life (Paperback)
Reviewed by Dustin A. Gish, Ohio University
Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2007.05.09
[http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2007/2007-05-09.html]
Scores of articles and book chapters are devoted to Plato's Gorgias, but few monographs. Devin Stauffer provides the first book-length study of the dialogue in many years.1 Although the Gorgias has been widely read and interpreted, scholars rarely articulate coherently the unifying idea which ostensibly binds together this complicated dialogue. Stauffer promises that a close reading, attentive to the twisting and turning path of the dialogue, links its diverse themes and reveals its true unity. In both detail and depth, Stauffer engages the text, and grapples with its hydra of arguments, making his book an essential and thought-provoking companion to the serious study of this dialogue in any academic discipline.2
The Unity of Plato's Gorgias examines the three sections of the dialogue (partitioned according to Socrates' three interlocutors) in four concise chapters, with the examination of the third section (the confrontation between Socrates and Callicles, which dominates the second half of the dialogue) divided into two. Stauffer's thesis is that the unity of the Gorgias derives from Socrates' concern throughout the dialogue with rhetoric. This means that the ascent implied by the tri-partite division of the dialogue (and Stauffer's subtitle) is deceptive, for the thrust of its arguments toward (a defense of) the philosophic life -- its action -- never transcends rhetoric at all. Stauffer thus illustrates how the Gorgias exposes the limits of rhetoric and the limitations of Socratic rhetoric in particular. He also reads the dialogue on its own terms, taking his bearings from its dramatic cues, "thinking through" the text rather than imposing his interpretation on it. Because his book is conceived as a "journey of gradual discovery" with the dialogue disclosing its themes gradually (8), this review proceeds by weaving its remarks into brief summaries of the chapters and sections that form the densely rich fabric of Stauffer's reading.
In his "Introduction" (1-14), Stauffer outlines his method for taming this rather unruly dialogue, drawing our attention to the dialogue form itself -- employed by Plato to embellish and create an enchanting portrait of the Socratic life, "the most obvious theme of the dialogues as a whole" (8). Here we discern a center of gravity for the Platonic corpus, for by Plato's own confession "there are no writings of Plato" but only those bearing his name that really belong to "a Socrates who has become beautiful and young" (9, 181; Second Letter 314c1-4). In this way, Plato appeals to readers with "a richer and truer account of human life, of the soul and its deepest concerns," than is found in modern philosophy (1, 179-180). This enchanting account cannot be easily extracted from the circumstances of Socratic conversation; it is embedded in the dialogues. Stauffer proposes to use "the most direct portrait" of the Socratic life in Plato's Apology as a guide and observes similarities with the Gorgias: the conflict between politics and philosophy, the apparent necessity of defending the Socratic life, and the prominence of rhetoric as a theme (9-12). His reading of the Gorgias builds on the Apology by pointing toward a form of "noble rhetoric" exercised by Socrates, which in turn illuminates the aims of Plato's own "literary-rhetorical project" (13, 181). In framing his reading of the Gorgias with the Socratic life and rhetoric on display in Plato's Apology, Stauffer thus forgoes the relation between its themes of justice and rhetoric and the treatment of those same themes in the Republic and the Phaedrus.3
Chapter One, "Examining the Master of Rhetoric" (15-39), demonstrates Socrates' interest in Gorgias and his art of rhetoric, and his own formidable rhetorical skills. Evident differences between Socrates' dialectical activity and Gorgias' rhetoric prompt us to wonder why Socrates wants to converse with Gorgias at all. The "mystery of Socrates' interest in Gorgias" is raised but not resolved in the dialogue's prelude (20). Stauffer focuses on this "unanswered question" about Socrates' intention (29) without rushing to answer it (see 127, 166, 177-182; cf. 81, 122). Stauffer instead considers how Socrates "ensnares" Gorgias. Socrates urges Gorgias to speak frankly about the power of his rhetoric by tempting his pride. Gorgias takes the bait; he exposes the moral ambivalence of his art but then quickly retreats into a claim about justice to escape blame should one of his students use rhetoric unjustly (25). He thus "draws attention to what makes rhetoric so attractive to potential students," but "at the expense of highlighting what is dubious about rhetoric" (31). Stauffer unveils the reasons behind Gorgias' crescendo and sudden retreat (31-33). Realizing his mistake, Gorgias learns the limit of his art -- namely, that "the power of [his] rhetoric is not so great that it can overcome the need for concealment" especially regarding its power to accomplish unjust ends (33). With silence he concedes to the implicit refutation worked by Socrates' rhetoric.
Socrates however does not humiliate Gorgias once caught; in fact, Stauffer shows how Socrates helps him free himself from his dilemma (33-37). Gorgias, like us, must wonder what Socrates has in mind when he releases Gorgias from the elenchos with the friendly remark that "the two of them would need to spend more time together" in order to sort out the matters under discussion (37). Socrates treats Gorgias rather as a potential friend or ally (37-39). To his credit, Gorgias neither becomes angry nor flees after Socrates' refutation (though excuses can be made: see Gorgias 448a). Stauffer's suggestion that Socrates speaks "indirectly" with Gorgias through the conversations with Polus and Callicles, as allies in some common cause (39-40), is provocative, though not original.4 His reading nevertheless does shed light on the purpose of this apparent Socratic enterprise. Socrates does not condemn rhetoric outright but envisions a noble form of rhetoric never yet seen (see 41, 126-127). This noble rhetoric cannot be grasped fully by Gorgias (or us) until the confrontation between Socrates and Callicles (see 166-167).
Chapter Two, "Polus and the Dispute about Justice" (40-81), builds a bridge from the silence of Gorgias through the recklessness of Polus to the outspokenness of Callicles and therewith from Socrates back to Gorgias. In his refutation of Polus, Socrates treats the man and his rhetoric as negligible, and his attack serves to draw Polus then Callicles into the quarrel or "battle" (43-44) announced in the dialogue's opening scene.5 According to Stauffer, Socrates signals to the listening Gorgias that there can never be harmony between his sophistic form of rhetoric and the polis since it disregards and so lacks an account of an ingrained human desire for justice (45-50). By observing him in action, Gorgias learns from Socrates "lessons that would carry less force if conveyed simply by arguments"; and the heart of those lessons concerns the importance of justice to human beings, even (or precisely) in those who deny it (41). This is the foundation upon which rhetoric may be ennobled. Stauffer argues that, to reveal this, Socrates intentionally demeans rhetoric in the extreme to trigger Polus' shameless defense of an unjust rhetoric that openly serves a tyrannical desire: "Far more openly than Gorgias ever did, Polus calls attention to the capacity of rhetoric for injustice" (50).
Socrates counters Polus in a Machiavellian mode, adopting an extreme stance, commonly known as 'the Socratic thesis,' according to which doing injustice, far more than suffering injustice, is the greatest evil for human beings (50-55). This severe formulation of justice, obviously at odds with what passes for conventional justice (55-58), aims less to persuade Polus than to expose the depth of his (and our) attachment to justice itself. Socrates demonstrates that even a reckless man like Polus feels indignation toward the injustices committed with impunity by tyrants (62). Thus, according to Stauffer, Polus' opinions are inconsistent with his own "buried concern" for justice; his failure to "deny the shamefulness of doing injustice reflects an unwillingness to deny it" and "stems from the fact that he truly believes that doing injustice is shameful" (74, 80). Even if Polus remains recalcitrant, Socrates has revealed to Gorgias a deep, at times hidden, human attachment to justice.6 Still, the blame for Polus' refusal to accept the bitter dose of this Socratic elenchos may be attributed to Socrates (71-80, cf. 165), who is unpersuasive. There thus appears a need for an alliance with a man like Gorgias, reformed to see "a better and more just use for his powers" (80, 41). Stauffer conjectures that Socrates has in mind an implicit additional use for a noble rhetoric as a means of self-defense when unjustly accused, since "one must take care not to suffer injustice at the hands of one's enemies" (81). Against the backdrop of the Apology, a grand Socratic enterprise for rhetoric comes into view.
Chapter Three, "The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles" (82-122), charts the tension in the dialogue's tone as it "becomes more serious and demanding" (82). Quarrelling over what is the best way to live, Callicles attacks Socrates and his life of philosophy (in the harshest terms allowed by Plato) and opens a seemingly impassable divide between them. Unlike the foreigners Gorgias and Polus, who failed rhetorically because of their conventional sense of shame (85-92), Callicles speaks frankly. Praising "real men" who adhere only to "the law of nature" (483e5) and exercise "true justice" (87), Callicles articulates and defends as a...
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