Customer Reviews

The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Vintage)

5 star:		(18)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

The first half of this book is a first rate history lesson on how the modern war fighting practices of Western military powers came about, with special emphasis on Clausewitz, Napoleon, the US Civil War and the Spanish rebellion against Napoleon (which originated the term "guerilla"). Also reviewed are some of the 20th centuries guerilla wars and how they were lost or won (not many of those) by regular armies.

This groundwork laid, the book examines how this framework of army-vs-army warfare is obsolete and is replaced by foreign "wars amongst the people" where the enemy is an irregular, rather than a standard army and where public opinion, both at home and in the country of operation, becomes paramount.

a) The need to "forget" Western concepts of overwhelming firepower in an army vs. army struggle, because no one is going to be silly enough to engage Western armies on that level for a while yet. For example, IED deaths in Iraq are partially caused by the military not taking into account the lack of truly peaceful areas in an insurgency war: soft skinned military transports become targets everywhere. While standard military doctrine thinks in terms of fronts and combat zones allowing for front line heavy armor and unprotected vehicles everywhere else.

Again and again the point is made that a competent enemy does not play to your strengths, but rather tries to exploit your weaknesses and that assuming otherwise is a good way to lose.

b) The need for clear political objectives to supplement military force - "if you gotta use force or station an army somewhere, please think of what you want to achieve with it, in political terms". And the need for the political and military efforts to complement each other. Many pages are devoted to this subject. For example, the 1950's guerilla in Malaysia was defeated, both by military action against the rebels and by offering civilians an attractive political alternative to rebel aims. Malaysia was often an inspiration for Vietnam military strategies, but no credible political system was proposed to, and accepted by, the South Vietnamese.

Clearly, this applies to the US military's success at planning Saddam's defeat, only for its government to totally fail to consider what it would do, politically, once it had achieved its military objectives.

c) The limits, in military terms, of shared command over multinational troops. As in the other previous points, the author draws heavily upon his experiences as a NATO commander in Bosnia.

d) The key contribution, for me, is the need to respect the law, decency, and employ restraint in counterinsurgency warfare. Both for ethical reasons and because brutality and needless civilian deaths only fuel insurgencies and alienate public opinion.

Being interested in military history I liked this book, especially the first half. The later parts were however clearly more aimed at engaging political decision makers, rather than the casual reader as it raised more questions than answers. This motivates my 4, rather than 5, stars.

Rupert Smith is not only a strategic thinker, but a former strategist and military commander. He has written a trully impressive book on the nature of war in the 21st Century which should be read by military professionals everywhere, and taken to heart and used to influence military operations in the pursuit of political goals, but probably won't. More on that at the end.

Smith's book has to do with war paradigms. I disagree with the use of the term, since following Thomas Kuhn it is questionable whether the term can be applied to the social sciences at all, and would prefer to use the term "ideal types" to describe Smith's concepts. Smith is however aware of the pitfalls but insists that we have essentially entered into a new form of war that although linked with the past (as Smith points out, Clausewitz identified the beginnings of this paradigm in the early 19th Century), is diffent from what we knew as "war" before. One will look in vain for buzzwords such as "4th Generation Warfare" or "Network Centric Warfare", since these dubious concepts only confuse the issue rather than clarify.

This new paradigm he describes as "war amongst the people" is related to "guerrilla warfare" and "revolutionary war" but is different from both due to the distinction of ossillating between "conflict" and "confrontation". Also due to the destructive nature of modern weapons, almost all combat in this paradigm takes place at the tactical level. Smith reserves intelligence and policy operations for the operational level.

A regular military force operating in "war amongst the people" must first of all achieve stability and then impose and maintain the rule of law within the political community they are operating. To ruthlessly utilize maximum military force and thus destroy the structures one is attempting to save, kill the people one is attempting win over, is self-defeating and most likely to increase the support of one's opponent.

Smith compares and constrasts "war amongst the people" with the conventional (and in Smith's mind outmoded) paradigm of "industrial war", which also dates from the early 19th Century. An interesting survey of the tactical innovation of industrial warfare runs from Napoleon through to World War II. Smith is not only a theorist of note, but knows his military history as well. "Industrial war", unfortunately serves as the paradigm in which we conceive of war, the weapons of industrial war - tanks, jet fighters, aircraft carriers - are the icons of war, even though the actual wars we wage are completely different than the wars these weapons systems were designed to fight. We fight "wars amongst the people" with the weapons, doctrine, military organization and thinking associated with the old paradigm of "industrial war", and spend a good bit of time defeating our own political purpose in the process.

So, why is this book liable to have little influence? Given the sad state of strategic thought in the US or even UK today, with most military officers and strategic thinkers unable to see outside the boundaries of "industrial war", not to mention their cultural and value assumptions, and the numerous false paths and confusion as to what is going on, we are at a similar situation to that of Ludwig Beck in 1938. He complained bitterly how his officers had lost all concept of the strategic link between military aim (seeing only in terms of military capability) and political purpose, or even attempting to recognize the limits and utility of military force.

Of all the best selling books on the subject, General Smith's is the lone voice of reason currently in strategic thought.

There are 3 things you need to know about this book:

1. There are parts where it's repetitive and he could've used an editor.

2. If you agree with his main premise - that we will no longer (and haven't been for decades) fight nation-state to nation-state (ala WWII) and that it's all going to be battles for what he calls "will of the people" (aka "hearts and minds") - then you can probably skip this book completely unless you want all the detailed why's and how's we got to this point from Napoleon to 2006.

3. The last third of the book is devoted to his approach to start resolving these issues:
- stop building industrial-complex level machines and technology; focus money on information-gathering, intelligence gathering and analysis and building force flexibility
- the military should be used to achieve military goals only; and then the rest of the "hearts and minds" battle turned over to agencies that train for that (in the US, that'd be AID, State dept, Commerce, etc.)
- the only time that the small level non-state enemies we face (insurgents, terrorists, warlords, etc.) are really vulnerable is when they shift from hiding to training and then from training into operations - at those phase points, and thus, information is crucial to determining when so we can strike
- there are no "pat" answers; because every non-state enemy is going to be different, there are no real "if X, then we bring Y+1" types of formulas to figure out what to do
- you need to have the political end-game goal figured out BEFORE you bring in the military (in the case of Iraq today, he argues that we should have figured out what we wanted after the "regime change" to determine how best to use the military and then when to turn it over to someone else because "force" is no longer needed to win hearts & minds).

That said, if you're a fan of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, this book belongs on your shelf.

J. Avellanet, Co-Founder of Cerulean Associates LLC

General Rupert Smith's "The Utility of Force" is an excellent book that explains how modern "war" has evolved from full-scale "industrial war" to modern "war amongst the people." General Smith drew on his long and distinguished military career in the British Army and his own experiences in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Ireland to produce this book. In "The Utility of Force," he brings Clausewitz to the 21st century and attempts to explain why the Western militaries are not always successful.

After an excellent discussion of Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era, and the development of the general staff, Smith traces the evolution of warfare through the 19th century through WWII, tracing the gradual transformation of conflict into total "industrial war." General Smith argues that, although nations still prepared for total war during the Cold War, the "industrial war" that culminated in WWII was made obsolete by the development of nuclear weapons. Smith's overview of military history is solid, but although he interjects Clausewitzian insights and begins to develop his concept of "war amongst the people," at times it is a bit mundane.

The post-WWII world has seen the emergence of "war amongst the people," and this is what Smith argues too many current leaders - political and military - have not adapted to. Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and now Iraq are all examples of war amongst the people. Smith identifies six characteristics of war amongst the people: military force is indecisive without supporting political action; the fight is amongst the people and not on a battlefield; the conflicts are timeless; we fight to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain a military objective; new uses are found for old weapons; and the sides are mostly non-state, both multi-national organizations and non-state parties or groups.

Smith concludes with recommendations on how modern states can adjust to the new paradigm of war amongst the people. He argues that the militaries can transform themselves to fight the new war (he points out that the Impressionist artists were trained as Realists; they used the same tools and medium to see the world anew), although I believe it will be difficult to change the conservative mindset of the modern Western military. Just as importantly, though, political leaders must understand how to employ military force as part of a larger policy and realize that military objectives don't solve the problems of war amongst the people. Finally, Smith concludes that war amongst people is best conducted as an intelligence and information operation.

This is an excellent book, and Smith does a fantastic job tying Clausewitzian concepts into the modern world, although his recommendations at the end of the book are easier to write than to implement. At times this book reads like Wesley Clark, recommending the measured use of force to support political goals; at other times (when describing Smith's command in Bosnia), it reads like General Romeo Dallaire's "Shake Hands with the Devil," as Smith describes the maddening difficulties of commanding a multi-national force that is handicapped by a lack of political will. This book should be read by anyone interested in the modern military or in modern foreign policy or politics.

Smith takes the reader through a well-designed account of the history of war before moving into the current situation facing the commander and the warfighter. I found the focus on the work of Napoleon, Clausewitz and Bismarck revealing and it sets the tone for the next phase of the discussion, focussed on, for eample, the Boer War and the specifics of that conflict. The two World Wars are covered in just enough detail so as to keep the arguments going (appreciated!!) before showing how the Cold War (or rather confrontation) set the scene for our current dilemma. Smith is crisp in his accounts. He builds a clear picture of every stage of the development of conflict and confrontation from the tactical and strategic perspective. The book is essential reading if you want to comment on force design, if you are involved in mission effectiveness studies or even if you want to develop new ideas around doctrine and command and control in a complex environment. As an engineer and scientist involved in simulation based studies of new warfare I found this book supported my growth towards a more holistic view of concepts.

Hindsight is always going to be more clear than trying to predict the future, and in this book where General Smith traces the history of war from the Napoleonic to the current age it is no surprise that he is far more clear and insightful looking backward than he is in looking forward.

The major thesis of his book is that war has shifted from what he calls "War Between the People," typified by separate nation-states fighting till decisive victory on a distinct battlefield, to what he calls "War Amongst the People" which will feature conflict including non nation states, waged indefinitely and indecisively on an amorphous front that includes both physical lands and intangible ones such as the media.

The book is very strong in several regards. First, General Smith's elucidation of Clausewitzian strategy, as well as providing the historical backdrop for when, how and why it was developied, is simply first rate. The biggest lessons drawn from Clausewitz that are still relevant today are that force must be applied to achieve some pre-determined purpose (hence the "utility of force," it is not merely the destruction of your opponent), and the concept of the trinity of government, military and the people. The best way to defeat an enemy is to break this trinity. In War Between the People this could be done conceptually more simply by flat out destroying the enemy military or their government, or perhaps more elegantly by dissolving the people's allegiance to the policies of their government and military, more effective against a democracy such as North Vietnamese efforts to reinforce and inflame the anti-war movement. Second the book's military history from Napoleon to the end of the Cold War is truly outstanding, worth the price of the book itself.

Smith is certainly not alone in sensing a major shift in the type of wars we have found ourselves in for the past nearly two decades now, and in pointing out the intellectual bankruptcy of our "Revolution in Military Affairs," more a techno-advertisement than a strategic realignment of our military forces based on an understanding of our current world and the permanence of human nature. In his new War Amongst the People the Clausewitzian trinity of government, military and people still exists, clearly and distinctly for state actors, but in a much more diffused and maleable way for non state actors such as terrorists. Therefore breaking their trinity becomes a much more confusing and difficult thing to achieve, -but none the less necessary- and much of the military theory for fighting the wars of the past are no longer applicable.

Unfortunately his prescriptions for how to fight our current and future wars, beyond the simple and now hopefully universally agreed upon maxim that your war must have a vision of peace you want to achieve by expending your blood and treasure, are complex and ultimately confusing. Due to being deployed to the Middle East and out of internet access for 6 months I have had to wait that long to write my review for this book, and can barely remember any of his concepts and suggestions for fighting and winning future wars, which doesn't bode well for someone trying to develop a new conceptual framework for our warriors and our society for facing the future. The biggest thing I do remember though is a much more coordinated effort needed between the military, the state department, aid groups, and especially the media. He also appears fatalistic that Wars Amongst the People are essentially intractable and will require a practically permanent peacekeeper presence like we have in the former Yugoslavia, where he commanded forces during the fighting, and developed and employed much of his thinking, and where his final chapters focus. (There is little direct application of this thinking to Iraq and Afghanistan.)

The Utility of Force is an excellent work nonetheless, and highly recommended for people trying to understand the current state of the world and what we can actually do to protect ourselves. For counterpoint the works of Lt. Col. Ralph Peters are suggested too.

Rupert Smith reviews the last 200 years of military history and clearly defines the nature of interstate, industrial war. He correctly identifies the end of the utility of such war as August 5th, 1945 - the day before the Enola Gay dropped her atomic bomb - and goes on to describe the dissonance between defense planning and actual conflicts in the ensuing 60-odd years. He uses the concept of War Among the People as an umbrella concept to describe the actions of guerrillas, revolutionaries, terrorists and other non-state actors; and identifies the people as the key objective in post-industrial war.

He believes that failure to understand the change in the nature and purpose of conflict - on the part of both policy makers and the military - has been at the root of the failure of nations, alliances and coalitions to effectively employ force over the past half-century.

Smith goes on to identify a model for political/military interaction in fighting War Among the People. The model itself is revolutionary, in that it departs from the concept of handing diplomatically insoluble problems over to the military and calls for the employment of diplomacy, force, aid and assistance as an integrated effort. In effect, he calls for 'force structuring' which would include elements of several cabinet departments - not just the military services - under a single theater commander (who probably would not be an officer of any service).

Smith's work is a useful antidote to some of the less disciplined and more technologically oriented discussions of "Fourth Generation Warfare" and "Transformation" that have appeared over the past few years. It is an important work - one that should be required reading for all of the 2008 Presidential candidates.

The book is, as others have noted, not an 'easy' read. It certainly could have been improved by better/more editing; but the content is more than worth the 'slog'.

General Smith's book can be summarized as EXTRAORDINARY. There are probably no more than a handful of generals in our country that understand what Smith is getting at, and that is most unfortunate. For this man has the capacity to completely alter the way we conduct our wars, and our policies, which precede war, but then again, the politicians would have to be listening - wouldn't they?

What Smith does in an absolutely brilliant, seductive, and necessary way is help lift you up to a different level where you can understand for the first time a TEMPLATE to explain how these wars worked. What was the REAL DEAL? What did they have in common?


INDUSTRIAL WAR

The theme of this book is that for hundreds of years, everyone involved in thinking about war had a solid understanding of war as an INDUSTRIAL WAR. This is a war where all the resources of a nation are mobilized, including the industrial capacity of a nation in the action of war. You fight army against army in an open field, if you win, you continue to advance until such time as you dominate the opposing country's capital, and then they capitulate.

First GULF WAR was INDUSTRIAL

The first Gulf War in 1990 was an Industrial War. Saddam's armies had uniforms, tanks, and artillery, fought in formation, and communicated as any industrial army would communicate. In 2003, for the first 29 days of our second invasion into Iraq, we also fought an INDUSTRIAL WAR. We destroyed his army, and marched to the capital Baghdad, the same way we marched to Berlin in World War II.

Once we were successful in destroying Saddam's government however, a new war emerged, what General Smith refers to as WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. Our generals are the best in the world at waging INDUSTRIAL WARS, but they were totally unprepared for this new paradigm. Even though they had spent years fighting this new type of war in Viet Nam, they just continued to imagine to themselves that they were fighting an INDUSTRIAL WAR, and therein lays our problem.


WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE

The author points out that our entire psyche as a country and our military and political leadership thinks in terms of every war, every action as Industrial War. It is this template, this paradigm that has led to serious miscalculations, and even in the case of Viet Nam a most UNSATISFACTORY result.

The new war is called a WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE, similar to Guerilla Wars. It involves an enemy who doesn't wear uniforms, doesn't fight in formations like brigades, regiments, or battalions, and doesn't fight for physical territory like towns and cities. The enemy LIVES WITH INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN, and camouflages himself by blending in. WARS AMONG THE PEOPLE have included:

1) Peninsular War 1808 - 1814
2) Boer War 1899 - 1902
3) The Arab - Ottoman Turk War remember Lawrence of Arabia in 1916
4) Malaysian War
5) Indonesia late 1950's - early 60;s
6) Algerian War late 1950's
7) Viet Nam - 1945 - 1975
8) Iraq 2003 to Present


In the eight instances above, not one of these wars was an INDUSTRIAL WAR. In no instance was mass army pitted against mass army, industrial might against industrial might. Only in Iraq 2003 to Present, during the first 29 days was it an industrial war. After that it became a WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE, and that is where we find ourselves today, with all of its difficulties. To quote Smith, "INDUSTRIAL WAR NO LONGER EXISTS."

What is important to note is that in each instance, a vastly inferior society from the standpoint of industrial might, and military sophistication was able to do well against vastly superior societies in terms of resources.

At different times depending on how quickly the industrialized society REVAMPED its thinking, the industrial society prevailed as in Malaysia and Indonesia. In the Peninsular War, the Spanish guerillas wreaked havoc on the military genius of his age, Napoleon Bonaparte. The guerillas successfully tied down 300,000 of Napoleons prime troops. Think about it, here's a guy Napoleon that ripped apart empires, England, Russia, etc., and now he gets his army tied up in knots by guerilla forces dressed in street clothes for six years in Spain. It's telling you something.

And so the crucial theme you take away from General Smith's book is this concept of the Industrial War being the wrong mindset to think about most military engagements we will be involved in the foreseeable future. We must think in terms of WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. These are the issues according to General Smith we need to reflect on:


A) Don't start a battle you can't supply - During the Civil War, the South could not supply its own army with the necessities of war. The South lost.

B) The enemy is always a reacting being that not only has no intention of falling in with your plans, but will actively be setting out to foil them p9

C) Throughout the Peninsular campaign England's Wellington used his British and Portuguese army by trading SPACE AND TIME. This meant Wellington would concede territory to Napoleon's army, and refused battle except on Wellington's terms. This is exactly what the Iraqi insurgents are doing to us. They are trading space for time. They won't engage except on their own terms, attempting to tire us out, to wait us out.


It will require a new level of thinking by a different breed of American politician who understands the concept of WAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. Do you or I care to make any bet on whether there is any American politician that has this type of thinking? In the interim, the best we can hope for is to READ THIS BOOK, get informed, and tell our fellow citizens about a new way of waging war. Good luck.

Richard Stoyeck

"War no longer exists" states author/general Rupert Smith, who spent some forty years in the British Army and retired in 2002. Indeed, confrontations between mass national armies are unlikely to occur, replaced by diplomatic efforts that hold more promise than military force. Modern examples from armed interventions that have failed to deliver resolution show why modern conflicts need a different kind of analytical focus -one that blends political and military events - rather than a traditional model of warfare fought on battlefields. Coming from a seasoned general, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD holds much hope for the modern world and is a pick not just for military libraries but for general-interest lending collections and college-level holdings strong in social issues, as well.

There are four major works on military strategy. They are, "The Art of War" (Clausewitz), "The Importance of Sea Power on History" (McMahon), "The Art of War"(Sun Tzu), and "The Book of Five Rings"(Miyamoto Mushashi). "The Utility of Force" will most certainly become the fifth. General Smith has clearly outlined the problems and the issues facing the U.S. in the current conflict in Iraq in clear and readable language. For those who want to understand the course of action which should be pursued not only in Iraq, but in the whole Middle East, this book is required reading.