Customer Reviews

Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-Day, June 6, 1944

5 star:		(11)
4 star:		(2)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Joseph Balkoski, a historian for the Maryland Army National Guard, is an expert on the 1944 Normandy invasion, as he demonstrated years ago in Up From the Beachhead. However, the US landings on Omaha Beach have tended to overshadow the equally important landings on Utah Beach as Balkoski notes, "the near disaster and shocking casualties on Omaha Beach have tended to dominate historical accounts of the American D-Day experience." In his latest volume, Utah Beach, Balkoski sets out to redress this imbalance. Balkoski covers both the V Corps landings on Utah as well as the supporting airborne assaults by the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions in great detail. In addition, Balkoski corrects some of the errors and misconceptions about Utah Beach that have appeared in both the official history and General Bradley's memoirs. Overall, this volume is a very good effort (although it lacks the incisive comment that made Up From the Beachhead such a valuable contribution) but it does suffer from a lack of German accounts and this is essentially a story told primarily from the US perspective.

Utah Beach consists of 11 chapters, four of which cover the development of the plan up to the movement to Normandy. Nine appendices cover US casualties, order of battle and post-battle awards. In chapter five, about one-third of the way through the book, the US troops begin arriving in Normandy. Balkoski weaves together first-person accounts and bits and pieces from various unit histories to provide a rich narrative on the US airborne landings and subsequent amphibious landings on Utah Beach. To be fair, many of these accounts appear in other books as well, but Balkoski also adds coherence to a very complex operation that other accounts lack. The narrative is also enhanced by two dozen maps that greatly clarify the tactical situation on an almost hour-by-hour basis.

Unfortunately, Balkoski's narrative provides very little from the German perspective, which substantially reduces the value of this book. The omission of German sources is particularly glaring given that a number of other D-Day books written in the past few years have added a great deal to the understanding of German actions on 6 June 1944. Indeed, Balkoski never even takes the time to discuss the actual German resistance nests on Utah Beach, even though forty years ago books by Paul Carrel and Cornelius Ryan both included accounts from the German W-5 nest. Although one of Balkoski's objectives in this book is to expose the inaccuracy of Bradley's statement that the landing on Utah Beach was "a piece of cake," his glossing over of the actual reduction of the German resistance nests on the beach does not support this goal. Nor is it only German sources that are missing from this book. In discussing the airborne drop around Ste. Mere Eglise, Balkoski fails to mention the inadvertent drop of a couple of paratrooper sticks in the town square, their subsequent massacre by the German garrison and Private John Steele's famous hang-up on the church steeple. Indeed, Balkoski never really mentions what happened to the German garrison in the town and merely notes that six paratrooper corpses were hanging in trees when US forces occupied the town.

Reading Balkoski, one gets the impression that the Germans had the means to crush the Utah landings were it not for the efforts of the airborne troops, but this is highly debatable. The Germans were unable to mount any significant counterattacks on D-Day until toward the end of the day and none of these were more than regimental-size. Although Balkoski mentions the German 6th Paratrooper Regiments counterattack against the 101st Airborne, he does not note that this attack cost the Germans the bulk of one battalion. Balkoski is also incorrect in assessing that the US forces were able to breach Hitler's Atlantic Wall on Utah Beach in less than two hours. The Atlantic Wall did not merely consist of the various bunkers and obstacles on the beach itself, but included all the pre-invasion defensive measures in the area, such as the flooded areas that bedeviled US operations in Normandy for days after D-Day. Furthermore, although V Corps punctured a one-mile wide hole in the German defenses at Utah, the march on the eventual goal of Cherbourg would have to push through several belts of coastal defenses around that city. Lately, it has become de rigueur for US historians to condemn the Atlantic Wall as worthless, but the fact is that weakness of German forces in France necessitated such measures and by and large, these measures did cost the Allies time and casualties (these critics ignore the fact that had the Germans possessed more air and tank reserves, the obstacle belts would not have been so easy to breach).

One of the best aspects of this book is that Balkoski includes virtually everyone who participated in the invasion in this sector, including troop carrier crews, the Special Engineer brigade, various corps attachments, the US Navy and even the usually-ignored 90th Infantry Division (which landed a few battalions late on D-Day). As Balkoski notes, the usual claim in the official history that US losses on Utah on D-Day were "fewer than 200" is incorrect since that only included data from the 4th Infantry Division, not the myriad of supporting units. Throughout D-Day, German mines and artillery fire inflicted serious casualties on the packed US units on Utah Beach and surrounding areas. Furthermore, Balkoski notes that when airborne casualties and naval casualties are factored in, the landing on Utah cost a similar number of casualties to Omaha. Overall, Balkoski's latest book is well worth reading for the valuable perspectives that he provides, but the inherent limitations in a book that focuses primarily on the US viewpoint on one day of a 90-day campaign put this book in the "do not use without consulting other sources" category.

This is an excellent book on the "Day of Days" as coined by the film "Band of Brothers". This book fills out what the rest of American paratroops and Utah beach landing beach troops did on this day. Only one page is provided on Easy Company. And, what a story it is! General Teddy Roosevelt walking Utah Beach with a cane and leading the troops ashore, thereby being awarded the Medal of Honor. The officers and troopers of the 82nd airborne taking Ste. Mere Eglise and holding it against numerous German counterattacks. The holding of the bridges over Meridet River (shades of Saving Private Ryan although this story is accurate), stopping a tank attack with a bazooka. The capturing of the four causeways from Utah Beach by the 101st airborne allowing the Utah beach landing troops of the 4th Division to break through. There are many fascinating stories supporting this outline of the events. Yes, this was the Day of Days and this is a great book describing it. A great addition to the author's other great book on Omaha Beach.

Not the same old info, he has a lot of original research. The book is well versed and it doesn't always offer the same tired conclusions. His thoughts on Montgomery were new and gave me something to think about. He also does a better job of explaining why the Americans were so dependent on Artillery vs the Germans who depended on thier machine guns. I think he does a better job than Stephen Ambrose in telling a true history instead of a "best selling story" written for Hollywood/TV. This is a book retired Military who want the real story.

Some of the information is rehashed from his previous books on the subject and they would be better served if written as a volume series so he does not have to repeat himself, but all of his books are worth reading.

Well researched and well written, Utah Beach covers ground that other books have not. It discusses the role of the 4th Division in much greater detail than any other D-Day book I've read, and explains how fortunate they were that the pre-landing air and sea bombardments were more accuarate and effective than those on Omaha beach. Even so, it took much courage to land and move inland under continuous artillery fire from the Germans. This book doesn't offer as much detail about the airborne troops' experience, but that has been pretty well covered in a number of other books. After reading this book and Balkoski's Omaha Beach volume, I was impressed by the extraordinary complexity of the entire D-Day planning, since those books covered only 2 of the 5 beaches involved in the invasion planning. This book is a very worthwhile supplement for serious students of World War II.

With Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944 Joseph Balkoski established himself as a historical researcher/writer to be reckoned with. His 2005 follow up Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 is a welcome companion piece and should set-in-stone Balkoski's reputation as one of the foremost historians on the American experience on D-Day. While Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944 was certainly an engaging scholarly piece of work (this reviewer gave it 5 stars), Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 is even better! Again, Balkoski shows that few present day Second World War historians can compete with him in terms of work done up front from largely primary (oft unpublished) sources to provide the scholarly basis for his writing. Like he did with Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944 Balkoski organizes Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 chronologically from the planning and lead up to D-Day through the day itself, and ending as 6 June 1944 ended. Not surprisingly given the title of the book, it is also temporally focused, dealing entirely (once the para-drops start in the early morning hours of 6 June) with the Utah Beach landing area where the 4th (Ivy) Infantry Division landed at dawn by sea, and the areas on the Cotentin peninsula behind the beachhead where the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions dropped (by `chute or glider) in prior to the seaborne landings. This focused approach provides Balkoski the confined format in which to build his impressively researched and extremely well-written story.

Balkoski's formal prose is given to the first 329 pp. of the book, with very informative Appendix (nine total, over 20 pp) and Notes/Bibliography (21 pp.) sections following. Balkoski covers both the airborne and seaborne portions of the Utah Beach assault fairly equally and thoroughly, and provides ample compelling evidence that contrary to conventional historical wisdom (often perpetuated by writings of the major players themselves, such as Gen. Bradley) Utah Beach was not a simple `walk-over' in comparison to the heralded bloody Omaha. As Balkoski points out the numbers of troops engaged at Utah (when seaborne, airborne and Naval forces in harms way are combined) was only slightly smaller than that engaged at Omaha, and quite contrary to popular belief, the casualties across these troops were on par with those suffered at Omaha, which was largely a seaborne invasion force. Certainly there are differences between the two beach invasions in terms of enemy troops and positions, but as Balkoski argues, in large part the solid invasion preparation, done by VII Corps commander Maj Gen Joseph (`Lightning Joe') Lawton Collins and 4th Inf Div commander Maj Gen Raymond (`Tubby') Barton, lead the `bloodless' (of course a misnomer) victory on Utah Beach as much as anything. Balkoski's research is tremendous and other historian/writers should take note: This is the way to produce a historical piece that will stand the test of time and be among the required `texts' of history students for a long time to come.

In terms of pure enjoyment (aside from the solid scholarly contribution), Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 is a real page-turner. Balkoski is able to weave a largely well-known story into one that is still gripping. He also, by virtue of his probing research, is able to provide enough new material and insight to make this gripping story compelling even to the most versed students of WWII history. This is a book all interested in the American experience in WWII will enjoy reading. The late Prof. Stephen Ambrose is often given great (and deserved) accolade for his abilities to convey the horrors and sacrifice of war to the masses, but Joseph Balkoski deserves similar praise and will hopefully achieve a similar level of `celebrity' for his prowess for historical research/writing.

In the end I can't recommend Utah Beach: The Amphibious Landing and Airborne Operations on D-day, June 6, 1944 highly enough. This book, with it's `companion' Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944, represent a pair of books on the Americans at D-Day that should be read by armchair and professional historians alike. 5 Stars!!!

Most people like the direct quotes from soldiers intermingled with the author's narrative. While I do too, I thought it is a little overdone; hence the one-star deduction from a five-star book. I found myself skimming some of the quote paragraphs to get back to the narrative which is excellent.

If you love the movie Band of Brothers, this book must be read to get a full and detailed feel for what the paratroopers went through, including the 101st.
I also got to appreciate Montgomery a little more. Without his input and direction, D-day probably would have been a lot tougher. I didn't know that before I read the book.

I've been reading WW2 books for over 50 years. This is in the top 10% of those books.

This book is another fine example (like his one on Omaha Beach) of what good research can bring to a book about a historical event. This is not dry academia writing, but is the soldiers' story in the soldiers words. Joseph Balkoski has quotes from the individual solder, sailors, and airmen all the way up to the commanding generals. They are describing what they saw, heard, and felt during the time of the invasion or soon thereafter.

I really enjoyed the descriptions of the battles of the parachute divisions as they struggled to find out where they were and tried to achieve their missions with far less troops than expected. There are many heroes here, not just the ones who were given medals, but also those who actions saved others that they never saw or met afterwards. The book gives a common everyman feel to the battles and shows what men can accomplish when the need is there.

A final note I would like to make about this book is that it makes you want to know what happened the next day and the days that follow. There are many references to soldiers who are killed on June 7th or in the next few weeks. The way the book is written, it makes you want to follow the soldiers all the way up to the liberation of Cherbourg. There are other books that talk about this period, but none of them are written with the same style which draws you into these groups of soldiers and want to know what happened to them.

This book really took me to the battlefield, its as simple as that. Well researched and well written with enough details to make you feel like you were there.
I highly recommed this fine read for anyone interested in the D Day landings and the Paratroop drops behind Utah beach.

Bought this book for a Christmas gift and needed it right away. The book arrived on time in excellent condition. Very happy with purchase and out com of order.

Utah Beach is Joseph Balkoski's next installment after Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944. This book follows the same format as his previous book using firsthand accounts along with his guiding narrative. Unlike most histories, Utah Beach has an ample amount of useful maps to demonstrate the movement described in the narrative. There are also numerous pictures which enhance the story. The book includes several appendixes which provide allied casualties at Utah, listing of Medal of Honor and Distinguished Service Cross Award recipients on D-Day at Utah, listing of the allied units involved in the first wave, listings of the leadership of the parachute regiments, 9th Air Force, and Naval Force U assault ships.

Balkoski starts this history by discussing the inception of the Utah Beach component to the Operation Overlord plans and how the logistics were worked out. Utah Beach was not included in the original invasion plans. It is interesting to see the various politics at work within the Allied military command and Montgomery at work. It is difficult to discern truth from fiction when Montgomery is the subject; however, the information presented here could explain Eisenhower's patience in dealing with Montgomery. In Last Battle: The Classic History of the Battle for Berlin you can see where Eisenhower's patience has worn thin by the later stages of the war.

Utah Beach's focus expands from the more narrow focus of Omaha Beach to discuss the airborne landings of the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions as they were planned to ensure the success of the beach landing. Balkoski describes the founding of the US airborne divisions and its roots from German demonstration. He tells of the uneasiness of committing airborne troops due to disasters in previous engagements. He describes the scattered drops and follows the movements of many of the major groups as they struggle to achieve their aggressive D-Day objectives. You will find yourself impressed by the tenacity of the airborne troops to complete objectives with only small fractions of the expected forces. As another reviewer pointed out, Balkoski's coverage of the airborne landings is not as comprehensive as some other accounts. However, the major movements and battles are discussed enabling the reader to understand how the airborne assault eased the rapid expansion of the beachhead. In fact, the actual landings on the beach are the anticlimax to the enthralling airborne assault. The real focus for the amphibious force is on the 4th Infantry Division's advance to link up with the heavily engaged airborne units.

Balkoski discusses the differences between the two American D-Day invasion assaults. He describes the more effective aerial bombardment using different tactics and naval artillery support where liaisons were able to call in devastating barrages. He discusses the weaker German defensive fortifications and lack of advantageous terrain. He points out the impact of the airborne assault on the enemy organization and ability to commit local reserves against the amphibious assault. How would the assault on Omaha Beach have gone if airborne troops had been deployed in support of the attack? He also explains the importance of the Utah Beach addition to Operation Overlord in providing a solid flank for the Omaha Beach assault while tying up most of the German reserves that were in position to fight on D-Day. But, he attempts to illustrate that the Utah beach landing was not as easy as it has been portrayed by pointing out the casualties suffered by the other parts of the invading force especially the airborne. I think the most important part from studying Utah Beach is the bravery of leaders and soldiers of the infantry to move with all haste to go the aid of their brothers in arms the airborne and for the airborne to hazard overwhelming opposition in order to protect their friends landing on the beaches. Utah Beach proved the costliness in lives of employing airborne troops and their effectiveness in taking targets and causing short-term disruption in the enemy. It also showed the vulnerability of cutoff airborne troops like Millett's lost elements of the 507th. However, this did not prevent Monty from planning the disastrous Operation Market Garden to go one bridge too far. I would recommend Cornelius Ryan's book A Bridge Too Far: The Classic History of the Greatest Battle of World War II on this subject.

My only complaint is the one-sided Allied viewpoint of the story. This follows the same pattern as Omaha Beach. The German units engaged are identified, but with little detail provided. While I still value Balkoski's contribution to the history of Utah Beach, I think this takes away from the story even more so than Omaha Beach because of more numerous reserve units involved over a much larger area. Despite this, I still give the book a strong four stars and recommend it for those interested in World War II. I would also recommend reading Cross-channel attack (United States Army in World War II. The European theater of operations). This book fills in the blanks on the German side. It discusses topics skipped by Balkoski like the German commanders being on a training exercise and away from their commands or explaining that Hitler's concern of the weakness of Cotentin resulted in the 91st Luftlande division being moved to Normandy. Don't get the Barnes & Noble version because it is missing vital maps.