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Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution

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A fascinating and revealing look at the creation of the United States constitution. Holton explores how much of the important events and causes of the convention that created our constitution are ignored in historical accounts. This book is an attempt to rectify that in some measure. Holton describes in detail what he believes the primary reason behind the framer's intent, the economic failure of the Confederation and the democracy of the States. The constitution was written to make the country less democratic and remove from the people the ability to get out of debt (through the courts or printing money) In doing so it created a elitist government that had to appear non-elitist. Holton says that in the end, the underdogs, the farmers, won because our nation isn't as elitist as it could have been. I tend to disagree with his conclusions... Still an excellent read that showed me a part of history I was unaware of.

A great read for the liberty minded!

The nature of the Constitution, as well as the intention of its framers, has long been debated by historians. "Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution" offers an interesting and instructive new perspective on this debate by suggesting that what emerged from the Constitutional convention and its ratification was especially democratic not so much because of the majority of the efforts of the framers themselves--although they did believe in basic democratic principles--but because of opponents to the Constitution who worked hard for concessions and protections that have been critical to the effective functioning of the nation since that time.

In essence, author Woody Holton, professor of history at the University of Richmond, asserts that critical cadre of such advocates was a part of the convention in Philadelphia drafting the Constitution but even more emerged in the various states during the ratification debates. The author makes a compelling case for the success of these individuals in juggling a variety of competing interests while constructing a bulwark that would preserve personal liberty. It was these "unruly Americans," in the author's phraseology, which ensured individual rights. He analyzes and celebrates the actions of these people to rise up and take action when those in powerful positions would seek to curtail liberty.

This book, of course, is very much a work of its time and place. The author's juxtaposition of political perspectives and their conflict over a cornerstone of democratic principles--individual rights and liberty--offers an analogy for our own day and the efforts to curtail civil liberties in the aftermath of 9/11.

This history, told mostly from the vantage point of the average colonial American, rather than from the traditional vantage point of the landed gentry, has a lot to offer in untwisting the mythology of how our Constitution came about.

It is basically a story about the chaos that ensued when all the contending forces -- from the grassroots upwards are thrown into the mix; and all side's views and interests are taken into account. What ensued in 1787 was not a pretty picture. That the author was able to capture this unruliness is a tribute to his skill, and in the end is a much fuller, much more honest and thus a more believable history than the sugarcoated version we have come to accept and revere as the true national story.

Woody Holton is not the first, the only, nor will he be the last historian to note that our founding fathers were an aristocratic and very much anti-democratic bunch, who were as careful and skillful at protecting their own economic interests as they were concerned about shaping a "people's democracy" through the details of the Constitution. And while this book does not go so far as to suggest that the overlapping interests of the landed gentry amounted to a silent reactionary conspiracy, as Charles Beard does in his "An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution," or as Howard Zinn leaves hanging in the air in his "A People's History of the United States," it does leave plenty of room for the careful reader to draw his own speculative conclusions.

The crux of the matter (and of the book) is that due to the rebellious attitudes and actions of the average colonial citizen, the framers (representing the interests mostly of the landed gentry) were worried about the post-revolutionary slide into "a real people's democracy." Without the heavy-handed intervention of the framers, the average colonial Joe-blow would have exercised an even greater influence over state and national policies than that granted them by the compromises that eventually ended in the Constitution that we now have. Whether the alternative would have been better than what we have, is arguable.

Correctly, Holton makes these average colonial citizens, the real "unsung heroes" of the Constitution, as it was their tenacity and forbearance, their refusal to be dictated to and looked down upon, their agitation in the streets as often as necessary to defend what they viewed as their inherent rights and interests that led to the Constitution we now have. Shay's rebellion is just the most "written about" of the many rebellions that took place during those very hectic times.

As one would expect, most of the debate, and the subtext of the competing interests, were shrouded in economic complexity, arcania and details of that era. For it is at this level that the democracy we have come to enjoy really gets played out. Altogether, Horton's rendition makes us better understand why we are still caught up in the same time warp, with the moneyed interests still exercising undue influence over national policy. Pulling this off without leaving the reader with the feeling that he had an axe to grind was no mean trick, and makes for very interesting reading to boot. Five Stars

Imagine this conundrum; governments, both state and national, pay their debts and bills with bonds, scrip, and promissory notes instead of hard currency or gold and silver coin. And then these same governments turn around and demand tax payments to themselves in hard currency or gold ONLY.(And very HIGH tax payments to boot!)

As one might intuit, this scenario is a prescription for financial distress if not out right rebellion and this is precisely what occurred in the thirteen states during the period when the Articles of Confederation were in effect. Mobs of ex-soldiers and foreclosed upon taxpayers laid siege to state legislatures demanding relief [p.148], closed courts to prevent foreclosures, and otherwise engaged in massive grass root resistance to tax collection efforts [p.153]. The worst of it being the Shay's Rebellion in western Massachusetts in 1786 [p.11].

Holton's thesis is that the economic elites of the new American state were terrified by all this and set out to take the people's hands off the levers of power to the greatest extent possible. It sure didn't hurt that many, many of the constitution's proponents (and their families and friends) were bondholders, creditors, and land speculators either, notes Holton, who follows in the "Cui Bono" school of economic history and is solidly in the tradition of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of The United States by Charles A. Beard (1913) and People's History of the United States: 1492 to Present (P.S.) by Howard Zinn (1980) [p.157].

The constitution that the ruling elites foisted on the American people to supplant the Articles says Holton, "...managed to construct a national government that was considerably less democratic than even the most conservative of the state constitutions" [p.211].

Some of the previous reviewers have made the criticism that Holton should have explained the arcana of institutional debt arrangements of those days better. I disagree. Holton explains these things well enough for most laymen to understand and going into greater detail would only interrupt the narrative flow to no great benefit.

I recommend this book as did the National Book Award nomination committee which selected it as one of the finalists for 2007.

The general story told in school - original US articles of confederation weak, needed to form a strong national government, Constitution created. Everyone happy. Rah rah rah. As in most stories like this, the actual tale of the formation of a new government is trickier, with multiple factions and views involved.
Most of the US constitution issues involves debt structures and taxation, which are complex issues, particularly since 18th century finance was a little different than current issues. The author takes on communicating this complex task admirably. His thesis, that the constitution ended up a balance of the defense of elitist economic interests and individual rights for all, particularly with the insistence of the addition of the bill of rights.
The overall tone of the book, though with a alternate version of history, is surprisingly not harsh, rather breezy, and sometimes amusing.
I highly recommend this book along with more traditional texts regarding the creation of the US constitution.

A lot of myth surrounds the American founding. It is not uncommon for many to see a continuum from the Declaration to the Constitution with liberty, freedom, and democracy being solidified along the way. But the exhilaration and potential for empowerment felt in 1776 had largely dissipated by the middle 1780s, as well as the commonality of purpose between elites and others. The defeat of England brought with it economic and political discord. This book discusses at length the economic hard times that were pervasive in the thirteen states dating at least from the last battle of the Revolutionary War in 1781, the attempts to deal with those problems ranging from self-help to legislation, and the impact of those developments on calling for a constitutional convention and the subsequent provisions of the US Constitution.

The states under the Articles of Confederation were not on a sound financial footing when the War broke out. The currency, certificates, bonds, etc that were issued to pay soldiers and buy supplies greatly depreciated over the next several years. In addition, the hard money supply dried up. Upon discharge, soldiers were forced to sell their certificates at steep discounts to speculators. Both creditors and bondholders insisted on payment of debts and interest on bonds. State governments raised taxes primarily to pay that interest.

Farmers and artisans, especially in light of a lack of circulating currency, were faced with both debts and taxes that they could not pay. Widespread foreclosures and confiscation of property administered by local sheriffs were the result. But those middling folks felt more victimized than deficient in compliance. The huge rate of return that speculators got on discounted bonds was especially irksome. The people living mostly in the western part of the states forcibly obstructed courts, sheriffs, and auctions and demanded that legislatures give some measure of debt and tax relief, as well as reintroduce paper money. Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786/87 is the foremost example of citizen self-help.

The ineffectualness of the Articles of Confederation coupled with what elites saw as irresponsibility and too much democracy on the part of average people and state assemblies precipitated a constitutional convention in May, 1787. The author discusses the balancing act of the elites of the Convention (virtually all lawyers, merchants, and large landowners) in curtailing democracy while appearing to secure it. For example, the provision for people electing members of the lower house of Congress was offset by large electoral districts, which diminishes the potential impact of interest groups, like debt-ridden farmers. Although states could no longer issue currency or give relief to debtors, the newly established right of the federal government to collect import taxes greatly reduced onerous individual tax burdens. Most of the Convention delegates were more concerned with what provisions could get through the state ratifying conventions, than any particular concern for democracy.

The book is a corrective to the usual discussions on the Constitution making process. The author is not concerned with day-to-day Convention affairs. His concern is with the underlying economic and political situation leading to the Convention and the general thinking of the delegates. The detailing of the financial hard times consumes much of the book but is a bit muddled, scattered, and repetitious, but nonetheless is informative. Also, it seems that the author overstates the impact that the people had on the final version of the Constitution, despite any unruliness. The founders actually made few concessions to democracy. The anti-Federalists hardly took up the cause of democracy; they were from the same class as the Federalists, but preferred to exercise their power on a state level.

Woody Holton's previous book, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture), is a classic account of the coming of the American Revolution. Here, Holton carries his story from Independence to the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution, and in fine style.

The form of the federal Constitution owes much to the role played in American politics and society in the 1770s and '80s by common folk, particularly debtors and taxpayers, Holton demonstrates. Peter S. Onuf and Herbert Sloan noted decades ago that James Madison's desire for federal reform owed much to his inability to contend with Patrick Henry at the state level, and the merit of Holton's book is to prove that Madison was far from alone. The Federalist movement of those years was in opposition to the heavy democratization of state governments that resulted from the American Revolution.

Check the headlines: the Federal Government is in many ways impervious to public opinion. (Polls have shown that people opposed the Bush-Bernanke Billionaire Bailout and that they've wanted the U.S. out of Iraq for several years.) Holton demonstrates that, at least insofar as leading nationalists in Philadelphia were concerned, it was supposed to be that way.

I think that Holton errs in equating nationalists with the Philadelphia Convention as a whole -- that is, in not noting the significance of Madison's defeats on several important issues in Philadelphia. For him, Madison's convention defeats were simple tactical adjustments, and the omission of provisions he favored was mere window-dressing for the achievement of elitist goals by other means. He seems to buy the idea of a Platonic ideal of the Constitution that is different from the version of it that the people were sold in the ratification dispute. (For that argument, see The Politically Incorrect Guide(tm) to the Constitution (Politically Incorrect Guides)).

While I disagree with him there, Holton's account is well worth reading. It shows readers that the main line of Federalist thought, which ultimately achieved dominance through the agency of John Marshall's Supreme Court, represented the betrayal of the American Revolution. Let us hope that he doesn't stop at that conclusion, but follows this argument into the nineteenth century.

Did the Federal Constitution of 1787 rescue or betray the Revolution? And in either case, which did the Framers intend? Both sides of those questions have been earnestly and intelligently advocated by scholars of our times, and both viewpoints were explicitly argued by the supporters and opponents of ratification in 1788-89. Woody Holton is not so foolish as to try to answer the questions conclusively in his study of "The Origins of the Constitution". Instead, he determinedly makes the case for both viewpoints as the case was made by contemporaries of the Founders; he does so by examining the financial/fiscal conditions of the years between the end of the Revolution and the framing of the new Constitution, as well as "listening" to the analyses of those conditions by people who experienced them in radically different ways. This was no easy task, the research that Holton put into the book "Unruly Americans". Don't expect any kind of lightweight popularizing if you decide to read this book or Holton's extremely significant earlier book "Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Salves, and the Making of the American revolution in Virginia." Holton, by the way, is a professor of history at the University of Richmond.

One thing is virtually indisputable. Almost nobody was satisfied with the governance of the 13 liberated states under the structure called the Articles of Confederation. But the dissatisfaction wasn't only with the federal governance; it was more vociferously directed toward the governance of each of the states. It's hardly flagrant revisionism in 2010 CE to maintain that the Constitution of 1787 was a "conservative backlash" against runaway democracy unleashed by the Revolution itself. In fact, that's essentially the orthodoxy historical dogma since the work of Charles Beard early in the 20th C. Woody Holton acknowledges that position from the onset, but reveals that his research has led him to a more nuanced conclusion: that it was the perception of unbridled 'leveling' by the 13 states' governments which generated the desires of "leading men" to construct a stronger federal government. In other words, for Madison and the others who assembled to frame a new constitution, the chief goal was to restrain States' Rights!

So... the greatest pertinence of Holton's analysis should be the light it sheds on the hot-button question of "original intent" that roils politics in the USA today. In many ways, Holton reveals, the furious divisions over the balance of relations between the states and the federal government already existed in the 1780s. Of course, the side taken by anyone, ever, on the issue of States' Rights has always depended on "interests". The defense of slavery was the most obvious and inflammatory interest from the very start, but Holton discovers an economic dynamic -- in very simplified terms, the debtors versus the debt-holders -- that divided opinion internally in each of the 13 former colonies.

There are quite a number of "amusing" ironies to be noted in the "States' Rights" arguments against a powerful federal government, ev n before that central government was established:
* prior to 1787, it was generally the Rich who adamantly denounced "tax relief" by the various state governments. But it has to be understood that the tax relief of the 1780s was inherently at the expense of bond holders and speculators.
* the States' Rights position was usually associated with a tolerance for inflation, for the issuance of paper money, as a means of equalizing wealth through a kind of indirect taxation.
* the supporters of the state governments, and therefore opponents of the federal, generally favored "easy" immigration and feared that a tighter-money federal government would discourage immigration and disrupt the supply of labor as well as stifle development of new lands.
* central to the political thinking of States' Rights advocates, those who wanted the state governments to be even more 'democratic', was the view that a "republican' government could only thrive in a climate of rough economic equality; thus the most articulate States' Rights spokesmen openly supported measures to "redistribute" property and to discourage "concentration" of wealth! And this objective of "redistribution" could, in their minds, be achieved most efficiently by state governments maximally answerable to the broad electorate. Thus, many strong states' rights proponents also advocated elimination of the state senates (i.e. unicameral legislatures), strict 51% majority rule on all legislation including tax proposals, and abolishment of gubernatorial/executive veto powers.

For a tightly focused academic study, Holton's "Unruly Americans" manages to spare pages here and there for wide-ranging insights. One of the best chapters of the book treats the cultural paradigm of "sentiment" that both sides of the debate over debt and taxes invoked. Holton's reflections on Adam Smith are extremely enlightening; in fact, he has convinced this reader that Smith's economic thinking is incomplete and incomprehensible without taking account of Smith's other great book, "A Theory of Moral Sentiments". Holton also casts his net over the implications of the post-Revolution social turmoil for changes in expectations of equality -- of the poor, of slaves and freed slaves, and especially of women. The accounts and activities of Abigail Adams, an astute self-interested bond speculator, form a key resource for Holton's research.

I recommend both of Woody Holton's books enthusiastically, for all readers interested in American history and the deep roots of the polarization that typifies American politics today, despite the seeming tweedle-dee/tweedle-dum nature of the two political parties.

This is an excellent, well-needed revisionist history of the creation of the Constitution.

While author Woody Holton doesn't go as far as Charles Beard in 1913 and call the Founding Fathers "economic royalists," he does clearly state (and demonstrate with plenty of evidence) that economic issues, and for one class of people, were probably the ultimately concern that led to the Constitutional Convention.

You've maybe heard of Shays' Rebellion in 1786 Massachusetts? Just one of many, many actions in most colonies at the local and regional level. States jacked taxes so high they were four times as high, per capita, as at Revolution 1775. And, most states' legislatures wouldn't print enough cheap paper money to appease farmers and other debtors, who, if not actually marching on state capitals, worked overtime to prevent sheriff's and county courts from selling off properties at debtors' auctions.

In other words, Holton presents the 1780s as William Jennings Bryan's 1896 America writ even larger. And, the Federalist founders as anti-Democrats worried about a debtors' revolt.

Time after time, Holton states the founders saw Article I, Section 10, which prevents states from printing paper money, as a keystone of the new constitution.

As far as mechanisms of government, he re-presents words of numerous Founders indicating their fear of true democracy, in part because they were worried debtors would continue to press governments for cheap money. That's why they cut the actual number of members in the first House in half, to 65, from Madison's original proposal of 130. They thought that the well-to-do could better control politics the larger the population represented by each Congressman. That's also why they didn't mandate single-member districts (read the Constitution, it's not in there), allowing statewide elections.

"Insure democratic tranquility"? Against mob action.

"Promote justice"? Against debtors wanting cheap money.

And, contrary to Publishers' Weekly, Holton does NOT call the Constitution a "democratic document."

Page 273: "The Framers designed the Federal government to be much less accessible than it seems."

The author (no relation to reviewer) hearkens back to a Progressive (perhaps even populist) tradition in history that goes back to Charles Beard et al and the economic interpretation of the Constitution's framers of 1787. Unruly Americans focuses on the backlash against state governments' fiscal policies in the 1780s, which were designed to pay down states' bond debts at the expense of farmers and other "small folk" who possessed not the means to pay the taxes levied on them. Most are familiar with Shays' Rebellion and its causes; Woody Holton argues that such rebellions were much more widespread than previously thought. More importantly , Woody Holton argues that historians and Constitutional scholars have neglected to incorporate the extensive effect these grumblings had on the US Constitution at its framing, and have perhaps taken too much at face value the Federalist argument that debtor relief laws were financially reckless.

Woody Holton provides a interesting thesis: that what he calls "unruly Americans" contributed to the writing of the US Constitution by the opposition to the Framers' designs. This book is primarily an economic rather than a political history, and so focuses on such arcane issues as bonds and currency. The book advances its thesis primarily through inferences--that the atmosphere engendered by the controversies over fiscal policies forced the Founders to rein in some of their more ambitious ideas to pare down democracy, nay even to remove democracy from the new national government.

Interesting enough for this book being in the Progressive tradition, the author does not really engage some contemporary arguments about the Constitution until the epilogue; given the importance that Americans place on the Constitution, it would have been better to see these arguments incorporated earlier in the book.