Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Focus Series) [Paperback]

D. M. Armstrong (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0813307724 | ISBN-13: 978-0813307725 | Publication Date: September 26, 1989

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy.

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About the Author

D. M. Armstrong is emeritus professor in the School of Philosophy at the University of Sydney.

Product Details

• Paperback: 160 pages
• Publisher: Westview Press (September 26, 1989)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0813307724
• ISBN-13: 978-0813307725
• Product Dimensions: 8.4 x 5.5 x 0.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.5 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #475,500 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An Excellent Survey of the Subject, May 22, 2001

By 

S. Guha (Redmond, Washington United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Focus Series) (Paperback)

Armstrong's book is what it promises: an opinionated introduction to the problem of universals, which in the most general terms is the problem of how to understand philosophically the phenomenon of similarity or resemblance between different things. Resemblance between things is the basis of classification and generalization, and it is presumably by noticing similarities among numerically distinct things that we form many abstract concepts and general terms. A realist about universals holds that similar things get to be similar by having some entity in common--repeatable features that are present identically in all of them, either as a constituent of the particular or as "instantiated" or "exemplified" by it in some mysterious way, without being in it. These repeatable features he calls "universals"--general things, as it were, to correspond to general terms, as names of particulars correspond to them. A nominalist denies that there are universals, and seeks to account for similarity without positing them. Armstrong spends most of the book comparing the relative merits of five different metaphysical accounts of similarity: natural class nominalism, resemblance nominalism, a realist "bundle theory" of particulars, a realist substance-attribute theory (his own favorite), and finally theories of tropes (that is, particular or non-repeatable properties and relations). Natural class nominalists take the notion of a "natural class", that is, a set of noticeably similar things, as primitive or undefined, and seek to account for similarity in terms of membership in a natural class. Resemblance nominalists take similarity among particulars as primitive instead, and seek to account for similarity among a class of things by way of resemblance to paradigm cases of such things. Both approaches suffer from serious defects, as Armstrong points out, not the least of which is that these are very awkward primitives to have. Next comes the extreme realist, who thinks universals are all there are, and that particulars are nothing but bundles of universals. This theory also has its share of difficulties, not the least of which is that it seems to be unable to explain what the bundling relation is. Next there is the substance-attribute realist, in which camp Armstrong belongs. Such a realist faces the problem of analyzing similarity in terms of identity of universals. Among particulars this is straightforward; the more universals they have in common, the more similar they are. But what about the universals themselves? Isn't the color red, say, more like orange than it is like green? Armstrong says he is working on this problem, but gives little indication how to solve it. Finally, there is the doctrine of tropes, that is, particular properties and relations which are in themselves simple, the doctrine I favor. The trope nominalist can readily substitute for universals equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes. (No problems analyzing resemblance; unlike the realist, I don't think there is any hope of doing that, and trope nominalism doesn't attempt it.) These will do all the work without having the bizarre problems that beset universals, problem which Armstrong mentions but to which he does not, in my view, give fully satisfying solutions. But whether you agree or disagree, the book is well worth the time of any student of metaphysics.

13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A lucid introduction to a neglected subject., October 12, 1999

By 

John S. Ryan "Scott Ryan" (Cuyahoga Falls, OH) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Focus Series) (Paperback)

D.M. Armstrong has written a charmingly opinionated introduction to a topic that is very much alive despite its seeming neglect: the problem of universals. ("Universals" are repeatable features of reality. The "problem" is: are there any? And if not, why do we seem to think there are?)

Armstrong has devoted a good deal of attention to this topic already (see his earlier work), but in this slim volume he makes some important additions and corrections to his previous views. It is a tribute to his clarity and organizational skills that he manages to do so _while_ he is providing a highly readable introduction to this subject.

For it _is_ highly readable; Armstrong has a gift for clear exposition, and his presentations of all the relevant positions are accurate and eminently fair. The reader may not agree with all of Armstrong's "opinionated" conclusions (I don't), but I don't know of a better introduction to the issues Armstrong is drawing those conclusions _about_.

Another nice volume to place alongside this one is the collection _Properties_, edited by D.H. Mellor (and also available through Amazon). The two together are the equivalent of a thorough undergraduate- or beginning-graduate-level course in the theory of universals.

For a more general introduction, try Michael Loux's _Metaphysics_. And, for a much-neglected attempted solution to the problem of universals, see Brand Blanshard's _Reason And Analysis_.

8 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Readable Introduction, January 5, 2004

By 

Steve Jackson "stevejackson100atyahoocom" (New England) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Focus Series) (Hardcover)

If, like many people, your first introduction to philosophy came through the writings of Ayn Rand, you might have a significant amount of "unlearning" to do. Although Rand had some interesting things to say (generally limited to culture and politics), her writings in purely technical areas of philosophy are highly problematic and at times grossly ill informed. Her discussion of the "problem of universals" is paradigmatic.

The problem of universals is, contrary to Rand, a problem of metaphysics, not epistemology. Why's that? Because it concerns the nature of reality and whether or not there exists something beyond "particulars," something which "instantiates" these particulars. For example, there are many objects (particulars)that are red. But where (if anywhere) is "redness" (a universal)? That's a metaphysical, not an epistemological question. And, contrary to Rand, there are only two theories of universals: nominalism and realism. (Alternative theories, such as conceptualism, are versions of nominalism, generally speaking.) Rand's theory, it turns out, is best seen as a version of moderate nominalism.

I don't know of an introductory work on this subject that is suited for someone without much knowledge of philosophy. However, D.M. Armstrong's UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION is a good place to start if you have some background in philosophy (or are willing to work a little harder than usual).

I've also purchased J.P. Moreland's UNIVERSALS which is even more advanced and takes issue with Armstrong on certain points.