24 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Flawed by Factual Errors, March 24, 2007
This review is from: Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Issues in Low Intensity Conflict) (Hardcover)
I've heard numerous times that this is the best book on Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. led invasion of Grenada. If so, this makes me sad.
As a participant of the operation (I was eating my wife's birthday cake when I received the alert notice to go) I bring an eyewitness perspective to many of the events the author describes. I was a Sergeant assigned as a gunner to a howitzer section with Battery B, 1/320th FA (Airborne), 82nd Airborne Division. We were part of the first battalion task force from the 82nd to deploy to the island.
Most accounts of the battle have been flawed - most unable to even get the order of battle right. Truth is like a fine suit, if one thread comes loose, the entire garment can unravel. Others have either hyped the battle to the point of being a mini-Iwo Jima, or worse, demeaned it to the point of being a bad joke. I believe both points of view are both wrong - and unfair.
So, having heard about Major Adkins' book on the subject, learning he had been there, and how good it was, I approached this work with some anticipation. There were many questions in my mind which have been unanswered, lo this past (has it really been that long?) twenty-four years; I longed for a good book with an overall point of view to make some of the things make sense. After all, I was a witness to these events, but I had a worm's eye view.
And indeed, when I first opened Major Adkin's book I was satisfied. He paints a compelling story of the events leading up to the operation. We were never really briefed on the "why" of why we went, in our briefings. I was aware from our threat briefing that there was unrest on the island, the government had been overthrown, and there was concern for the safety of American students on the island. However, Adkins does an admirable job of filling in the gaps.
I am grateful to Major Adkins for making a clear argument that the bombing in Beirut had little or nothing to do with Reagan's decision to go into Grenada. This has been much brought up by those who would love to tarnish Reagan's legacy as President.
However, I am disturbed when Adkins describes actions in which I was a participant, and I find his description of events don't match my recollections. If I'm going to criticize hs work, it's only fair I back up my criticism with facts so let me bring up some cases in point:
He does an excellent job in describing the confusion surrounding the deployment. In my pocket I had a Xeroxed tourist map of the island (which I now wish I had kept), as there were no military maps available. When I boarded my aircraft as senior man on board I was told we were going to Barbados to link up and organize with the rest of our unit before either jumping or airmobiling in to Grenada. Imagine my surprise when I landed on Grenada in the middle of sniper fire. That was Urgent Fury.
Here is where I begin to part ways with Major Adkin's account of the battle. He describes a house full of snipers overlooking the airport being blasted by Navy A-7 Corsairs. I personally witnessed the destruction of that house within moments of my arrival by one of our howitzers in direct fire.
I also disagree with his account of the rescue of students at the Grand Anse campus. My battery fired the artillery prep for that mission. I am aware of no Naval air or surface gunfire support for that mission. There was a genuine fear of hitting the students or collateral damage, which we did our best to keep at a minimum. This would also explain his swipe at how "slow" we moved. We were under orders to win the hearts and minds of the Grenadian people; you don't do it by blitzing urban areas and wiping out everything in your path. Frustrating for a soldier, but a political necessity.
His assertion we left our aiming circles behind when we deployed is not only untrue, but ludicrous. I don't know where he heard that from. As a gunner I was responsible for "laying" my piece for azimuth of fire. It was Division Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for both battery commanders - and Executive Officers of firing batteries to jump in with an Aiming Circle strapped to their legs if we jumped in. I personally saw our aiming circles on the island and used them to lay my piece. Even if we had left the circles behind we could have done just as good a job using a compass.
He blames the "inaccurate" on Calvigny Point to the lack of aiming circles on the island. How then, did we do such a great job on Grand Anse? If we did miss the target as he says, it was due to bad maps, not negligence on the part of our commanders. Even then, his story of the commander in the chopper railing helplessly because he couldn't correct our fire rings false. We had fire support teams with the infantry calling our fire. The bombardment lasted over 30 minutes! If we had been missing, our FIST teams would have corrected our fire.
I have often wondered if the story of our rounds falling in the sea came from the fact that the 319th FA who were left on the island as part of the occupation force, had to fire several thousand rounds of ammunition into the sea after the battle because the condition they were in rendered them unsafe to transport.
His order of battle lists 2/508th as being part of the 2nd Brigade also leads me to question his veracity elsewhere. The 2/508th was part of the 1st Brigade, and was deployed with a company of one of the battalions of the 504th (I don't recall which battalion, though). To my knowledge they were never part of our brigade, either tactically or administratively.
I agree with Major Adkins the operation was bureaucratic SNAFU at the top. However, he appears to relish every mistake made by the American high command while giving short shrift to the things done right at the bottom. Perhaps I am overly sensitive to criticism after enduring years of it. But one must remember, we hadn't been to war in over ten years; many of the things learned in Vietnam were forgotten in the years of peace between. The military had just come out of at least four years neglect from 1977 -1981, morale had been low, readiness at an all-time low.
As a former commander of the 82nd MG James Lindsay (who I wished had commanded us in Grenada) was fond of saying, "We have eighteen hours to go to war. That's not a lot of time to get smarter, faster, or better - you go with what you got!" Unlike soldiers in most other wars, we didn't have time to learn from our mistakes. We went with what we had. Major Adkins attributes our victory to pure dumb luck. I've never been much of a believer in dumb luck. I discovered one makes his own luck, usually. I think the troopers and marines on that island made ours.
He appears to have an open disdain, even dislike for the troopers of the 82nd. He neglects to mention the two engineers from the 82nd who jumped in with the rangers and were instrumental in clearing the wreckage from the airstrip in a timely manner. It is true, that at first, there was problem keeping the guys in proper uniforms. It was hot, we were, indeed, clothed in uniforms ill-suited for a tropical environment (you go with what you got), as an NCO I insisted that my troops at least keep their helmets and flak vests on and that they not have their M-16A1 any farther than arms' length from them at all times. I believe most NCOs got the guys in line fairly quick. The "magic" helmet, which saved a trooper's life by stopping an AK bullet helped immensely. I never had a problem getting my guys to keep their helmets on after that was passed around.
He does mention the reason the marines were able to move so quickly on the island was the fact they met little or no opposition in the north, while we faced the brunt of the opposition and were moving through an urban environment with strict orders to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. But we were moving. After Calvigny, the artillery's role was to "lay" on targets to be ready to fire if needed as the infantry would move into a new area and clear it. When the area was declared "safe" we would adjust accordingly to the next area. We did this frequently. Someone was moving.
There is also some discussion as to the sheer numbers of troops sent to the island. I appreciate his explanation of the reason, though I don't remember him mentioning another real possibility that occurred to us on the island- the idea that Castro might have tried to reinforce his Grenadian allies. Remember, at the time we didn't know what the relationship between Castro and the Coard faction was, we were told by the Grenadian people that the Cubans had helped the PRA terrorize the people. I was told this personally by Grenadian citizens who were grateful we came.
When our current leaders are being criticized for not sending enough troops to Iraq, pardon me if I scratch my head in confusion. The Iraq war is being criticized for taking too long and and causing too many casualties, Grenada is ridiculed because it was over too fast and didn't cause many casualties. Where's the logic in that?
His book, written in 1989, criticizes the Army people for wanting to eliminate every pocket of resistance instead of moving rapidly around them and driving on to the main objective. Reading the book in 2007, please excuse me if I find his criticism ironic because our operation in Iraq in 2003 is being criticized for the exact opposite reason: our troops bypassed pockets of resistance allowing them to melt into the landscape and organize a guerilla/terrorist resistance. Perhaps Iraq now proves our commanders on Grenada to be wise? But what do I know? I'm just a cannon cocker.
Also, the book, written and researched in 1989 could not have known the impact...
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9 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
THE BEST BOOK YET WRITTEN ON THE BATTLE FOR GRENADA, May 8, 1998
By A Customer
This is THE book to learn what happened on Grenada in 1983. This battle overlooked today marked the turning point in the Cold War. This was the first American military victory since the Vietnam War and sent a signal to the Soviets that communist expansion would cease under the Reagen administration. Major Adkin's book covers all of this, and points out the fight centered on the 10,000 foot strategic runway at Point Salines which as proven by the vast quantities of arms captured was the transfer point to all of Latin America for violence.
The book shows how the New Jewel Movement collapsed due to personal jealousies and assassinations leading to a swift U.S. plan to invade, which while not perfect, was necessary rather than delay in order to secure American medical students held hostage from harm. Reading the details he lays out of the U.S. Army Rangers parachuting in under 500 feet--under Cuban anti-aircraft guns---to seize the Point Salines airfield is exilherating and well wriitten, and busts open the Hollywood myths foisted by movies like "Heartbreak Ridge" that marines did the fighting and rescuing when their assignments to the north were uncontested, and without any Americans to be rescued. Adkin shows how the PRA and Cubans were dug in on the beaches waiting for a water landing when The Rangers, then the 82d Airborne Division came from the sky, catching them by surprise. Follow on operations had the Rangers rescuing U.S. medical students using mc and U.S. Army helicopters and the 82d Airborne Division fighting against stiff resistance before fanning out to secure the southern half of the island.
The book doesn't flinch however from tactical details and how things could have been done better. He has maps and drawings of where the actions took place that drive his points home, as well as photographs, to include mc helicopters that were shot down, and the leaders and rivals in the New Jewel movement. Readers will enjoy small points like the Ranger officer who used a signal mirrror t! o mark a Cuban recoilless rifle gun in a building for destruction by a TOW missile.
The point derived from this awesome book is that U.S. forces must be ready to conduct no-notice operations and to be able to come from unexpected directions like parachuting from the AIR as well as conventional sea directions. This book is a must-read for anyone in the military today or who has any interest in modern tactical affairs.
AIRBORNE!!
Mike Sparks 1st Tactical Studies Group (A)
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9 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Excellent Objective Approach to the Grenada Invasion!, April 14, 2003
This review is from: Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Issues in Low Intensity Conflict) (Hardcover)
"We blew them away," a senior White House advisor remarked regarding the overwhelming success of the invasion of Grenada in late 1983. For the first time in history, a democratic nation had crushed a Marxist regime-and did so with few casualties. To the untrained eye, it seemed that the U.S. military had operated flawlessly in defeating the communists in Grenada. However, the British Major Mark Adkin, Commanding Officer of the Caribbean Peace-keeping Force (CPF), contests that theory and counters in his book Urgent Fury that the U.S. armed forces came extremely close to a major political defeat. Adkin asserts that American forces were never in jeopardy of losing the battle for Grenada. However, he believes that the U.S. military command had committed major flaws in the planning and carrying out of Operation Urgent Fury. These leaders narrowly escaped insurmountable American deaths through luck and through the battlefield intuition of lower grade officers.
Adkin's main assertion is that the invasion of Grenada was not the staunching success that the military and the Reagan Administration heralded. Adkin draws out several major accounts of compromised military objectives and traces all of these back to poor planning on a senior officer's part. From the initial invasion on October 25 to the "all-clear" in December, the military units involved were sent out on poorly planned and uncoordinated missions that nearly cost America numerous casualties. Fortunately the U.S. had on its side overwhelming superiority and availability of American fire support to bail out our forces from near defeat.
The invasion of Grenada was divided into two major sections. The first was the U.S. Marine landing in the northern division of the island. The second assault was in the southern portion of the island and was composed of elements from the Navy SEALS, U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, and the 82nd Airborne-the Army's elite paratroop division.
It is in the second assault which Adkin details most in the book. This is because of the fact that it was in the southern portion of the island most of the major complications happened. Adkin has a major bias against the special operations units in the southern assault because he is a member of the British elite and the British and American forces tend to have a friendly rivalry. Adkin's main contention against the American elite units is due to the fact that he was the commander of the third assaulting force on Grenada, the British led CPF. Adkin personally witnessed the planning and carrying out of the invasion of Grenada. Therefore, in Urgent Fury he illustrates just how close America came to shipping home hundreds of body bags.
There are three reoccurring themes in Urgent Fury which show the ineffective leadership of the planners and senior commanders. The first contention the author has is the lack of military intelligence involved in planning the island invasion. The military had not topographical maps of the island and was forced to use outdated British touring maps to plan the invasion. Also, the nature and location of the enemy forces were almost completely unknown to the invading forces. This lack of knowledge resulted in the shooting down of several choppers by Cuban anti-aircraft guns and caused Delta Force to abort two missions. The helicopters simply could not drop the units off in the middle of a firefight.
The second problem was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system. Unlike the fighting elements which were organized to conduct operations independent of one another, communications systems were not allowed such freedom. Adkin believes that communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of that mission. It cannot be said that communications capability itself was abundant. The author cites several dilemmas in the shortages of communications, but the most compelling is the account of the SEAL assault upon the Governor-General's mansion in which the units were pinned down against an overwhelming force heavy machine guns. Hovering above the men fighting were two large gunships which they were unable to contact through the radio. They were forced to use a telephone in the mansion to call their commander at Fort Bragg, N.C. to gain radio access to the gunships. Adkin points out that the fact that these units could not communicate one-to-one could have caused more casualties from enemy and friendly fire.
However, the most shocking and dangerous part of the mission was the fact that the invasion force lacked precise data on the location of the American medical students they were to rescue. Adkin notes that attack planners did not realize that more than a thousand American medical students were spread out over three locations instead of merely at the True Blue campus in the southern tip of the island. When the Rangers counted the students they realized that there were more than four hundred missing. Fortunately for our sake, Adkin asserts, the Marxist forces did not bother with these students. If the enemy had chosen to use the students as human shields, the battle would have been much bloodier on both the military and civilian sides.
The book raises no real objections to the author validity. Adkin fought in Grenada as a commander and gives first hand account. Furthermore, he also uses primary sources from actual after action reports to support his claims on the fallacies of the senior American command. This book has raised doubts on the quality of leadership involved in the Grenada invasion, but does so logically and with thoroughly grounded contextual evidence. The book challenges our perception as to whether we should believe that superior technology always guarantees battlefield success.
In Grenada, American forces had a five to one ratio in manpower and an overwhelming firepower advantage over the Marxists and yet there were multiple opportunities for disaster. We just were lucky. Adkin believes that we cannot trust luck to guide us in future conflicts. In war, the commanders need to be aware of the potential cost of their actions. He believes that there is no excuse for unsound decisions as they are placing men's lives at risk. There is no replacement for real military leadership.
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